



SUPREME STALEMATES: CHALICES, JACK-O’-LANTERNS, 
AND OTHER STATE HIGH COURT TIEBREAKERS 
DON R. WILLETT† 
High courts + high stakes = high drama. But not always. As the Supreme Court’s 
2015 Term showed, some bombshell cases fizzle rather than dazzle. During the 
fourteen months it took for Justice Antonin Scalia’s successor to arrive at One First 
Street, some of the Term’s most controversial—and consequential—cases divided 4–
4. And when the highest court in the land deadlocks, it issues a dry, nine-word order: 
“The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.” Supreme stalemate. 
That anticlimactic result isn’t inevitable. Indeed, thirty-three states reject 
SCOTUS’s “ties happen” approach, using various substitute-justice mechanisms to 
avert or break legal logjams when their high court is shorthanded. The anti-stalemate 
states differ in four important ways: (1) when fill-in appointments are made; (2) who 
can be appointed; (3) who does the appointing; and (4) how much discretion the 
appointer has. In Louisiana, for example, the court clerk randomly plucks a 
potentially tiebreaking justice’s name, pre-deadlock, from a plastic Halloween Jack-
o’-Lantern. In Texas, the Governor handpicks the temporary justice, post-deadlock, 
knowing exactly which case has stymied the high court. Imagine the President of the 
United States deciding Bush v. Gore by deciding who will decide it! 
This Article, based on original survey research, canvasses impasse resolution in 
all fifty states’ high courts and evaluates the good, bad, and in-between of the sundry 
approaches. How do unsatisfying SCOTUS stalemates compare with what happens 
in state courts of last resort? High-court snarl-ups are a vexing issue, and the state-
by-state details vary widely—and wildly. But this much is clear: Some state 
mechanisms to avoid stalemate are plainly more juris-imprudent than others. 
 
† Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For their careful readings and 
helpful revisions, I thank Mitu Gulati, Evan Young, Ben Aguiñaga, Matt Fisher, Ari Herbert, 
Brittany Bull, Nicholaus Mills, Alexa Gervasi, Michael Cotton, Cristina Squiers, Hope Garber, 
Colleen O’Leary, and Abigail Frisch. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I was in Atlanta for a symposium on Supreme Court transparency when 
the shocking news arrived in a terse Twitter direct message: “Scalia dead.” 
For a generation of legal conservatives, the February 2016 death of Justice 
Antonin Scalia was a devastating philosophical loss. A towering intellectual 
figure, Justice Scalia was the undisputed godfather of the Court’s conservative 
invigoration. His passing portended a seismic, once-in-a-generation altering 
of the High Court’s ideological balance. 
The impact was not just philosophical, but practical. Justice Scalia’s seat 
remained empty for 422 days, the longest-ever opening on the nine-member 
Court. The Nation’s capital was consumed with fractious DEFCON-1 rancor, 
amplified by the impending presidential election, and Justice Scalia’s 
successor had to await President Obama’s successor.1 
 
1 Soon after Justice Scalia’s passing, two constitutional scholars examined the Court’s various 
eight-justice rosters since World War II and concluded that the Court, while “in a tough spot,” had 
weathered such vacancies before and “managed its docket without a hitch.” Josh Blackman & Ilya 
Shapiro, Only Eight Justices? So What, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/only-eight-justices-so-what-1456272088 [https://perma.cc/9LT3-CKR7] 
(noting also that only twenty-five of fifty-four reargued cases ended up 5–4). The Court, they said, 
would not “grind to a halt” but “can easily handle the current vacancy, however long it lasts.” Id. The 
most likely result, they predicted: delayed rulings in a handful of cases. Id. Supreme Court justices 
from both the left and right appeared to agree. Two uniquely qualified authorities, Justices Breyer 
and Alito, similarly remarked that the Court would not be unduly hamstrung in its work. “We’ll miss 
him, but we’ll do our work,” said Justice Breyer. Jon Schuppe, Supreme Court’s Breyer Says Scalia’s Death 
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Political stalemate in turn yielded judicial stalemate. Because SCOTUS has 
no tiebreaking mechanism, divisive cases either lock up 4–4 (thus affirming the 
lower court), linger until a new justice arrives, or resolve in ways that duck the 
more nettlesome issues. Here, a single indefinite vacancy left the Court evenly 
divided in several cases, producing 4–4 nondecisions that resolved nothing.2 
Fast forward to 2020, when the passing of another legal giant, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, sparked an even fiercer confirmation fracas. For the second 
presidential election in a row, the Court instantly became a major campaign 
issue. This time, the stakes were even higher (the prospect of a 6–3 conservative 
supermajority), and the election even nearer (just forty-six days away). Leading 
Democrats openly spoke of “packing” the Supreme Court (expanding its size 
for the first time since 1869) if they captured the White House and Senate.3 
But put aside Court packing—adding seats in hopes of influencing the 
Court’s decisions. What about Court hacking? Not addition but infiltration. 
What if a politician could singlehandedly engineer the outcome of a case? 
Specifically, what if the President could name a fill-in justice to cast a 
tiebreaking vote in a single case? Imagine if President Obama (while the 
“Scalia seat” sat unfilled) or President Trump (had the “Ginsburg seat” 
remained unfilled) had possessed the extraordinary power to appoint a 
 
Won’t Impact Most Votes, NBC (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/supreme-court-s-breyer-says-scalia-s-death-won-t-n525856 [https://perma.cc/HUA2-ZHQ5]. 
“We will deal with it,” replied Justice Alito when asked about Senate Republicans’ determination not 
to advance any nominee during the 2016 election year. Alito: Supreme Court Will Find a Way to Do Its 
Work with 8 Justices, CBS (Feb. 26, 2016, 4:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alito-supreme-
court-will-find-a-way-to-do-its-work-with-8-justices [https://perma.cc/55LX-AWLV]; but see Katie 
Reilly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Suggests Senate Should Confirm Merrick Garland in Lame-Duck Session, TIME 
(Oct. 12, 2016, 4:22 PM), https://time.com/4527889/ruth-bader-ginsburg-merrick-garland-
confirmation [https://perma.cc/U8AM-BV8M] (“Eight is not a good number for a collegial body that 
sometimes disagrees.”). 
2 Even before Justice Scalia’s passing, the Court was at risk of deadlock over a recurring 
controversy: the constitutionality of racial preferences in college admissions. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (considering an eight-year-old case making its second trip to the High 
Court). Justice Kagan recused herself, likely given her work on the case while serving as Solicitor 
General. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Justice Kagan’s 
Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-
students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals [https://perma.cc/PS6W-H7AZ] 
(suggesting reasons for Justice Kagan’s recusal). A Kagan-less Court might have split 4–4 over race-
based admissions, but after Justice Scalia died, the Court proceeded with seven justices and divided 4–
3 in favor of racial preferences. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198. 
3 See Emily Jacobs, Top Democrats threaten to pack Supreme Court if Trump Fills RBG Seat, NY 
POST (Sept. 21, 2020, 8:13 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/09/21/top-democrats-threaten-to-pack-
supreme-court-if-trump-fills-seat [https://perma.cc/CH7G-BZX5] (reporting on Democratic 
support for court packing) (quoting, among others, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, House 
Judiciary Chairman Jerrold Nadler, and former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder). 
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substitute justice to break 4–4 deadlocks.4 How would that strike our finicky 
Framers, who preferred to divide power rather than concentrate it? Such 
singular clout seems unthinkable. One might hope, however naively, that a 
President would nobly refuse to game the system by naming a “sure thing” 
temporary justice. But could any flesh-and-blood politician, if given such an 
extraordinary prerogative, withstand the lure of putting a finger (or an anvil) 
on the scale, deciding the case by deciding who will decide the case? 
Consider this Mother of All Hypotheticals: Bush v. Gore, with President 
Clinton (a Democrat) selecting a tiebreaking justice to decide whether 
George W. Bush (the Republican candidate) or Al Gore (his own vice 
president) will succeed him. Or recall Spring 2012 when the Court was first 
weighing the constitutional fate of President Obama’s signature domestic 
achievement, the Affordable Care Act.5 Assume that Justice Elena Kagan, 
who was Solicitor General when the ACA was debated and passed and whose 
office was involved in litigation strategy, had recused herself.6 Presumably, 
the High Court would’ve deadlocked 4–4. Under a President-picks tiebreaker 
system, President Obama would’ve had the astonishing power to choose who 
decided whether the cornerstone of his presidential legacy lived or died. 
These hypotheticals may seem outlandish or otherworldly. But that’s 
precisely the system used in my home state of Texas. What sounds hysterical 
for SCOTUS is historical for SCOTX. When the Supreme Court of Texas 
locks up 4–4, the Governor alone chooses a temporary, one-case-only 
tiebreaking justice.7 More remarkable, the Governor knows not just that a case 
is tied, but which case is tied. As a constitutional matter, the Governorship of 
Texas is relatively weak.8 But this perk is unparalleled. No other Governor in 
America boasts such unilateral power—carte blanche license to, essentially, 
decide an identifiable supreme court case by handpicking the tiebreaking vote.9 
 
4 Justice Ginsburg’s successor, Justice Barrett, was swiftly confirmed. But the temporarily 
shorthanded Court did split 4–4 in an important election case, thus affirming a ruling from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that had extended the deadline for counting some mailed ballots. 
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Tie Gives Pennsylvania More Time to Tally Some Votes (Nov. 4, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/us/supreme-court-pennsylvania-voting.html 
[https://perma.cc/XVC4-4UNS]. 
5 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
6 See Wermiel, supra note 2. 
7 See infra Subsection II.B.2.b. 
8 See, e.g., Paul Burka, The Terminator, TEXAS MONTHLY (Dec. 2009), 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/the-terminator [https://perma.cc/29V6-AUFG] (“[T]he state 
constitution of 1876 . . . established the governorship as a weak office with few powers . . . .”); accord Harold 
H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1990) (recounting that 
the constitutional convention “fragmented the executive branch by providing for a weak governor”). 
9 See infra Section II.B; Appendix A. Texas boasts innumerable sources of Lone Star pride: 
Intrepidity at the Alamo; entering the United States as the Republic of Texas; fifty-
eight Texas-born recipients of the Medal of Honor; Bob Wills and George Strait; 
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In Washington, D.C., things operate differently. The United States 
Supreme Court is famously tiebreaker-free. As the Court put it a century and 
a half ago: “No affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are 
equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be 
made.”10 While federal district and circuit courts freely enlist fill-in judges as 
needed, no analog exists for filling a temporary SCOTUS vacancy. In fact, 
federal law flatly forbids it.11 When the High Court deadlocks 4–4 (or 3–3, as 
happened in 1792, when the Court first split down the middle),12 the lower-
court judgment is automatically, procedurally, perfunctorily affirmed. With 
nine bland words, the case is nulled, exactly as if the Court had never granted 
certiorari in the first place: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided 
Court.”13 In other words, “a tie goes to the Respondent.”14 
A 4–4 nondecision, though hailed by the party that won below, carries the 
aura of failure. Failure to decide. Failure to guide. Failure to “get the conflict 
resolved,” as Justice John Paul Stevens put it.15 When certiorari is granted at 
SCOTUS, it means the issue was deemed significant by at least four justices 
who wanted to settle it. Briefs were submitted. Oral argument was held. 
Another cert petition that might have been granted was denied to make room 
for this one. True, the issue may recur, and the Court may not be shorthanded 
when it does. But for the foreseeable future, a 4–4 draw maroons the 
undecided issue on an island of legal confusion, where it lingers, unsettled, 
squandering untold public and private resources, lost in “the repeating loop 
of intercircuit conflicts.”16 
 
Nolan Ryan and Babe Didrikson Zaharias; five Super Bowl titles (sadly, none this 
millennium); Dr Pepper and the “little creamery” in Brenham; deep-fried anything at 
the State Fair; a spirit of daring and rugged independence . . . . 
In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 378 (Tex. 2011) (Willett, J., dissenting). But the Lone Star State’s 
anomalous approach to breaking high court ties does not make the list. 
10 Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (authorizing retired federal judges to assist in various federal courts but 
stating “[n]o such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme Court”). Subsection (d) 
does not explicitly bar retired SCOTUS Justices from sitting by designation on their former Court, 
but the implied prohibition is widely accepted. 
12 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); see also Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the 
Supreme Court “Supreme”—A Case Study on the Importance of Settling the National Law, 4 GREEN BAG 
2D 129, 130 (2001) (citing Hayburn’s Case as the first equally divided Court). 
13 See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, 562 U.S. 40, 41 (2010) (per curiam) (“Justice 
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.”), aff ’g by an equally divided court 541 
F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
14 Baker, supra note 12, at 130. 
15 Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of 
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 91 n.39 (2011). 
16 Baker, supra note 12, at 131. 
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Sure, if shorthandedness results not from a recusal but from a vacancy, the 
Court can simply order reargument once it regains full strength.17 Reargument 
is common. But if deadlock stems from a recusal, the lower-court decision 
persists, yielding finality (of a sort) to the parties but not to the People, for 
whom legal clarity must await another day, and possibly quite a far-off day. 
The rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court is entirely judge-made. 
Nothing in positive law—constitutional, statutory, or otherwise—requires it, 
although Congress has tacitly accepted it.18 Unlike the cert-granting Rule of 
Four, which “has become interwoven in the warp and woof of the 
jurisdictional statutes,”19 the rule of implicit affirmance is an internal 
housekeeping tradition. But it is a longstanding one, first appearing in 1792, 
when the Court divided 3–3 on a motion,20 and formally adopted in 1825.21 
By contrast, state high courts are less hidebound, and, frankly, more 
consequential. SCOTUS may be the highest court in the land (at least on 
federal-law matters).22 “For most Americans,” however, “Lady Justice lives in 
the halls of state courts.”23 “Day by day, American justice is dispensed—
overwhelmingly—in state, not federal, judiciaries.”24 As Justice Scalia once 
observed, state law (and thus state courts) matter far more to citizens’ 
everyday lives: “If you ask which court is of the greatest importance to an 
American citizen, it is not my court.”25 And when it comes to avoiding high 
court stalemate, most states reject SCOTUS’s “nonprecedent” precedent. 
This Article examines an ignored area of judicial administration: impasse-
avoidance mechanisms in state courts of last resort. Using original survey data 
covering every state in the nation, plus interviews with key judicial and 
 
17 This is what happened, for example, following Justice Robert Jackson’s sudden death in 1954 
and Justice Lewis Powell’s retirement in 1987. See Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1 (noting also 
that only twenty-five of fifty-four reargued cases ended up 5–4). 
18 See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 643, 646, 651-52 (2002) (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 2109, which suggests Congress “presupposed 
the existence of the rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court”). 
19 Baker, supra note 12, at 130. 
20 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); see also Baker, supra note 12, at 130. 
21 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 67 (1825) (“Where the Court is equally divided, the 
decree of the Court below is of course affirmed, so far as the point of division goes.”). As Chief 
Justice Marshall explained the following Term in Etting v. Bank of the United States, “the principles 
of law which have been argued cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the Court being 
divided in opinion upon it.” 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 59, 78 (1826). 
22 See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018). 
23 John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/us/budget-cuts-for-state-courts-risk-rights-critics-say.html 
[https://perma.cc/7F3G-4KW6] (quoting former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis). 
24 Thompson v. Dall. City Att’y’s Off., 913 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 2019). 
25 See Justice Scalia Honors U.S. Constitution, GW TODAY (Sept. 18, 2013), 
https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/justice-scalia-honors-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/RXU4-77T2]. 
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gubernatorial officials, the Article takes an approach generally more 
descriptive than normative. 
In short, states respond to tie-vote situations in eclectic ways.26 Seventeen 
states emulate SCOTUS. If the high court splits evenly, the lower-court 
judgment stands.27 But thirty-five courts reject SCOTUS’s “ties happen” 
approach. These anti-stalemate states all use a temporary fill-in justice, 
though the state-by-state details vary in four fundamental ways: 
1. When a temporary justice is appointed, pre- or post-deadlock: Twenty-four 
states name a substitute justice as soon as the court dips below full strength, 
while eleven courts wait until a tie emerges before naming someone. 
2. Who is eligible for appointment: In thirty-two state high courts, the 
replacement justice must be a jurist; in three courts, others are also eligible. 
3. Who does the appointing: In twenty-three courts, the Chief Justice 
names the substitute justice; in seven, the court does so; and in four, the 
Governor steps in. 
4. How much discretion the appointer has: Some methods are rote and 
mechanical. For example, in fun-loving Louisiana, the clerk draws a name 
from a plastic Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern.28 In more urbane Washington 
State, they use an elegant chalice.29 In other states, the appointer has 
unfettered discretion, sometimes provoking cries of abuse. 
This Article proceeds in four parts: 
• Part I discusses the myriad costs inflicted by unbroken ties in courts 
of last resort (and at least some costs of breaking ties). 
• Part II comprehensively examines how America’s various high 
courts—not just SCOTUS—resolve, or refuse to resolve, evenly divided 
votes. In particular, it examines why SCOTUS has never had any tiebreaking 
mechanisms, and then looks in some detail at how different states tackle 
supreme court deadlock. 
• Part III evaluates the vices of divergent tiebreaking systems used in 
state courts of last resort. 
• Part IV, drawing on these broad experiences, proposes a more 
sensible approach for breaking high-court impasse, focusing on my home 
state of Texas, which has perhaps the most disquieting method of all. 
Through this comprehensive analysis, I hope to spark fruitful 
reconsideration—perhaps even recalibration—in state capitals across America. 
 
26 See infra subsection II.A.2; Appendix A. 
27 Some of these states actually have a substitute-justice mechanism but never invoke it to 
break ties, e.g., New Jersey. See infra notes 414-423 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra Section II.B. 
29 See id. 
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I. THE TROUBLE WITH DEADLOCK 
In law as in life, ties can be deeply unsatisfying. Rabid football fans would 
self-immolate outside National Football League headquarters on Park 
Avenue if the Super Bowl ended in a soulless tie. Indeed, the icon after whom 
the Lombardi Trophy is named reportedly said, “Winning isn’t everything; 
it’s the only thing.”30 Participation trophies are ubiquitous in youth sports, 
but grown-up championships distinguish victor and victim. Game seven of 
the World Series would never end in a dismal 4–4 tie.31 But America’s other 
national pastime—suing people—can end that way. It’s the legal equivalent 
of the infamous cut-to-black ending of The Sopranos, when irate HBO 
subscribers thought their cable had been whacked; no bang or whimper, 
just . . . nothingness. 
What is the raison d’être for courts? Krispy Kreme exists to make 
decadent, melt-in-your-mouth donuts. Lamborghini exists to make 
audacious, 0-to-60-in-under-3-seconds supercars. But what about the 
inscrutable judiciary, steeped in pomp and majesty with velvet curtains, black 
robes, mysterious Latin phrases? What’s its bottom-line business, specifically 
courts of last resort? There’s no consensus answer: 
 
“To decide cases.” 
 —Justice Byron White, U.S. Supreme Court32 
 
“Courts exist to do justice, to guarantee liberty, to enhance social order, to resolve 
disputes, to maintain rule of law, to provide for equal protection, and to ensure 
due process of law. They exist so the equality of individuals and the government 
is reality rather than empty rhetoric.” 
 —National Association for Court Management33 
 
I side with no-nonsense Justice White. Courts, including high courts, are 
in the case-deciding business. They render decisions. And decisions rendered 
 
30 Beau Dure, Winning Isn’t Everything; It’s the Only Thing. Right?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2015, 
5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/sep/24/winning-everything-sports 
[https://perma.cc/AWD7-R7Y7]. 
31 At least not since 1885, when the second baseball world championship ended in a 3-3-1 tie, 
forcing St. Louis and Chicago to split the $1000 prize. Victor Mather, Not Again: Chicago and St. 
Louis Met in 1885 and 1886 Playoff, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/sports/baseball/not-again-chicago-and-st-louis-met-in-1885-
and-1886-playoff.html [https://perma.cc/5D6V-X3LL]. 
32 Charles Lane and Bart Barnes, Longtime Justice Byron White Dies, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Apr. 16, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/04/16/longtime-justice-
byron-white-dies/a5c2335a-81d8-4eb4-8696-1cc061a8b9f0 [https://perma.cc/8HUV-SU23]. 
33 Purposes and Responsibilities of Courts: Why Courts Exist, Nat’l Ass’n for Ct. Mgmt., 
https://nacmcore.org/competency/purposes-and-responsibilities [https://perma.cc/8XTX-43J7]. 
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by courts of last resort have precedential effect across their entire jurisdiction, 
which (one hopes) advances the noble virtues and institutional goals that 
NACM identifies above. 
The decisions themselves do the bread-and-butter work of providing 
guidance, resolving uncertainties, and clarifying what the law prescribes and 
proscribes. On the federal level, the Framers of Article III commendably 
aimed for uniformity when they created “one supreme Court.”34 Courts of 
last resort, both state and federal, have an irreplaceable function: to settle the 
law.35 But no court can do that except by issuing decisions that declare both 
result and rationale.36 
Stalemate, while infrequent,37 subverts the fundamental—and 
institutional—purpose of a supreme court: to be supreme and to speak 
supremely. Just as tech lovers once camped outside the Apple store because 
they craved the newest iGadget, law lovers frantically click “refresh” on 
SCOTUSblog because they too want a product: the latest U.S. Supreme 
Court declaration of what the law is. The decision is the prize because it 
provides what matters—who won, who lost, and why. The ruling rules. 
A 4–4 tie produces a winner but no precedent; it resolves the case but not the 
issue. All that time, money, and energy—by the litigants and by the Court itself—
with nothing to show for it. Such wheel spinning impairs the Court’s indispensable 
role in resolving lower-court conflicts and ensuring national uniformity. 
 
34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To 
produce uniformity in [judicial] determinations; they ought to be submitted in the last resort to one 
supreme tribunal.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (examining the judiciary in the 
proposed constitution). 
35 Baker, supra note 12, at 129 (describing Justice Brandeis’s appreciation of the Supreme 
Court’s unique responsibility to settle law). As Justice Brandeis famously put it, “It is usually more 
important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.” Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 
U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He once told Justice Frankfurter, “In ordinary 
cases . . . you want certainty and definiteness and it doesn’t matter terribly how you decide so long 
as it is settled.” PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS—JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 366 (1984). 
36 Some states have slightly modified this doctrine by authorizing—under carefully controlled 
circumstances—what is anathema (indeed, an epithet) to all federal and most state courts: advisory 
opinions. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 58 
(7th ed. 2015) (describing how some state courts may render advisory opinions when, for example, 
formally requested by the state legislature). But such a situation only highlights my larger point—a 
tie in an advisory opinion is especially worthless, akin to a doctor telling you that you are at death’s 
door or perfectly healthy, without deciding between those options. 
37 See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 
7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005) (finding an average of approximately 0.65 4–4 splits per 
Term from 1986 to 2003); see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 94 (2011) (“In recent years, the 
Court has, on average, decided fewer than one case per term by a 4–4 vote as a result of a recusal.”). 
Indeed, the Court is not often seriously shorthanded. Between 1946 and 2003, “at least eight Justices 
participated in almost 97 percent of the Court’s cases.” Id. at 98 n.72. 
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Indeed, the mere prospect of deadlock—or more accurately, the absence 
of a needed fifth vote—alters litigant behavior. As the head of a D.C.-based 
association of corporate lawyers put it, “to assess risk, the business 
community likes to expect stability.”38 In the wake of Justice Scalia’s sudden 
death, some fretted openly about a divided, Scalia-less Court. For example, 
Dow Chemical swiftly reassessed its risk in a then-pending class-action case 
and opted to cut its losses, settling the case because it was unsettled about the 
Court. Said the corporate spokeswoman: “With this changing landscape, the 
unknowns, we just decided to put this behind us.”39 Courts exist to provide 
certainty, and the specter of stalemate haunts those craving predictability. 
Call it adjudication recalibration. Risk-averse businesses doubtless believed a 
Scalia-less Court was less likely to restrict class-action suits.40 And since a 
Supreme Court loss ripples from sea to shining sea, they thought it better to 
stand down than risk defeat. 
High-court impasse lands with a soul-crushing thud. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court put it plainly: “This Court’s responsibility is to decide all 
cases presented to it in an orderly and just fashion; a case affirmed by an 
equally divided court without opinion is not a quality decision by any stretch 
of the imagination and would limit this Court’s responsibility.”41 This policy 
has since been rescinded, however.42 It is no surprise that tie votes produce 
“some unhappy parties,” as the clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court 
understatedly put it.43 The North Carolina Supreme Court clerk agrees: 
“Parties and litigants are not happy”44—or, at least, the parties who sought 
the court’s now-denied review are not happy. One New Jersey group 
 
38 Joshua Jamerson & Brent Kendall, Scalia’s Vacancy Could Leave Companies at a Loss, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2016, 8:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-settles-lawsuit-citing-
supreme-court-position-after-scalias-death-1456491317 [https://perma.cc/M56G-6TCR]. 
39 Id. 
40 Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, What Happened When Merrick Garland Wrote for Himself, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (March 21, 2016, 11:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/21/what-happened-when-merrick-garland-wrote-for-himself 
[https://perma.cc/D2KP-HKET] (describing some differences between the late Justice Scalia and 
President Obama’s nominee to replace him); see also, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—
Reviewed: Brooding Spirits, C.J. Garland Edition, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (March 16, 
2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-brooding-spirits-c-j-garland-
edition-by-aaron-nielson [https://perma.cc/XCS4-LK7Q] (collecting opinions in which Chief Judge 
Garland wrote separately). 
41 Ky. Utils. Co. v. S.E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 407, 410 app. (Ky. 1992). 
42 See infra note 154 
43 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Donna Humpal, Clerk, Iowa Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
44 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Christie Roeder, Clerk, N.C. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
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editorialized that tie votes “are not good for either litigants or the Court as 
an institution.”45 
Even so, it bears noting that some are untroubled by deadlock—or, at the 
very least, less troubled by deadlock than by the mechanisms for resolving 
deadlock. For example, some may fret that breaking a high-court tie using a 
non-high-court judge heightens the risk of error and of destabilizing precedent. 
Although averting impasse yields instant resolution, that benefit may pale in 
comparison to the potential costs of an erroneous resolution of the case or an 
erosion of stare decisis. On top of that, is it really that distressing for litigants 
to remain stuck with the able, reasoned judgment of the lower court? 
As a former state supreme court justice, I dislike judicial deadlock. Many 
contemporary legal scholars focus on optimal court structure, assessing how 
divergent design characteristics further a court’s goals: impartiality, 
independence, efficiency, clarity, accuracy, and consistency.46 But whether these 
lofty goals are underscored, or undermined, turns entirely on a court’s ability 
to fulfill its fundamental role: to decide cases. For example, some scholars favor 
enlarging the U.S. Supreme Court and letting it sit in panels.47 Why? So the 
Court can decide more cases, which in turn will further normative goals like 
clarity and consistency48 or reduce the power of a “swing” justice and perceived 
politicization.49 Scholars may dispute which goals courts should advance, but it 
is indisputable that courts can only do so through their decisions. And because 
deadlocks dam decisions, it is no wonder that a supermajority of states have 
adopted a hodgepodge of procedures to stave off stalemate. 
 
45 Editorial, Three’s Not a Charm, 201 N.J.L.J. 394 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
46 See, e.g., Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. 
Supreme Courts, 43 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 173, 175 n.7, 193-95 (2013) (analyzing the impact of court 
structure on access, cohesiveness of doctrine, inter-judge relations, and outside perception of the 
court); Benjamin R.D. Alarie, Andrew J. Green & Edward M. Iacobucci, Is Bigger Always Better? On 
Optimal Panel Size, with Evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada (Univ. Toronto Legal Stud. Rsch. 
Paper No. 08-15, 2011) (examining the structure of a variety of international high courts and 
proposing a model for determining optimal court panel size); F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. 
Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645 (2009) (discussing the interaction 
between size and performance of the Supreme Court, and suggesting reconsideration of the Court’s 
size to better achieve institutional goals); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United 
States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009) (proposing several 
changes to the Supreme Court, including an increase in the size of the Court’s membership). 
47 See George & Guthrie, supra note 46, at 1457 (suggesting that Congress should authorize 
fifteen Supreme Court Justices to allow for panels of three); see also Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the 
Court: The Case for Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century, 33(3) 
PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 155, 155 (2004) (arguing for an expansion of the Supreme Court to nineteen 
justices but not the use of panels). 
48 George & Guthrie, supra note 46, at 1442 (arguing that panel hearings would allow the 
Supreme Court to hear more cases without compromising outcomes). 
49 Turley, supra note 47, at 157 (arguing that the prevalence of 5–4 Supreme Court decisions 
suggests that more power is concentrated in one or two “swing justices”). 
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Every state high court is odd. That is, while state courts of last resort have 
different numbers of justices—five (18), seven (28), nine (6)50—all 50 states have 
an odd number of justices, with one self-evident upside: avoiding deadlock.51 
Judicial vacancies do not slam shut the courthouse doors; the work of the 
court continues. But in discrete cases, vacancies can hobble a court. As a 
justice of the five-member Indiana Supreme Court aptly noted in response 
to a recusal motion, “the moving parties can do the appellate math and know 
that in the event of my recusal, they would only have to convince two judges 
to prevail, leaving the Court split and winning the tie.”52 
 
50 See infra Appendix A. The total is 52 because, in Texas’s and Oklahoma’s dual systems, each 
state has two high courts. Id. In these two states with bifurcated high courts, the only court that 
doesn’t have nine justices is Oklahoma’s five-member Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. 
51 The U.S. Supreme Court began as a six-member Court and endured several changes to its 
size until finally settling at nine in 1869. See Robinson, supra note 46 (discussing the early years of 
the Supreme Court and the fluctuating number of justices). While an odd-numbered body seems 
obviously preferable, many common law courts—the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, 
and the Court of the Exchequer—operated for centuries with four judges each. See John V. Orth, 
How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 681, 686 (2002). 
52 Ind. Gas Co. v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 992 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 2013) (Massa, J., denying motion 
for disqualification). The peril is most acute, however, not when a court faces equal division resulting 
from a single vacancy, but incapacitation resulting from multiple vacancies. For example, New York’s 
highest court began its 2015 session only seventy-two percent full. The seven-member court had two 
vacancies, “a deficit that could potentially affect dozens of cases on the court’s docket.” Colby 
Hamilton, Court of Appeals Begins 2015 Two Judges Down, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2014, 5:55 AM); 
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Figure 1: Number of Justices on State High Courts 
Black: 9 justices, 6 states; Dark gray: 7 justices, 28 states; Light gray: 5 justices, 18 states 
(Oklahoma’s civil high court has nine justices and the criminal high court has five) 
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II. STAVING OFF STALEMATE: IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN COURTS OF 
LAST RESORT 
The nation’s highest court has no mechanism to break 4–4 ties. This “ties 
happen” approach isn’t intrinsic to courts of last resort. SCOTUS’s approach 
is largely the product of history.53 And in our compand republic,  states aren’t 
bound to follow SCOTUS’s lead when it comes to deadlock. Indeed, most do 
not. Unsurprisingly, in our laboratories of democracy, entrepreneurial states 
have adopted innovations galore—ranging from mimicking SCOTUS (and 
doing nothing)54 all the way to ceding nearly absolute control to the 
Governor, as in Texas.55 
A. Ties That Bind: SCOTUS and Seventeen Like-Minded States 
1. SCOTUS is Statutorily and Structurally Tied to Ties 
The U.S. Supreme Court is a by-the-book, rule-laden institution. For 
example, it takes four votes to grant a case56 and ordinarily five to decide a 
case—but it takes a quorum of six justices to hear a case.57 Congress set the 
six-justice quorum under its broad constitutional authority to enact “all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the judicial 
power.58 A majority of whatever number of justices sits is all that is required 
for a decision. So, a 4–2 decision is the tightest majority vote possible because 
 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2014/12/court-of-appeals-begins-2015-
two-judges-down-000000 [https://perma.cc/3Z68-RSZU] (describing the process and challenges of 
filling the vacant seats on the New York Court of Appeals). The court needs all five judges to have 
a quorum. Id. Upshot: Any court decision would require four of the five to agree. Id. If they split 3–
2, the court would have to reargue and re-conference the case after new judges come aboard. Id. 
53 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
54 Id. 
55 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
56 See Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981-82 (1957) (quoting 
Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 490 (1937) 
(statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, reading letter from Chief Just. Hughes)) (outlining the Supreme 
Court’s rule that, as Chief Justice Hughes put it, “the petition is always granted if four so vote”). 
57 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of 
the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”). 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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it is a bare majority of a bare quorum.59 The High Court can decide a case 9–
0 or 5–4 or 5–1 or 4–2.60 But not 5–0 or 3–2 or 4–1. 
The quorum statute and other rules dictate how cases are decided, but 
another rule dictates how cases are not decided. Throughout its history, the 
Court never purported to have the authority to allow former justices to sit as 
substitutes in order to break a tie, and a New Deal-era statute (a vestige of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing plan) appears to codify that 
practice.61 If the Court deadlocks, so be it. Retired Supreme Court justices 
can sit on lower federal courts, but not on their former High Court.62 Justice 
Potter Stewart once remarked that it was “no fun to play in the minors after 
a career in the major leagues.”63 All the same, Justices Tom Clark, David 
Souter, and Sandra Day O’Connor used their comparatively early retirements 
to sit often with courts of appeals across the Nation.64 
a. Recusal Rules Make SCOTUS Uniquely Vulnerable to Ties 
Unlike the Judiciary (or Congress), clear rules govern absence, recusal, or 
incapacity in the Executive. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified 
 
59 More precisely, the Supreme Court “decides” a case by a majority of those sitting, but by 
statute six justices must hear a case for there to be a quorum. Thus, it takes five to decide a case 
when there are eight or nine justices sitting. But if only six or seven justices sit, then any four can 
decide it. For example, in the important securities-fraud class-action case Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy were recused. The Court 
nonetheless decided the case by a 4–2 vote, with Justice Blackmun writing for himself and Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices White and O’Connor dissented. When reconsidering that 
precedent a quarter-century later, the majority and an opinion concurring in the judgment fought 
over whether Basic was entitled to stare decisis, but neither side even mentioned Basic’s bare quorum 
or its four-justice majority, much less suggested that those features made it any less authoritative. 
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274-77 (2014) (explaining why Basic 
was entitled to stare decisis); id. at 297-300 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (disputing the 
applicability of stare decisis without questioning the validity of a four-justice decision). 
60 See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. 224. 
61 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (describing the procedure for designating and assigning retired judges 
and justices to sit in lower federal courts but stating that no designations or assignments of lower-
court judges “shall be made to the Supreme Court”); see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 83. 
62 § 294(d); see also Jess Bravin, Welcome Back, Souter (and O’Connor and Stevens), WALL ST. J. 
L. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/29/welcome-back-souter-and-
oconnor-and-stevens [https://perma.cc/NAK7-Q5RX] (“[R]etired justices Sandra Day O[’]Connor 
and David Souter help decide mundane disputes before federal circuit courts, but are disqualified 
from the job they know best.”). 
63 Jess Bravin, Change of Venue: In Retirement, Justice O’Connor Still Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124994271588320565 [https://perma.cc/97FU-LL3T]. 
64 See id. (“As a substitute judge, Justice O’Connor has heard nearly 80 cases and written more 
than a dozen opinions.”); Bravin, supra note 62; Tom C. Clark, Former Justice, Dies; On the Supreme 
Court for 18 Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/06/14/archives/tom-c-
clark-former-justice-dies-on-the-supreme-court-for-18-years.html [https://perma.cc/PYU3-UNP6] 
(“He was believed to be the only retired Justice in history to sit on all 11 circuits.”). 
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following President Kennedy’s assassination, makes the Vice President the 
Acting President when the President is “unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.”65 But the Constitution says nothing about a Supreme 
Court justice’s inability to discharge powers and duties, either for a short time 
(as with a temporary physical issue) or indefinitely (as with a permanent 
mental issue). The only vehicle for forced removal is impeachment.66 And the 
lone relevant statutory authority seems to foreclose the temporary 
replacement of an absent or recused justice.67 
Because these structural conditions make tie votes statistically inevitable, 
the Court has had to determine the legal effect of a tie. The rule of affirmance 
by an equally divided Court derives from a Latin maxim: semper praesumitur 
pro negante—that is, the presumption is always in favor of the one who 
denies.68 As Justice Field put it in 1868, “It has long been the doctrine in this 
country and in England, where courts consist of several members, that no 
affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided 
in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made.”69 This 
ancient principle applies in legislative bodies too.70 
The rule of affirmance by an equally divided Court has been criticized by 
Professor Thomas Baker as “an internal procedural finesse . . . not required 
by the Constitution or by any statute.”71 He would prefer that “[s]omeone on 
the Court [be] willing to compromise and change his or her vote to settle an 
important issue and to move the policy question back to Congress.”72 
The Court must apply this rule most often when a justice recuses, 
typically for one of three reasons: (1) a personal or familial interest in the case 
(stock ownership or a close family member who works for a party or law firm 
involved in the case); (2) prior involvement in the case (as a lawyer or lower-
court judge); or (3) a non-case-related need to recuse because of the particular 
 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3, 4. 
66 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). 
67 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (providing for the substitution of retired judges to the courts of appeals and 
district courts but stating that “[n]o such designation or assignment shall be made to the Supreme Court”). 
68 AMERICAN LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://lawi.us/semper-praesumitur-pro-negante 
[https://perma.cc/NSF7-R8UX] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). 
69 Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868). 
70 See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. 
L. REV. 971, 974 (1989) (tracing the principle back to Aeschylus’ Eumenides, where Athena’s vote to 
acquit might have created a tie vote, a scene “plainly meant to signal the beginning of both 
democracy and the reign of law”); id. at 1010 (explaining that legislation cannot pass under a tie vote 
“because of the ancient rule that a motion needs a majority to pass”). 
71 Baker, supra note 12, at 130. 
72 Id. (arguing that the justices “failed” their “institutional responsibility to administer the 
national law” by dividing equally in Free v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 592 U.S. 333 (2000)). 
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issue the case raises.73 Recusal for illness or other reasons is also possible, but 
as described below, 4–4 ties are rare in those circumstances. 
The first category (personal or familial interest) is the clearest and subject 
to the most objective rules. Its application is harsh—owning a single share of 
a stock will trigger recusal.74 But it often is also remediable. Federal judges 
who initially recuse from a case sometimes return to the bench, for example, 
if they sell the stock that necessitated the recusal.75 
The second category (prior involvement in the case) typically affects justices 
only early in their tenures.76 For example, justices promoted to the Supreme 
Court from circuit courts typically recuse themselves from cases (including at 
the certiorari stage) that had been pending before their previous courts, while 
they were judges there. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, 
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett were promoted to the Supreme Court from 
federal circuit courts. Once they became justices, they followed this practice of 
recusal.77 With each passing Term, the need for such recusals diminished. 
Justices coming from the Executive Branch face even greater recusal 
obligations. For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall, former Second Circuit 
Judge and U.S. Solicitor General, recused himself in fifty-seven percent of 
cases decided in his first Term on the Court.78 More recently, Justice Kagan, 
 
73 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455; Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court 
Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1547 (2012) (describing recusal in practice as being within 
the judge’s discretion). 
74 § 455(d)(4) (“‘[F]inancial interest’ means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however 
small . . . .” (emphasis added)); An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 
1038 (2004) [hereinafter Open Discussion] (recalling a case on which she recused until selling her 
share in a company). 
75 See Open Discussion, supra note 74, at 1038. 
76 § 455(b)(2), (3). 
77 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Chief Justice Roberts did not participate 
because he was on the panel at the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); 
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (Justice Alito did not participate because he was on the panel 
at the Third Circuit in Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2005)); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (Justice Sotomayor did not participate because she was originally 
on the panel at the Second Circuit in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 313 n.* 
(2d Cir. 2009), though she was elevated to the Supreme Court before a decision was reached there); 
Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (per curiam) (Justice Gorsuch did not participate in Sharp 
because he was on the Tenth Circuit for Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017); the Court 
initially deadlocked, but later resolved the case by relying on McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 
(2020), a case that presented the same issue without the recusal conflict); Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 
S. Ct. 759, 203 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2019) (Justice Kavanaugh recused because he was on the D.C. Circuit 
at the time of the challenged decision, Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017)); Walton 
v. First Merch.’s Bank, No. 20-311, 2020 WL 7132748 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020) (Justice Barrett recused 
from the denial of rehearing following denial of certiorari, having been on the panel that issued the 
challenged Seventh Circuit decision, 820 F. App’x 450 (7th Cir. 2020)). 
78 Noah M. Schubert, Replacement Justice on the United States Supreme Court: The Use of 
Temporary Justices to Resolve the Recusal Conundrum, 46 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 215, 218 (2011) (citing Tom 
Goldstein, An Update on Recusal, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2010)). Justice Marshall recused himself 
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who also served as Solicitor General, recused herself from roughly one-third 
of the Court’s merits cases during her first Term.79 In fact, the specter of 
frequent recusal was one of the arguments lodged against her confirmation—
that the Court would be short-staffed for several high-stakes cases.80 Two 4–
4 splits resulted that Term: (1) a highly anticipated copyright infringement 
case involving gray-market goods;81 and (2) the constitutionality of a 
citizenship-transmission statute that favored the citizenship claims of 
nonmarital children born abroad to U.S.-citizen mothers over U.S.-citizen 
fathers.82 Court watchers were disappointed. As to the copyright nondecision, 
“The justices’ 4–4 tie left the question unanswered, to the disappointment of 
the many people watching the Court and hoping for a definitive resolution.”83 
As to the citizenship case—when the Court gave dads an unwanted “tie” a 
week before Father’s Day—many decried “a waste of judicial resources (it 
takes a long time and a lot of work for the Court to decide a case) and a wasted 
opportunity to make law on a presumably important issue.”84 
The third category, while the rarest, can be the most challenging for the 
Court as an institution. A need to recuse because of the presence of a 
particular issue is not easily cured by selling stock or taking a case from a 
different party posing no conflict, as with the first category, nor does it 
naturally dissipate after a few early Terms, as with the second. If a justice 
must always recuse when a particular issue is raised, and the remaining 
justices are evenly divided, this means that the Court will be unable to resolve 
the issue at all until either the recusing justice is replaced or another justice’s 
replacement takes the opposite view. Justice Scalia, for example, recused 
himself in 2004 in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,85 a case 
involving the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, after having publicly stated that he disagreed with the Ninth 
 
in sixty-one cases, fifty-three of which were related to his service as solicitor general. See McElroy 
& Dorf, supra note 1537, at 96 n.65. 
79 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 82. 
80 See Tom Goldstein, Elena Kagan and Recusal—UPDATED, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2010, 6:20 
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/elena-kagan-and-recusal [https://perma.cc/M5WW-C9HR]. 
81 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2011) (per curiam), aff ’g by an equally 
divided court 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
82 Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam), aff ’g by an equally divided 
court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
83 Lisa M. Tittemore, With Supreme Court Deadlock, Cloud Lingers Over Gray Market Goods, 
SUNSTEIN, http://sunsteinlaw.com/publications/with-supreme-court-deadlock-cloud-lingers-over-
gray-market-goods [https://perma.cc/8ALA-8U58]. 
84 Lisa McElroy, This Week at the Court: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2011, 
2:43 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/this-week-at-the-court-in-plain-english-6 
[https://perma.cc/S9DG-JCTL]. 
85 542 U.S. 1, 3 (2004). 
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Circuit’s conclusion on the merits of the challenge.86 The remaining justices 
resolved the case without a 4–4 split. But they did so without reaching the 
merits—instead relying on the nebulous doctrine of “prudential standing.”87 
Ties occur in criminal cases, too, with deadlock in death penalty cases the 
starkest example. In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Beazley v. Johnson with 
a bare six-justice quorum.88 Beazley involved the death of a federal appellate 
judge’s father, and three justices recused themselves given their close 
relationship with the victim’s son (who had clerked for one justice and assisted 
in the confirmation of two others).89 The Court divided 3–3 on whether to 
stay the execution pending certiorari, prompting this criticism: “A tie 
shouldn’t go to the executioner.”90 
Besides recusals, a 4–4 tie is also possible when there’s a lengthy absence 
on the Court. A vacancy on the Court sometimes goes unfilled for a long 
time. Or a justice might take time away for health reasons or for other duties 
of unusual importance. For instance: 
• Three chief justices have presided over courts of impeachment.91 
The first two chief justices were forced to miss sessions of the Court. In fact, 
Chief Justice Chase’s absence during the impeachment trial of President 
Andrew Johnson was listed as a basis for reargument of the canonical case 
Ex parte McCardle.92 
• Justice Robert Jackson’s service as chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg 
Trials from 1945 to 1946 meant that he was physically absent during a 
 
86 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on ‘Under God’ in Pledge to Flag, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/us/supreme-court-to-consider-case-
on-under-god-in-pledge-to-flag.html [https://perma.cc/LAJ4-RGCL]. 
87 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 17-18. 
88 533 U.S. 969 (2001) (noting that Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas abstained). 
89 Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Execution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/us/three-abstain-as-supreme-court-
declines-to-halt-texas-execution.html [https://perma.cc/8DRD-7DQP] (quoting George Kendall of 
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund).  
90 Id. To be fair, the more accurate description is that a tie goes to whoever doesn’t need the 
Court to do anything. Thus, if a lower court stays an execution, and the Supreme Court ties on 
whether to lift it, the stay would remain in place, meaning the execution would not proceed. 
91 See Frank Bowman, The Role of the Chief Justice in an Impeachment Trial, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 
10, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/01/the-role-of-the-chief-justice-in-an-
impeachment-trial [https://perma.cc/A57C-UTL2] (discussing how Chief Justice Salmon Chase 
presided over President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist presided over 
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial, and Chief Justice Roberts presided over President 
Donald Trump’s first impeachment trial). 
92 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 509 (1868) (reporter’s statement of the case) (noting that “the Chief 
Justice being detained from his place here, by his duties in the Court of Impeachment,” lead to 
reargument the next Term). 
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substantial number of arguments. To break ties, the Court ordered three 
rearguments upon his return.93 
• When recovering from a serious injury after being thrown from a 
horse, Justice William O. Douglas missed arguments from October 1949 until 
March 1950.94 
• In early 1985, Justice Lewis Powell, who occupied the Court’s 
ideological center, missed fifty-six oral arguments while ill.95 Eight cases 
deadlocked 4–4, and five others were reargued.96 (It’s unclear why the Court 
exercised discretion to reargue some cases while non-precedentially affirming 
others.) One notable example: In December 1987, before Anthony Kennedy 
was confirmed as Justice Powell’s successor, the Court deadlocked on the 
constitutionality of laws restricting minors’ access to abortions.97 
• Chief Justice Rehnquist missed forty-four oral arguments while 
receiving treatment for thyroid cancer in 2004 and 2005, declining to 
participate except when needed to break a tie.98 
• While the “Scalia seat” sat vacant for a record-setting 422 days99—
the better part of two Terms—the Court endured deadlock (and thus, at 
minimum, delayed rulings) in multiple divisive cases.100 
As was the case following Justice Scalia’s death, a vacancy on the Supreme 
Court may go unfilled for a long time, not because of a sitting justice’s health 
 
93 Jeffrey D. Hockett, Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Supreme Court, and the Nuremberg Trial, 1990 
SUP. CT. REV. 257, 279 (quoting a letter from Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone explaining that the 
eight-justice Court had led to a number of 4–4 splits requiring reargument, three of which he was 
to announce that day). 
94 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 360, 367 (1979). 
95 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Tie Vote: What Happens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/
1987/10/05/us/tie-vote-what-happens.html [https://perma.cc/3CA9-9MRV]; see also Powell Has Operation for 
Cancer of Prostate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/05/us/powell-has-operation-
for-cancer-of-prostate.html [https://perma.cc/Z3LR-2DCC]. 
96 Taylor, supra note 95. 
97 Linda Greenhouse, Battle Over; Now, a War, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1989), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/05/us/battle-over-now-a-war.html [https://perma.cc/S7MU-5X9A]. 
98 Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard This Term, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2004), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/12/14/rehnquist-wont-vote-in-every-case-
heard-this-term/b4ff02b1-0fa0-495d-b89a-196166db3c94 [https://perma.cc/GGW2-XQY8]; Mark 
Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Chatty Thomas Breaks with Precedent, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 6, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/24d0b14b7ba98d1976ebff1f7106582f [https://perma.cc/62MP-T3MS]. 
99 Alana Abramson, Neil Gorsuch Confirmation Sets Record for Longest Vacancy on 9-Member 
Supreme Court, TIME (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://time.com/4731066/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-
record-vacancy [https://perma.cc/XAH6-5CYX]. 
100 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (mem.); Friedrichs v. Cal. 
Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (mem.); Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank, 136 S. Ct. 1072 
(2016); Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Bank of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); see also Franchise 
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (affirming by an equally divided Court on one of two 
issues). 
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or choices, but because there is no sitting justice. In 1969, after Justice Abe 
Fortas resigned from the Court amid controversy, President Nixon struggled 
to get a successor confirmed.101 The Fortas seat sat vacant for more than a year 
before Justice Harry Blackmun—Nixon’s third choice—took office.102 “During 
this period eight cases yielded 4–4 decisions, and 18 cases had to be reargued.”103 
b. At Least Partly to Avoid Ties, Supreme Court Recusal is Uniquely Disfavored 
Justice Scalia himself emphasized the disturbing threat of seemingly 
endless stalemate when he denied the Sierra Club’s recusal motion based on 
his 2002 duck hunting trip with Vice President Cheney (coincidentally 
enough, less than a week before the argument in Newdow, in which he did 
recuse).104 A Court of eight, he explained, often “will find itself unable to 
resolve the significant legal issue” presented.105 “Even one unnecessary recusal 
impairs the functioning of the Court.”106 For example, if the issue in Newdow 
had returned to the Court before Justice Scalia passed away, and if Justice 
Scalia still deemed himself disqualified, we likely would still be without an 
authoritative answer; the seats of the four justices who left the Court between 
 
101 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1; see also Andrew Hamm, Legal History Highlight: The Failed 
Election-Year Nomination of Abe Fortas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 10, 2016, 4:03 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/legal-history-highlight-the-failed-election-year-nomination-
of-abe-fortas [https://perma.cc/Y4KD-CU6S]. 
102 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1; Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/us/documents-reveal-the-
evolution-of-a-justice.html [https://perma.cc/EUX3-LY73] (“Harry Blackmun was President 
Nixon’s third choice, ‘Old No. 3,’ as he liked to call himself.”). 
103 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1. The hand of fate also plays a role. When Justice Stone 
fell ill, the Court held over West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish because “an evenly divided Court was 
thought an ‘unfortunate outcome.’” Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 620, 638 (1994); see also West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality 
of state minimum wage legislation). A quarter-century later in NAACP v. Button, Justice Frankfurter 
had initially circulated a draft majority upholding the law, but then Justice Whittaker resigned for 
health reasons, leaving the Court (apparently) divided 4–4. Reargument was ordered for the next 
Term, but by then, Justice Frankfurter had suffered a stroke and resigned. With two new members, 
the Court voted 6–3 the other way. See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State 
Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 355, 373-76 (2006); see also Button, 371 U.S. 
415 (1963) (striking down a Virginia barratry law that would have impeded the NAACP’s role in 
desegregation cases post-Brown). 
104 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.) 
(describing the motion to recuse); id. at 916 (noting his recusal in Newdow). 
105 Id. at 915. 
106 Id. at 916 (quoting Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, 
JJ., Statement of Recusal Policy, Nov. 1, 1993, reprinted in RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 1101-03 (2d ed., 2007)). 
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2004 and Justice Scalia’s death were all filled by new Justices whose views 
would probably not have differed sharply from their predecessors’.107 
Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in his 2011 Year-End Report on 
the Federal Judiciary. Lower-court judges can recuse knowing that another 
judge (even a retired judge or one from a different court) can fill the vacancy, 
but “[a Supreme Court] Justice . . . cannot withdraw from a case as a matter 
of convenience or simply to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an 
obligation to the Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding to 
withdraw from a case.”108 
The High Court does try to avoid 4–4 splits. By the Justices’ own 
admissions, practical considerations impact their recusal decisions. The 
Court’s 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy, cited by Justice Scalia in his Cheney 
memorandum, details recusal principles when a law firm associated with a 
Justice’s close relative appears before the Court. It suggests that the lack of 
judicial substitution warrants a less-rigid recusal standard for the Court than 
for lower-court judges.109 While Justice Stevens said that Justices should recuse 
without thought to collateral consequences,110 other Justices have confirmed 
that functional factors, like avoiding 4–4 procedural affirmances, are at work. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a memorandum explaining his refusal to disqualify 
himself in a case, described a SCOTUS Justice’s duty to sit as “stronger” than 
a lower-court judge’s duty, given the statutory prohibition on filling recusal-
based vacancies.111 Chief Justice Rehnquist was disapproving of “bending over 
backwards . . . to deem oneself unqualified.”112 In fact, as he battled thyroid 
cancer, he announced he would only participate in cases when necessary to 
prevent a tie vote.113 Justice Ginsburg agreed on the undesirability of tie votes: 
“Because there’s no substitute for a Supreme Court Justice, it is important that 
we not lightly recuse ourselves.”114 After Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, 
three cases that could have ended in stalemate were reargued after Justice 
Samuel Alito was confirmed to replace her.115 
 
107 Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice O’Connor by Justice 
Alito, Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan. 
108 CHIEF JUSTICE’S YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2011), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43SK-Y67P]. 
109 Rehnquist et al., supra note 106; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 
56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 681 (2005). 
110 See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 100-01 n. 80 (“Standards of recusal are totally 
independent of what would occur after recusal.”). 
111 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). 
112 Id. at 838 (quotation marks omitted). 
113 Lane, supra note 98. 
114 Open Discussion, supra note 74, at 1039. 
115 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Kansas v. 
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Rearguments, 
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Unnecessary recusals are, therefore, a last resort and never a first impulse. 
Recusals are always undesirable, especially when the Court is weighing a 
circuit split. Imagine this hypothetical (set prior to the Court’s decision in 
Carpenter v. United States116): The Court grants two petitions on the 
constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s bulk, warrantless collection 
of Americans’ phone records. One court of appeals has struck down NSA’s 
metadata program; the other has upheld it. Justice Kagan recuses herself, 
having formulated the government’s legal position while Solicitor General. 
The Court deadlocks 4–4 along familiar lines. Constitutional chaos ensues, as 
both lower-court judgments are affirmed, meaning the NSA program is 
constitutional in some parts of the country but unconstitutional in other 
parts—something Chief Justice Rehnquist described as “one rule in Athens, 
and another rule in Rome.”117 Indeed, other circuits—Florence and Venice—
may have also chimed in with altogether different interpretations. The 
disputed law may be federal, but it is not national. 
Or consider how differently the “Obamacare” drama would have ended 
had Justice Kagan recused herself in the original Affordable Care Act case 
from 2012.118 Shortly after the decision was issued, it was widely reported that 
the Court had originally voted 5–4 to strike down the individual mandate, 
but that Chief Justice Roberts later flipped to uphold the mandate under 
Congress’ taxing power.119 Yet had Justice Kagan recused herself, the original 
vote presumably would have been 5–3 against the mandate. A later vote 
switch by the Chief Justice would have meant 4–4 deadlock. It’s difficult to 
imagine the Court unable to decide the most high-profile case in recent 
memory. Or perhaps the Chief Justice would not have changed his vote, 
meaning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision (the case the Court granted) striking 
 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 31, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/scotus-for-law-students-
rearguments [https://perma.cc/W3TU-JC5T] (“A similar practice occurred when Justice Alito replaced 
Justice O’Connor in January 2006. Two cases, Hudson v. Michigan and Kansas v. Marsh, were reargued after 
Alito arrived and when his vote was required to resolve a four-to-four deadlock.”). 
116 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (concluding that obtaining cell-site 
location information from a wireless carrier is a Fourth Amendment search for which the 
government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause). 
117 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). 
118 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
119 Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012, 
9:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law 
[https://perma.cc/2BFA-ZBV6]. 
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down the ACA would have stood.120 Meanwhile the Sixth Circuit and D.C. 
Circuit had issued decisions upholding the individual mandate.121 
It’s no wonder that the Supreme Court avoids tie votes if at all possible. 
Professors Reynolds and Young tally 123 “equal divisions” between 1925 and 
1982—seventy-five percent resulting from a recusal or temporary absence, 
and twenty-five percent resulting from a Court vacancy.122 And a recent 
analysis in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death pointed out that since World War 
II, when the High Court has split evenly, “25 times the court affirmed the 
lower-court judgment without opinion (or precedential value) and 54 times 
the court set the case for reargument.”123 
c. Plenty Have Proposed Solutions to SCOTUS Ties 
Admittedly, split decisions don’t happen every Term,124 but they happen 
often enough to raise concern.125 Each stalemate exacts an enormous price. 
 
120 See Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1282 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s commerce power”); 
Steven M. Klepper, The Practical Implications of Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 73 MD. L. REV. 
ENDNOTES 13, 15 (2013) (discussing the effect of the possible recusal of Justice Kagan on the fate of 
the ACA). 
121 See Thomas More L. Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the ACA 
as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (affirming the constitutionality of the ACA). 
122 William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, 
Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 30, 36 n.34 (1983–84). 
123 Blackman & Shapiro, supra note 1 (noting that only twenty-five of those fifty-four reargued 
cases ended up 5–4). 
124 Black & Epstein, supra note 37, at 90. The authors suggest that perhaps 4–4 splits are so 
few because Justices are more apt to recuse in cases they think will not divide 4–4. Id. at 95. Or 
maybe a Justice holds her nose and votes strategically to join a 5–3 decision she doesn’t like because 
she fears a future decision “may be even more distant from her policy preferences.” Id. at 96. Or a 
Justice may simply change his vote “for institutional reasons,” id., as Justice Frankfurter apparently 
did in Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959), lest a case “be cast into the 
limbo of unexplained adjudications.” Id. Justices White and Blackmun similarly voted to avoid splits. 
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969) (White, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion 
of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally 
divided Court.”); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (using 
the exact same language as Justice White). 
125 Tellingly, Justice Scalia has implied that the Court has relatively few recusals because there’s 
no replacement mechanism. See generally Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) 
(memorandum of Scalia, J.). He suggests recusals would happen more frequently if there were a 
tiebreaking procedure. Id. Justice Breyer told a House committee, “You have a duty to sit because 
there is no one to replace me if I take myself out, and that could sometimes change the result.” John 
Gibeaut, Sitting This One Out: Health Care Case Again Raises Recusal Controversy, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 
2012), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sitting_this_one_out_health_care_case_again_raises_
recusal_controversy [https://perma.cc/3XAB-YLME]. Would former Solicitor General Kagan have 
recused herself in the first ACA challenge had there been a designation policy in place—for example, 
if she knew that retired Justice Stevens might have taken her place? Strategic behavior might color 
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Obviously, the Court and the parties have expended tremendous resources to 
resolve an issue the Court believes should be resolved—yet there is no 
resolution. The nation gets conflict rather than consistency. A law’s 
constitutionality may remain unsettled indefinitely—as, for instance, if the 
pledge’s constitutionality, dodged in Newdow, returned to a divided Court.126 
The potential disarray could be stark. Many citizens live in New Jersey but 
work in Manhattan, separated only by the Hudson River, yet a law’s 
interpretation may mean one thing in Newark (the Third Circuit) and the 
polar opposite in New York (the Second Circuit). Worse than thwarting 
“equal justice under law,” that circumstance—if extended indefinitely—could 
subject the same person to completely different applications of supposedly 
uniform federal law. 
There are proposals galore to help the Court to avoid 4–4 stalemates. 
Justice Stevens favored enlisting willing retired SCOTUS Justices—who can 
already sit in lower federal courts—an idea he said Chief Justice Rehnquist 
also supported.127 In September 2010, barely one month after then-brand-new 
Justice Kagan recused herself in roughly one-third of the Court’s docket, 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill to allow a majority of active 
SCOTUS Justices to designate a retired justice.128 
 
recusal decisions, at least subconsciously. Imagine a controversial case that a Justice suspects will be 
decided 5–4 the way she wishes. But if she recuses and is likely to be replaced by someone she 
considers an ideological foe, the other side would claim the five-justice majority. Two law professors, 
recognizing that a justice may resist recusal if it means the designation of an unlike-minded 
replacement, have proposed a lottery system. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 101, 103. 
126 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
127 McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 83 n. 7. Sometimes, though, there are no retired justices, as in the 
span of years before Justice O’Connor left the bench in 2006: Chief Justice Burger retired on September 26, 
1986 and died on June 25, 1995; Justice Powell retired on June 26, 1987 and died on August 25, 1998; Justice 
Blackmun retired on August 3, 1994 and died on March 4, 1999. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/8CKA-6WZE] (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2020); Justices, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices [https://perma.cc/57AU-7FRL] (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2020); Warren E. Burger, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/warren_e_burger 
[https://perma.cc/RZF6-CWP6] (last visited Nov 21, 2020); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr [https://perma.cc/4CZ5-8GBF] (last visited Nov 21, 2020); 
Harry A. Blackmun, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/harry_a_blackmun [https://perma.cc/H6D4-
TXBT] (last visited Nov 21, 2020). 
128 S. 3871, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010). Scholars have discussed the Leahy proposal in depth. See 
generally McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15 (discussing the proposal’s complications as well as the 
benefits of avoiding the unlikely 4–4 tie); Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, Comment, A Second Sitting: 
Assessing the Constitutionality and Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court Justices to Fill Recusal-
Based Vacancies on the Bench, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 253, 267 (2011) (arguing that Senator Leahy’s 
proposal is a beneficial innovation and preferable to alternative solutions to recusal-based vacancies). 
Senator Leahy’s proposal raises many questions. Can the recused justice help select the retired 
justice? See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 103 n.91 (flagging the bill’s lack of clarity on this 
point). If so, is that “essentially voting by proxy”—picking someone most apt to vote the way the 
recused justice would have voted? See Saidman-Krauss, supra at 281. If the recused justice cannot 
vote on the replacement justice, what happens if the remaining eight justices deadlock? Does nobody 
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Professors Reynolds and Young take particular aim at the rule of 
affirmance by an equally divided Court. They contend that in the appellate 
context, sometimes “[the] policies supporting reversal may outweigh those 
supporting affirmance.”129 For example, they argue, when a lower court strikes 
down a federal statute as unconstitutional, a 4–4 Supreme Court should 
require reversal given the presumption of constitutionality.130 Similarly, a 4–
4 tie in a criminal case would produce a reversal of a conviction.131 Notably, 
the professors themselves tie 1–1 when their two proposed rules collide: 
“[W]hen the Court divides on the constitutionality of a federal statute 
challenged on constitutional grounds by a criminal defendant.”132 How do 
they resolve their stalemate? By reverting to a SCOTUS-like rule: “The 
authors, being divided evenly here, cannot make a recommendation on this 
issue.”133 Professor Baker, in fact, argues that a 4–4 split should be resolved 
through some sort of vote switching.134 Indeed, he would prefer that someone 
flip his or her vote so that the legal question is decided and the policy question 
is returned to Congress.135 
Although federal law bars the assignment of temporary SCOTUS 
Justices, meaning ties go unbroken, the same is not true in most state supreme 
courts. Even so, some state high courts mimic the federal High Court. 
  
 
get appointed? The Court splits 4–4 most often in ideologically divisive cases. Does that suggest the 
four liberal justices would strategically resist enlisting a retired colleague if they suspect she might 
vote with the four conservatives, and vice versa? Might they favor stalemate, even one that affirms 
a conservative lower-court victory, over a High Court judgment that broadens it nationwide? Might 
the four justices who voted to grant certiorari push for a particular retired justice, effectively winning 
the case “before it is even argued?” See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 15, at 101 n. 83. Even if the 
selection method were random, what if the justice pondering recusal suspects the odds are slim that 
a like-minded ally will be chosen? Or what if the chief justice, rather than the Court as a whole, is 
empowered to designate someone unilaterally? Does that vest him with lopsided power, essentially 
giving him two votes? See Saidman-Krauss, supra at 281-82 (fretting the risk of such disproportionate 
influence); see also infra Section III.B (highlighting the problems that can arise when the chief justice 
of a state supreme court picks a temporary justice). 
129 Reynolds & Young, supra note 122, at 46. 
130 Id. at 50. 
131 See id. at 52-53 (arguing that “[o]ur system of criminal justice evidences a great concern that 
persons not be convicted of crimes unless clear law as applied to clear fact so warrants”; therefore, 
“a conviction should not be sustained unless affirmed by a majority of the highest court to hear the 
case”). 
132 Id. at 52. 
133 Id. at 53 n.105. 
134 See Baker, supra note 12, at 136 (describing how justices have historically suppressed their 
own preferences to settle a case and arguing that modern justices should be willing to do the same). 
Of course, this raises the obvious question of which justice ought to switch votes. 
135 Id. at 130. 
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2. Survey Says: Seventeen States SCOTUS’s “Ties Happen” Approach 
 
Like SCOTUS, seventeen state high courts follow the no-tiebreaker 
approach: Alaska,136 Colorado,137 Illinois,138 Indiana,139 Iowa,140 Kansas,141 
 
136 ALASKA R. APP. P. 106(a) (“[A]ny issue or point on appeal on which the justices are equally 
divided is affirmed in that appeal . . . .”). 
137 COLO. APP. R. 35(b) (“When the supreme court acting en banc is equally divided in an 
opinion, the judgment being appealed will stand affirmed.”). 
138 See Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam) (“[I]t is 
preferable . . . to follow substantially the procedure that is employed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States when the judges of that court are equally divided.”). 
139 IND. R. APP. P. 58(c) (“When the Supreme Court is evenly divided . . . the decision of the 
Court of Appeals shall be reinstated.”). 
140 IOWA CODE § 602.4107 (“When the supreme court is equally divided in opinion, the 
judgment of the court below shall stand affirmed, but the decision of the supreme court is of no 
further force or authority.”). 
141 Unlike in many other states, Kansas law does not affirmatively state the legal effect of a tie 
vote. The seven-member Supreme Court of Kansas, however, has adopted an equal-division-equals-
affirmance rule, relying on article III, section 2 of the Kansas Constitution, which states that at least 
four justices “shall be necessary for a decision.” See Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1982).  
The general rule in this jurisdiction, and elsewhere, is that when one of the justices is 
disqualified to participate in a decision of issues raised in an appeal and the remaining 
six justices are equally divided in their conclusions the judgment of the trial court 
must stand. . . . The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed by an equally 
divided court. 
Id. 
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Figure 2: Ties Happen 
17 States Affirm by an Equally Divided Court 
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Kentucky,142 Maine,143 Massachusetts,144 Michigan,145 Minnesota,146 
Mississippi,147 New Jersey,148 North Carolina,149 Pennsylvania,150 Rhode 
Island,151 and Wisconsin.152 
 
142 See infra note 154. 
143 See Day v. State Tax Assessor, 942 A.2d 685, 686 (Me. 2008) (“Because the Court is evenly 
divided, we affirm the judgment.”). 
144 See Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 446 N.E.2d 1060, 
1060 (Mass. 1983) (“The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed by an equally divided court.”); 
Pacella v. Milford Radio Corp., 476 N.E.2d 595, 595 (1985) (same). Massachusetts includes the rule 
in its rules of appellate procedure: 
If, following allowance of an application for further appellate review, the justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court are equally divided in opinion, unless a majority of the 
participating justices decides otherwise, the court shall issue an order noting such 
equal division, the effect of which shall be the same as if the court had denied the 
application for further appellate review. 
MASS. R. APP. P. 27.1(g). 
145 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.230 (“When the justices of the supreme court are equally 
divided as to the ultimate decision of any case properly before the court on review, the judgment of 
the court below shall be affirmed.”); see also People v. Sullivan, 609 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 2000) (“[T]he 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed by an equal division of the court.”), aff ’g by equal 
division 586 N.W.2d 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed 
by an equal division of the court.”). 
146 See State v. Retzlaff, 842 N.W.2d 565, 565 (Minn. 2012) (“[U]pon an evenly divided 
court . . . the decision of the court of appeals . . . is, affirmed without opinion.”). 
147 While the Mississippi Constitution can be read to empower the Governor to appoint a 
tiebreaking justice, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation has been to seek a 
substitute justice only when necessary to reach a quorum: 
Today we reiterate the long standing application of Section 165. The appointment of 
a special justice to this Court is appropriate where the Court lacks a quorum and where 
the parties are unable to agree in the selection of special justices to hear a case. 
However, so long as the Court has a quorum to conduct business, such an appointment 
is not authorized by our Constitution. 
Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1243 (Miss. 2003). The court in Hewes was interpreting the 
following section of the Mississippi Constitution: “Whenever any judge of the Supreme . . . for any 
reason, be unable or disqualified to preside . . . the Governor may commission another, or others, of 
law knowledge, to preside . . . during such disability or disqualification in the place of the judge or 
judges so disqualified.” MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 165. 
148 A clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court confirms that while New Jersey law allows substitute 
justices, such appointments are never made to break a tie. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with 
Gail Haney, Deputy Clerk, N.J. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
149 See Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 326 S.E.2d 30, 30 (N.C. 1985) (“The remaining members 
of this Court being equally divided . . . the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed and 
stands without precedential value.”). 
150 See Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 705 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he Court being evenly 
divided, the Order of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.”); see also PA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROCS. § 4(B)(3) (“When the votes [of the participating justices] are equally divided, 
any resulting opinions shall be designated as the ‘Opinion in Support of Affirmance’ or ‘Opinion in 
Support of Reversal,’ as the case may be.”). 
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In some of these states, like Michigan, the “no tiebreaker” approach is 
prescribed by law;153 in others, like Kentucky, Minnesota, and Mississippi, 
fill-in justices are permitted and used to ensure a quorum or adequate number 
of sitting justices, but not in response to a tie.154 
In most no-tiebreaker states, if impasse results, the court generally issues 
a pro forma order or opinion citing the relevant rule or statute that a tie 
 
151 In Rhode Island, the chief justice may assign retired Supreme Court justices but declines 
to do so in cases of an evenly divided court. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 587 (R.I. 2013) 
(“[T]he Family Court judgment is affirmed by an evenly divided court.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 8-3-8(d) (“Any [retired] justice of the supreme court . . . shall at the direction of the chief justice 
of the supreme court, subject to the retiree’s physical and mental competence, be assigned to perform 
such services as an associate justice of the supreme court as the chief justice of the supreme court 
shall prescribe.”); Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, Clerk, R.I. Sup. Ct. 
(Dec. 2015) (on file with author). 
152 See Sohn Mfg. Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854 N.W.2d 371, 371 (Wis. 2014) (“The 
court is evenly divided upon the question of affirmance or reversal. That results in affirmance of the 
judgment of the court of appeals . . . .”). 
153 See supra note 145. 
154 For discussion of Mississippi’s quorum-ensuring appointments, see supra note 147. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court calls up lower-court judges to ensure it has a quorum—even using a 
fancy random number generator to assign temporary justices—but, says the clerk, “There is no 
specific process for appointing acting justices to avoid or break a tie.” But adopting one isn’t out of 
the question, says the clerk, noting, “The court has not had to consider the tiebreak issue in the 
context of an original jurisdiction case, in which there is no ‘decision below.’” Telephone and E-mail 
Correspondence with Rita DeMeules, Ct. Comm’r, Minn. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). 
Sometimes state high courts shift gears and blaze a new trail over time. In Kentucky, where a 
tie vote means affirmance, the system is “rather convoluted,” says the clerk. Telephone and E-mail 
Correspondence with Susan Clary, Clerk, Ky. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-February 2016) (on file with 
author). The constitution prescribes that the Governor appoints special justices—but only when “as 
many as two Justices decline or are unable to sit.” KY. CONST. § 110(3). The clerk says the Governor 
is a lawyer and has “remarkable staff,” adding, “they’ll review the pleadings and will put people on 
who are skilled in that area.” Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan Clary, supra. 
Pleadings aren’t available online, though. “They must request copies,” says the clerk, “and the current 
governor, unlike previous governors, does,” adding the Governor has always appointed “competent 
people, not those with agendas.” Id.  
But what if only one justice can’t participate, a more common scenario than multiple recusals? 
“[H]ere is where it becomes a bit more tricky,” says the clerk. Id. In 1989, the Court, believing it had 
the inherent power to name a single replacement, adopted a policy under which the Chief Justice 
would appoint a non-judge lawyer as a special justice. Ky. Utils. Co. v. S.E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 
407, 410 app. (Ky. 1992). The court opted for lawyer appointees because of this constitutional 
provision: “[The Chief Justice] shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, 
active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment 
necessary for the prompt disposition of causes.” KY. CONST. § 110(5)(b). The court took this to 
mean it could appoint lawyers to the Supreme Court. Under the 1989 policy, each justice (elected in 
districts) would, at the beginning of the Court’s term, provide the Chief Justice a list of at least 10 
attorneys from his district, and if recusals arose, the Chief Justice would pick someone from that 
list. Ky. Utils., 836 S.W.2d at 410 app. Yet the current Court does “not embrace that logic” and chooses 
to either “go with six or wait out the vacancy.” Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan 
Clary, supra; accord Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 1999) (“[T]he policy set forth in 
the Appendix to the opinion in Kentucky Utils. Co. v. South East Coal Co., supra, has been rescinded.”). 
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affirms the lower-court judgment. In Maine, for example, a 3–3 split results 
in this anticlimactic sentence: “Because the Court is evenly divided, we affirm 
the judgment.”155 Similarly, the rule in Colorado is that “[w]hen the supreme 
court acting en banc is equally divided in an opinion, the judgment being 
appealed will stand affirmed.”156 Result: oodles of squandered resources—
both public and private—but no precedent. 
Other states have an impasse-avoiding mechanism at their disposal but 
elect not to use it—at least not consistently. For example, the Alaska Supreme 
Court clerk says that, while “a tie goes to the status quo,” the high court itself 
“sometimes appoints a retired justice as a pro tem in select cases—not as a 
tiebreaker but on the front end to ensure full strength.”157 So the court uses a 
discretionary procedure in “select cases” to avert ties, but not to break them. 
The Chief Justice has wide latitude to do it differently—for example, to assign 
someone only after stalemate has arisen. The Alaska Constitution broadly 
declares: “The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative 
head of all courts” and “may assign judges from one court or division thereof 
to another for temporary service.”158 The Chief Justice may assign—it’s 
discretionary—but doesn’t have to, and the current chief justice has opted to 
appoint only in “select cases,” and only on the front end, not after deadlock 
occurs. But just what makes cases “select,” and why are they spared the threat 
and costs of deadlock but not “non-select” cases? The clerk confirms the court 
uses pro tem justices “in other situations, but I don’t think they’ve ever 
appointed someone to break a tie.”159 Why not? “The court doesn’t want 
someone who is not a sitting justice to be the deciding vote in setting 
precedent,” says the clerk.160 But a pro tem justice appointed pre-deadlock is 
just as surely the deciding, precedent-setting vote if the court ultimately splits 
3–2, with the pro tem justice in the majority.161 
Interestingly, even when state law can be read to authorize a tiebreaker, a 
high court may opt for deadlock.162 In Mississippi, the Constitution states 
 
155 See Hale v. Antoniou, 820 A.2d 586, 586 (Me. 2003). 
156 COLO. APP. R. 35(b). 
157 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Marilyn May, Clerk of App. Cts., Alaska Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
158 ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 16. 
159 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Marilyn May, supra note 157. 
160 Id. 
161 Because pro tem assignments are used haphazardly, not consistently, and never to break 
ties, I have classified Alaska as following a SCOTUS-like approach. 
162 A generation ago in Illinois, the seven-justice Supreme Court “carefully considered” what to 
do when, after two justices recused, the court was unable to muster a constitutional majority of four. 
Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam). This wasn’t a tiebreaker 
situation, but it broadly presented a choice between no decision and some decision. The per curiam 
court concluded it was “preferable” to follow a SCOTUS-like approach. Id. Notably, the Chief Justice 
dissented, stating that although “there is no completely satisfactory means of resolving cases such as 
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broadly that when any member of the Supreme Court cannot sit, the Governor 
may commission someone.163 But the Chief Justice says his Court’s longtime 
view is that “a tie’s a tie,” and “we only go to the Governor if we fail to have a 
quorum,” never when the Court is deadlocked.164 This view, the Chief Justice 
concedes, “is not without detractors,” both on the Court and off, but it’s been 
the consistent practice “as far back as anyone knows or can research.”165 
In North Carolina, retired Supreme Court justices may become emergency 
justices subject to temporary recall to active service, but only to replace a 
justice who is temporarily incapacitated, not for ordinary recusals or other 
sporadic vacancies.166 The clerk says they affirm by an equally divided court 
about three times a year—“not common but not rare.”167 And the justices “try 
their darndest not to, using their general persuasive powers.”168 What do the 
petitioning parties think when the Court locks up? “Not happy.”169 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court likewise declines to name a fill-in 
justice when it divides 2–2. State law authorizes the Chief Justice to 
temporarily recall a retired high court justice to assist the Court,170 “but it is 
not routinely done in those few instances when they are evenly divided,” says 
the clerk.171 In 2009, for example, when the Chief Justice retired, the acting 
chief justice issued an order recalling his retired colleague until a replacement 
 
this,” it was “desirable to utilize a uniform means of resolving all cases in which four members of this 
court fail to agree.” Id. at 67 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice insisted that ample 
authority to overcome deadlock was found in the Illinois Constitution, which reads, “The Supreme 
Court may assign a Judge temporarily to any court.” Id. (quoting ILL. CONST. ART. VI, § 16). The 
chief justice even fleshed out a specific proposal—assigning appellate judges rotationally from a list 
(to avoid the mischief of strategic selection) and only after deadlock had arisen: 
On the infrequent occasions when at least four members of this court are unable to 
agree, because of the disqualification of one or more of us, I would assign to our court 
appellate court judges who would sit in place of our disqualified members and only 
for the purposes of deciding the case in which four of our members could not agree. 
In order to eliminate any possibility that the result in a given case had been 
preordained by the selection of a particular judge, I believe our court should select 
now a list of seven appellate court members and list their names alphabetically, or in 
the order drawn by chance. Those judges would then be assigned to our court, as the 
need arose, in rotation. 
Id. 
163 See supra note 147; see also MISS. CONST. art 6, § 165. 
164 Telephone Interview with Bill Waller Jr., Chief Just., Miss. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 14, 2016) (on file 
with author). 
165 Id. 
166 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-39.3, 7A-39.5 (2019). 
167 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Christie Roeder, supra note 44. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-3-8(d) (2020). 
171 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, supra note 151. 
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chief was named.172 In 2011, after a subsequent vacancy, the court simply 
operated with four justices.173 The default is affirmance by an equally divided 
Court.174 Notably, though, Rhode Island has a rule of appellate procedure that 
arguably substitutes for a formal tiebreaker, allowing a litigant to move for 
reargument when the Court is joined by a fifth member.175 
Some state judicial officials say having no tiebreaker heightens judges’ 
willingness to find common ground. The Michigan high-court clerk reports 
only one tie in fourteen years, calling it “extremely rare” and saying justices 
“work hard to reason with each other to reach compromise.”176 Collegiality 
matters enormously, she stresses: “If personal relationships, especially trust 
and respect, are cultivated among the justices and their staffs, there will be 
fewer entrenchments that result in tie votes.”177 The Kentucky clerk voiced 
similar sentiments: “People try to woo and try to convince to avoid 3–3.”178 
Yet in Rhode Island, the Chief Justice responded that he can’t really say that 
lacking a formal tiebreaker nudges the Court toward compromise.179 
Another upside, say officials in some no-tiebreaker states, is that working 
“without a net” provides an opportunity for chief-justice leadership. In 
Michigan, says the clerk, the Chief Justice wields “ultimate control of the 
conferences at which opinions are discussed,” adding, “if [she] thinks an 
opinion can be massaged in such a way that it could garner a majority, [she] 
will continue to bring it back for conference discussion to try to make that 




174 See Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 587 (R.I. 2013) (“The court is evenly divided . . . 
Accordingly, the Family Court judgement is affirmed . . . .”). 
175 R.I. SUP. CT. R., art. I, r. 25(a) (discussing petitions requesting reargument before the full 
court “because the Court has evenly divided in an opinion”). 
For example, 
On December 18, 2009, this Court, sitting as a bench of four justices, was evenly 
divided and thus affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. Morrow moved pursuant to 
Article I, Rule 25(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure to reargue 
her appeal once this Court was joined by a fifth member. Her request was granted on 
January 15, 2010 and on September 29, 2010, this Court again heard oral argument. As 
such, we now decide Morrow’s appeal upon its merits. 
Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011) (internal citation omitted); see also Ucci v. Mancini, 387 
A.2d 1056, 1057 (R.I. 1978) (“When Mancini’s appeal came on to be heard, a four-man court divided 
equally and affirmed the trial justice’s judgment. Later, we granted Mancini’s motion to reargue 
before a full court.”) (internal citation omitted). 
176 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Larry Royster, Clerk, Mich. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
177 Id. 
178 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Susan Clary, supra note 154. 
179 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Debra Saunders, supra note 151. 
180 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Larry Royster, supra note 176. 
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entrenched in partisan positions so that was probably more difficult to do,” 
but today, “the justices are more collegial and seem willing to find common 
ground.”181 Also, while “Court policy usually allows a new justice to sit on the 
sidelines for any case in which they did not participate in oral argument,” if 
it seems the case will deadlock 3–3, “the new justice is strongly encouraged to 
participate in the decision in order to break the tie.”182 
Yet the lack of a decision doesn’t always mean the lack of guidance. At 
SCOTUS, litigants typically get a terse “The judgment is affirmed by an 
equally divided Court”—nothing more, and ordinarily no indication of how 
individual justices viewed the case.183 Justices are free to express their views 
but rarely do. For example, Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion 
explaining his merits views in Biggers v. Tennessee, a case where the judgment 
below was affirmed by an equally divided Court because newly appointed 
Justice Thurgood Marshall was recused.184 
Some state high courts follow this approach, with justices filing competing 
merits-based opinions in deadlocked cases do. When the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts is evenly split, the justices can still write full opinions 
explaining why they would affirm or reverse.185 Pennsylvania also permits 
dueling writings: “Opinion in Support of Affirmance” vs. “Opinion in 
Support of Reversal.”186 To some extent, this mitigates the lack of guidance 
that otherwise flows from the sterile announcement of an evenly divided 
court, because if multiple justices join these advisory writings, future litigants 
can tailor their arguments, having discovered who leans which way and why. 
Many state high courts, while opting against tiebreakers, have no qualms 
about always telling the public how each individual judge voted, whether or 
not there are reasons. For example, in Iowa, the court issues a short 
statement—”The court, being equally divided, declares this case affirmed by 
operation of law”—but the very next sentence lists by name the justices who 
favored affirmance and reversal.187 Likewise in Kansas: Deadlock affirms the 
lower court, but the per curiam opinion lists those who would affirm and 




183 Supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
184 390 U.S. 404, 404-09 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
185 See, e.g., Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 832 N.E. 2d 639, 640 (Mass. 2005) (listing 
separate opinions, and the justices who joined them, in a case with an equally divided court). 
186 210 PA. CODE § 63.4(B)(3) (2020). 
187 See, e.g., Polk Co. Bd. of Review v. Village Green Co-Op, Inc., No. 13-1205, 2014 WL 
2619674, at *1 (Iowa June 13, 2014) (per curiam) (citing IOWA CODE § 602.4107 (2013)). 
188 See, e.g., Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d 475 (1982). 
189 See, e.g., Sohn Mfg., Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854 N.W.2d 371 (Wis. 2014). 
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In sum, seventeen states mirror SCOTUS to some degree, letting the 
lower-court judgment stand. That leaves thirty-three states with mechanisms 
to either avoid or break deadlock. The following section surveys and evaluates 
the various approaches taken in that supermajority of states. 
B. Varying Procedures of Varying Prudence: Avoiding and Breaking Legal 
Logjams in State High Courts 
Thirty-five courts take a stab at resolving judicial deadlock.190  
  
 
190 See infra Appendix A for summary chart classifying each state’s approach. 
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Figure 3: Not Fit to be Tied 
35 Courts Avoid or Break Ties 
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And as described below, the no-tie procedures in these antistalemate 
states vary in four fundamental ways: 
• When a temporary justice is appointed, either pre- or post-deadlock: 
Twenty-four courts aim to avert ties by appointing a substitute justice as soon 
as the court finds itself shorthanded. The others wait until a tie actually occurs 
before naming someone.  
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Figure 4: Timing of Appointments 
Light gray: Pre-deadlock, 24 courts; Dark gray: Post-deadlock, 11 courts 
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• Who can be appointed?: In thirty-two high courts, the fill-in justice 




191 Classifying Texas and Tennessee is admittedly tricky. In the Lone Star State, fill-in justices 
on the civil high court (the Supreme Court of Texas) must be lower-court judges while fill-ins on 
the criminal high court (the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) may be “a person who is learned in 
the law.” See infra Appendix A. In the Volunteer State, the governor’s appointee must have “law 
knowledge” while chief justice appointees are assumed to be lower-court judges. See id. 
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Figure 5: Who Can Be Appointed? 
Black: judge, 32 courts; Light gray: other, 3 courts 
(Others: In Arkansas, the appointee must be a lawyer. In Tennessee, eligible appointees are 
“men . . . of law knowledge.” In Texas, the civil court appointee must be a judge and the criminal 
court appointee must be “a person who is learned in the law.”) 
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• Who does the appointing?: In twenty-three courts, the Chief Justice 
picks the temporary justice; in seven, the Court does so; and in four, the 
Governor steps in.192 
 
• How much discretion the appointer has: Some selection methods are 
completely randomized, literally the luck of the draw. In Louisiana, the clerk 
plucks a name from a large Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern. And in Washington 
State, a name is drawn from a fancy chalice. In other states, the appointer 
 
192 See id. Caveat: in some of these states, the chief justice or court delegates the actual 
selection to its administrative staff. Also, Tennessee is counted under both “chief justice” and 
“governor” since state law divides the assignment power. 
Figure 7: The Washington Chalice Figure 8: The Louisiana Jack-o’-Lantern 
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Figure 6: Who Appoints the Tiebreaking Justice? 
Black: Governor, 4 courts; Dark gray: Chief Justice, 23 courts; Medium gray: Court, 7 courts; 
Light gray: shared between Governor and Chief Justice, 1 court 
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wields unchecked discretion, free to pick any qualified person, which can spur 
cries of cronyism.193 
Quite simply, the details vary significantly. Some systems are purely 
ministerial and apolitical, drawing a substitute justice’s name at random from 
among those who are eligible. Others are highly discretionary, where a Chief 
Justice or a Governor appoints someone—not neutrally, but purposefully.194 In 
some states, a pro tem justice is named as soon as the court is operating at less 
than full strength, sometimes even before a case is granted, meaning the court 
is naming someone in order to avert a tie, not to break one.195 In other states, 
a tiebreaker is commissioned only after the court is hopelessly deadlocked.196 
This section will explore these different methods in greater detail. 
This Article categorizes states based on what they actually do, not on what 
they’re authorized to do. For example, the Missouri Constitution says the 
Supreme Court makes temporary judicial assignments,197 but “the practice is 
for the Chief Justice to do it as the court’s agent,” says the clerk.198 Another 
example: Massachusetts law allows the Chief Justice to temporarily assign 
retired high court justices, including presumably to break a tie, but the 
practice is to affirm by an evenly divided court.199 Same in Minnesota, where 
the Constitution authorizes temporary assignments, but the Court declines 
to do so to avoid deadlock.200 This section focuses on courts’ actual practice, 
whether or not that practice accords with the written law. 
 
193 States also vary in terms of whether an appointer must appoint someone or may appoint 
someone. In twenty-six states, the law uses mandatory, shall-like language, while in ten states, the 
law uses more permissive, may-like language, giving the appointer discretion whether to appoint a 
substitute. Some states, like Texas and Tennessee, defy easy classification. Texas, like Oklahoma, has 
dual high courts, one for civil matters and one for criminal matters. The chief justice of the Texas 
Supreme Court has discretion whether to notify the governor, who, once notified, must name 
someone. But the presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “shall” notify the governor 
of disqualifications, and the governor “immediately shall” appoint someone. In Tennessee, where 
appointment power is divided between the governor and the chief justice, the former seems to have 
a duty to name someone, while the latter seems to have discretion. For full treatment, see infra 
Subsection II.B.2. 
194 See infra Subsections II.B.2.a-b. 
195 See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
196 See infra Subsections II.B.2.a-c (e.g., Texas, New York). 
197 MO. CONST. art. V, § 6. 
198 E-mail Correspondence with Clerk, Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 7, 2016) (on file with author). 
199 See infra Appendix A; see also supra note 144. 
200 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Rita DeMeules, supra note 149; MINN. 
CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“As provided by law judges of the court of appeals or of the district court may 
be assigned temporarily to act as judges of the supreme court upon its request and judges of the 
district court may be assigned temporarily . . . to act as judges of the court of appeals.”). 
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1. Roughly Three-Fourths of Anti-stalemate Courts Appoint Fill-in Justices 
on the Front End, Aiming to Avoid Deadlock in the First Place 
Twenty-four states aim to bypass impasse—that is, to avoid ties rather 
than break them: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.201 
Here is a sampling of various tie-averting approaches: 
Arizona: In Arizona, the Chief Justice routinely appoints a lower-court 
jurist (“usually a court of appeals judge,” says the clerk) as soon as the court 
is operating at less than full strength.202 And in Alaska, as discussed above, 
the Chief Justice will sometimes appoint a retired justice “in select cases”—
not to break a tie “but on the front end to ensure full strength.”203 If no front-
end justice is named, and the court later ties, so be it. 
Arkansas: In Arkansas, the Governor names a substitute justice “anytime a 
justice recuses,” says the clerk, and such appointments happen frequently—
“maybe 10 percent of cases . . . it’s happening more and more.”204 Today’s 
Arkansas high court is “divided,” says the clerk, making it “impossible to do 
anything with six,” so it’s “a time-saver on the front end.”205 The Governor 
knows the case’s docket number, parties, counsel, and so on.206 But again, these 
appointments happen early and every time there’s a recusal, not just when a 
tie happens.207 The clerk cannot recall seeing a repeat appointee, who can be a 
retired or active jurist or even merely a licensed attorney.208 And if the 
Governor dawdles, the Lieutenant Governor gets to make the appointment.209 
Delaware: Delaware also avoids ties on the front end by only hearing cases 
at full strength. Under Delaware law, the Chief Justice designates a lower-
court judge to be a temporary justice.210 The Chief Justice has “lots of 
discretion,” and this is how he describes his selection process: 
 
201 See infra Appendix A. 
202 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Janet Johnson, Clerk, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
203 See supra notes 157-161 (discussing Alaska). 
204 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stacey Pectol, Clerk of Cts., Ark. Sup. Ct. 
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210 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 2(a) 4(a); DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 12, 38. 
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The Chief Justice selects a trial judge after consultation with the presiding 
judge of whatever trial court it is, solely to ensure that the trial judge is 
current on her other work.  
There was an old written rule that suggested we go to the presiding 
judges of certain trial courts and then down the line in terms of seniority. 
That has not been used for years.  
No trial judge, of course, sits on an appeal from a colleague on his own 
court.  
To my knowledge, there has never been a controversy about this. But 
there is a contextual reason for that, which is important to understand. We 
have a bipartisan judiciary. Every other judge is of the other party by 
Constitutional mandate. Since 1977, each Governor has employed a 
bipartisan judicial nominating commission to help select judges, who are 
nominated by the Governor and confirmed by our Senate. As a result, 
whatever differences have ever occurred on our Supreme Court have never 
been partisan in nature. And we go en banc on any case where there is a 
difference of opinion.  
*   *   * 
I have lots of discretion.  
But we’ve had a lot of turnover recently and had to use lots of trial judges.  
I have, as have prior CJs, tried to get a variety of trial judges in the mix.  
I don’t recall ever thinking about political affiliation.  
I do think about getting a diverse array of trial judges in the mix, and in 
some particular cases (complicated business law cases) having judges with 
experience. That is also true in criminal cases, though. I do always want to 
make sure the trial judge is current in her work and not burdening colleagues 
by joining us.  
We are a small state. In the past two years, I would bet I have asked 20-
30 trial judges at least to serve. Half come from Chancery, the Superior 
Court, Family Court, and the Court of Common Pleas.  
I have actually opened it up a bit, b[y] appointing more Family Court 
and CCP judges to serve.211 
 
211 E-mail Correspondence with Leo Strine, Chief Just., Del. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 26, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
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Georgia: A tie vote “has never occurred” in Georgia, says the clerk, because 
the Court names a substitute pre-argument. 212 “We rarely operate at less than 
full strength” and “have never had to appoint someone to break a tie.”213 
Idaho: Avoiding ties is also the priority in Idaho, where the Idaho Supreme 
Court clerk says, “If a justice recuses, I appoint a retired justice to sit so we 
don’t end up in a tie.” 214 
Missouri: Missouri likewise fills any holes on the front end, before 
argument, to avoid charges of gamesmanship.215 What’s more, while the 
Constitution’s “wording is the Court does it . . . the practice is for the Chief 
Justice to do it as the Court’s agent,” explains the clerk: 
If the appointment is solely by the chief justice and made only when the court 
is tied, there will be considerable discussion that the process was manipulated 
to secure a particular result. If the appointment is earlier in the process, it 
can be by the chief justice as there is no way to know how the case will turn 
 
212 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Therese Barnes, Clerk, Ga. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
213 Id. 
214 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stephen Kenyon, Clerk, Idaho Sup. Ct. (Jan. 
2016) (on file with author). 
215 Sometimes efforts to quell substitution-related criticism fall short. In Missouri recently, 
the Supreme Court issued on the same day conflicting decisions involving wrongful-death claims—
one case decided by the court’s seven regular members, the other using a substitute justice. Compare 
State ex rel Beisly v. Perigo, 469 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (allowing a wrongful death 
claim to go forward despite the statute of limitations under the doctrine of equitable estoppel) with 
Boland v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 471 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Mo. 2015) (holding, to the contrary, that 
courts “may not add exceptions to a special statute of limitations”). “The bar was understandably 
confused,” said the clerk. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Clerk, supra note 198. A 
dissenting justice shared the bar’s discomfort: 
[T]his Court should not have issued the majority opinion in this case that is contrary 
to the position taken by a majority of the regular members of this Court in Boland, 
especially as the majority in this case was only possible with the assistance of a special 
judge from the Court of Appeals, Western District. 
*   *   * 
In my view, there is no practical or legitimate reason to issue an opinion in Beisly 
which is in conflict with Boland on the same day and that required a special judge to 
garner a majority. As noted, the proper approach would have been to retransfer, which 
requires a majority vote of the judges on the case. 
Beisly, 469 S.W.3d at 445-46 (Fischer, J., dissenting); see also Jeff Lehr, State’s High Court Provides 
Latest Twist in Beisly Murder Case: State’s High Court Issues Conflicting Rulings in Beisly, Boland 
Decisions, JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/state-s-
high-court-provides-latest-twist-in-beisly-murder/article_e34bd8e6-61c2-56bb-8bba-
02558a278ab5.html [https://perma.cc/7L96-TU6N] (quoting one lawyer as saying, “the disparity 
between those two decisions makes following the law in the future impossible”). 
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out. If the appointment is only after the vote is known, it may be better to 
have the whole panel or court make the appointment.216 
Montana: Montana similarly aims for tie avoidance. The seven-member 
Montana Supreme Court hears most of its cases in five-judge panels.217 But 
when the Court is sitting en banc and there’s a temporary vacancy, a district 
judge is appointed before oral argument.218 (Montana has no intermediate 
appellate court.219) “We always have a full complement,” says the clerk, and 
“it’s taken care of up front.”220 The Chief Justice appoints with “wide 
discretion.”221 There is “no criteria,” but the chief “tries to give everybody a 
shot.”222 The clerk describes the chief ’s temp-picking authority as “probably 
the biggest power a chief justice has” and, with commendable candor, says he 
favors “the clerk picking on a lottery basis.”223 Letting the chief pick with 
boundless discretion—prompting questions like, “Why should someone have 
two votes?”—invites public qualms.224 “You want people to have confidence 
in the court system.”225 
Nebraska: The Nebraska Supreme Court likewise names someone “prior 
to argument,” says the clerk, “to avoid a tie, not to break one.”226 The process 
is “not controlled by rule and is relatively informal.”227 Nor is it “case 
dependent as to the issues or type of case involved.”228 But it happens fairly 
often, says the clerk, adding, “We’ve had some retirements lately.”229 Basically, 
“[i]f the Chief learns that there will be a vacancy for any reason (conflicts, 
illness, etc.) the practice is to attempt to fill out all cases with a full Court of 
seven, even if a full Court is not constitutionally required.”230 
 
216 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Mo. Clerk, supra note 198. 
217 William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Examination of the Business of the Montana 
Supreme Court, in OPEN JUDICIAL POLITICS (Rorie Spill Solberg, Jennifer Segal Diascro & 
Eric Waltenburg eds., 2020), https://open.oregonstate.education/open-judicial-politics/
chapter/mclauchlan [https://perma.cc/JH5G-LE4J]. 
218 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Ed Smith, Clerk, Mont. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-
Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
219 See McLauchlan, supra note 217. 
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New Mexico: A similar tie-avoiding procedure occurs in New Mexico, where 
the clerk says temporary assignments happen “all the time.”231 There’s “no set 
or written policy.”232 “It changes from chief to chief,” who has wide selection 
discretion and may “focus on subject-matter expertise and geographical 
variety” or “go back and forth between trial and appellate judges to get 
variety.”233 But appointments have occurred “with frequency the past few years, 
especially when we get a new justice with lower court experience who has to 
recuse a lot.”234 The current Chief Justice is “careful not to be seen as court-
packing,” particularly in “cases of political notoriety,” and “might look to a judge 
of another party to avoid the appearance of slanting the case.”235 When 
appointing an appellate judge, the current chief justice has a list “and goes down 
the list on a seniority basis.”236 There is no such list for trial-judge appointees.237 
North Dakota: In North Dakota, the Chief Justice (actually, the clerk) 
names someone “at the first possible moment,” says the clerk, who says swift, 
pre-deadlock appointments “avoids the suggestion that someone was 
handpicked due to subject matter.”238 When the North Dakota Supreme 
Court is short-staffed, the clerk sends an email to trial court judges outside 
the district where the case arose. “The first to respond gets it,” says the clerk, 
adding, “Frankly, we don’t get a lot of responses back because our trial courts 
are too busy.”239 And if no trial judge responds, “we then go to senior 
judges.”240 The prior Chief Justice wanted to approve substitute judges, but 
“the current chief wants to avoid accusations of political [maneuvering] if 
there’s a hot topic.”241 Such appointments happen frequently—”happens 
every month,” reports the clerk—since one Justice is married to a trial judge, 
and another is “married to a big-firm lawyer” whose law firm often appears 
before the Court.242 
Ohio: Ohio has a front-loaded system, too, explains longtime Chief Justice 
(and former Lieutenant Governor) Maureen O’Connor.243 If a 3–3 split arises 
 
231 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Joey Moya, Clerk, N.M. Sup. Ct. (October 
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243 Telephone Interview with Maureen O’Connor, Chief Just., Ohio Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
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at the “jurisdictional” phase, when the Court is deciding whether to grant a 
case, she will name a judge from the court of appeals.244 “It’s simple and 
expeditious,” she says, adding, “My predecessor did it the same way.”245 If the 
case is granted, Chief Justice O’Connor will designate another appellate judge 
from around the state.246 Appointments are relatively infrequent, she says: 
“[T]hree a year would be a lot.”247 She tries to spread appointments “evenly,” 
doesn’t use brand-new judges, and doesn’t factor in a case’s subject matter.248 
“The process is not random, but it is equitable.”249 
Oregon: Oregon recently altered its impasse-resolution procedure. 
Formerly, the Oregon Supreme Court “would not bring on judges at the outset 
unless it was a death sentence or a case of significant public importance.”250 
Today, the court does so “at the beginning of a case if we’re not at full strength,” 
says the clerk, after review is granted but before argument, adding “we’ll go 
ahead and appoint regardless of perceived magnitude.”251 
Utah: The Utah system also aims to avert stalemate on the front end. As 
soon as the five-member Utah Supreme Court is operating at less than full 
strength, the Chief Justice “shall call an active judge from an appellate court 
or the district court.”252 Says the clerk: “We avoid the tie-break scenario 
altogether by maintaining an odd number . . . for all matters.”253 The clerk’s 
office turns to the Presiding Judge of the court of appeals, sends along basic 
case information, and it’s based on availability—“whoever volunteers first.”254 
Vermont: Vermont likewise tries to avoid stalemate by appointing someone 
early. But the process is “haphazard,” says the clerk’s office, “no guidelines at 
all”—and also “fairly rare, maybe 4–5 times in 26 years.”255 The relevant 
statute merely says the Chief Justice may “appoint and assign . . . to a special 
assignment.”256 And if the court “knows about a recusal ahead of time, it’ll go 








250 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Lisa Norris-Lampe, Clerk, Ore. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
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252 UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 2. 
253 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Andrea Martinez, Clerk, Utah Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
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255 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Deb Laferriere, Program Adm’r, Vt. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
256 4 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 22. 
257 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Deb Laferriere, supra note 255. 
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thinks a 2–2 vote is possible, then “an administrative person, not the chief, 
will pick a retired Supreme Court justice or a sitting superior court judge.”258 
The Chief Justice prefers that administrative personnel do the picking—
which creates “nervousness” in the clerk’s office when asked who they plan to 
call “because I know their tendencies.”259 The Court always informs the 
parties but does not reargue the case.260 The selection process is “convoluted,” 
says the clerk, who cites a generic “potential for interference” but says 
selection turns on “factors unrelated to the nature of the case, like who might 
be available or who’s close by,” adding, “budget may also be a factor because 
we don’t have to pay a superior court judge.”261 
Virginia: In Virginia, the Chief Justice designates and assigns retired 
members of the Virginia Supreme Court—and only retired members of the 
Virginia Supreme Court—“to perform the duties of a justice of the Court.”262 
He bases his selection on “whatever reasons he wishes,” says the clerk, who 
adds that appointments “happen frequently” and “as soon as the Court is less 
than full strength.”263 If for some reason a retired member of the Court is 
unavailable—which is “rare,” according to the clerk—a 3–3 tie affirms the 
lower-court judgment.264 
Also notable is that while various appointment provisions seem to impose 
certain criteria, appointers sometimes interpret such provisions loosely. For 
example, in Idaho, the Constitution says the Idaho Supreme Court “may call 
a district judge,”265 but the clerk says the court reaches outside the district 
judge pool to use retired Supreme Court justices “for most recusals, with an 
occasional district judge if needed, primarily because of travel issues.”266 
According to the clerk, “each retired justice is budgeted a certain number of 
days to sit with the Supreme Court. We track their days to make sure we’re 
staying within our budgeted days for each retired justice, and make the 






262 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-302(B) (2020) (“Any Chief Justice or justice who has retired from 
active service . . . may be designated and assigned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia to perform the duties of a justice of the Court.”). 
263 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Trish Harrington, Clerk, Va. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
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2. Roughly Two-Thirds of Anti-Stalemate States Rely on the Chief Justice 
to Select Substitute Justices 
Broadly speaking, there are three methods for tiebreaking. The first 
category maximizes judicial discretion; the Chief Justice appoints the fill-in 
justice. The second is all about executive discretion. In those states, the 
Governors pick a temporary, replacement jurist. In the third category, the 
court’s administrative personnel handles substitute-justice selection. 
a. Twenty-Three Courts Rely on the Chief Justice 
Almost seventy percent of states with a mechanism to avoid or break ties let 
the chief justice appoint the replacement justice. In some states, the chief justice’s 
pick isn’t really a “pick” at all; rather, appointees are chosen alphabetically, 
rotationally, or drawn at random from eligible appointees. In other states, the 
chief justice has unfettered discretion to select whomever he wishes. 
i. In Some States, the Chief Justice Selects Neutrally or Randomly 
California: The Golden State’s system is unique. The Chief Justice has 
“almost total discretion” in appointing a temporary justice268—whether to 
appoint, when to appoint, how to appoint, and whom to appoint.269 No 
procedure is specified, and no consultation is required. The power is 
unbounded. And because it takes five justices to decide for the seven-member 
court, the various chief justices have wielded it often. In the quarter century 
between 1977 and 2003, 408 cases involved a temporarily assigned justice.270 
Between 1954 and 1984, a temporary justice cast the deciding vote seventy-
three times.271 
Not only have California’s chief justices exercised their power frequently, 
they have exercised it differently. Chief Justice Rose Bird, for example, 
handpicked the fill-in justice, a practice that critics say smacked of 
manipulation to achieve preferred results.272 Sensitive to these charges of 
 
268 Stephen R. Barnett & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Assignment of Temporary Justices in the 
California Supreme Court, 17 PAC. L.J. 1045, 1047 (1986). 
269 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; see also Fay v. Dist. Ct., 254 P. 896, 899 (Cal. 1927) (holding that 
this provision confers on the chief justice the power to make temporary assignments to the Supreme 
Court as well). 
270 See James C. Brent, Stacking the Deck? An Empirical Analysis of Agreement Rates Between Pro 
Tempore Justices and Chief Justices of California, 1977-2003, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 14, 21 (2006) (showing that 
the rate of temporary judge appointments accelerated under Chief Justice Bird’s ten-year tenure, 
with 271 votes cast during that time). 
271 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1049. 
272 Id. at 1183-84 (“This study has found enough evidence of pro-chief-justice bias in the votes, 
and possibly the selection, of temporary justices sitting with the California Supreme Court to 
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cherry-picking, her successors, while possessing no less discretion, have 
adopted an “alphabetical, rotational assignment procedure,” which the clerk 
described this way: “The Chief Justice assigns in alphabetical order a court of 
appeals justice with at least one year of experience. If the justice is not able 
to serve, they will be next in line for the next appointment, and then the 
process returns to alphabetical order.”273 The clerk said the Court “always 
brings in a seventh for oral argument and will bring in a pro tem at the 
petition phase to break a tie.”274 
At the petition for review stage, when “four justices cannot agree on a 
disposition,” the Chief Justice “assigns in alphabetical order . . . a Court of 
Appeal justice as a pro tempore justice . . . .”275 The pro tem justice must have 
served on the Court of Appeal for at least one year, and if the justice is unable 
to serve as pro tem, “the next justice on the alphabetical list will be assigned, 
and the Court of Appeal justice who was unable to serve will be assigned in 
the next case in which a pro tempore appointment is required.”276 Here’s what 
happens if a justice recuses or is otherwise unavailable post-petition: 
When it is known after a case is granted but before argument that a justice 
for any reason is unable to participate in a matter, the Chief Justice 
pursuant to constitutional authority . . . assigns on an alphabetical 
rotational basis . . . a Court of Appeal justice to assist the court in place of 
the nonparticipating justice.277 
California, like a few other states, tries to bypass impasse, adding a pro 
tem justice early in the process, whenever the court is shorthanded, not 
waiting for deadlock to arise. 
Florida: Many states operate their tiebreakers loosely based on custom, 
tradition, and history, but the Sunshine State has reduced its appointment 
system to writing. If four justices “cannot ultimately agree to a disposition, 
the chief justice may in certain cases assign a judge or senior judge to the case 
as a temporary ‘associate justice’ under the procedures below.”278 The 
prepositional phrase “in certain cases” is key. In discretionary review cases, a 
3-3 tie means “the Court will discharge jurisdiction” (tie goes to the status 
quo)—except if four justices agree that “extraordinary circumstances exist 
 
conclude that the present system of appointing those justices, a system of virtually unlimited 
discretion in the chief justice, threatens the reputation and integrity of the court.”) 
273 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Frank McGuire, Ct. Admin. & Clerk, Cal. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
274 Id. 
275 CAL. SUP. CT., INTERNAL OPERATING PRACS. & PROCS. § IV.J. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. § XIII.B. 
278 FLA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. § X, http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/
pub_info/documents/IOPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG6Z-JM3X]. 
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that would justify deciding the case . . . .”279 In mandatory review cases, the 
Chief Justice (or Acting Chief Justice) will always assign a temporary 
justice.280 The “Method of Selection” is prescribed in detail: 
Associate justices shall be the chief judges of the district courts of appeal 
selected on a rotating basis from the lowest numbered court to the highest 
and repeating continuously. A district court shall be temporarily removed 
from the rotation if the case emanated from it. If more than one associate 
justice is needed, they shall be selected from separate district courts according 
to the numerical rotation. If the chief judge of a district court who would be 
assigned under this procedure is recused from the case or otherwise 
unavailable, the next most senior judge on that court (excluding senior 
judges) who is not recused shall replace the chief judge as associate justice.281 
In sum, the chief judges of the courts of appeal are assigned by 
numerical rotation. 
Hawaii: In the Aloha State, the Constitution gives the Chief Justice wide-
open discretion when naming a temporary justice. But “to avoid any appearance 
of anything,” the Supreme Court of Hawaii has adopted a rotational system, 
says a lawyer in the Chief Justice’s office.282 The Court maintains a list of trial 
court judges, and when an appointment is needed, we “go down in order.”283 
The list started off alphabetically, but “names get added to the bottom as new 
judges are appointed.”284 Moreover, the Court appoints as soon as full strength 
is lost, even before the case is granted.285 Appointees, though, are only drawn 
from Oahu, where the Supreme Court is.286 Excluding other islands is “not 
intentional, but more for financial and logistical reasons.”287 
New Hampshire: The Granite State is a rarity, the only one where state 
law, not merely court custom or internal procedure, requires that substitute 
justices be selected “on a random basis.”288 The statute specifies who can be 
appointed, and the order of preference (retired supreme court, retired 
superior court, active superior court, active district, or probate court). The 
statute is silent on timing, meaning “there’s discretion on when to appoint,” 
says the clerk, adding, “there’s no temporary justice in most cases where the 
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2021] Supreme Stalemates 489 
Court has three or four.”289 Generally, “a temporary justice is only appointed 
if needed to meet the quorum requirement of three justices, or if there is a 
quorum, once the tie presents itself.”290 And when the need arises, says the 
clerk, “the chief authorizes me to go forward, so we start with retired supreme 
court justices—we put their names on slips of paper and put them in an 
envelope.”291 Why the statutory randomness requirement? “It was added in 
2004 in response to concern that a temporary justice could be assigned to 
reach a particular result.”292 
New Hampshire’s move toward randomness resulted from an 
extraordinary crisis: the 2000 impeachment (but not conviction) of Chief 
Justice David Brock amid accusations he had abused his discretion in making 
temporary assignments (among other ethical lapses).293 It was the first 
impeachment of a Granite State public official since 1790 and arose from a 
bitter divorce involving one of the Court’s other members—Justice Stephen 
Thayer.294 The divorce proceedings reached the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court on an emergency motion filed by Justice Thayer’s wife.295 The upshot 
of Justice Thayer’s divorce landing in the lap of the Supreme Court was that, 
naturally, every single justice needed to be recused.296 So Chief Justice Brock 
was required to appoint replacement judges for the entire bench.297 The Chief 
Justice announced the replacements at a conference at which Justice Thayer 
was present, and Justice Thayer vigorously protested one of Justice Brock’s 
appointees.298 The Chief Justice was then accused of inviting Justice Thayer’s 
input. Justice Thayer later resigned to avoid criminal misconduct charges 
stemming from, among other things, his alleged attempt to influence his 
colleagues’ handling of his case.299 
Washington: Washington’s system—names drawn at random from a fancy 
chalice—seems as ministerial as can be. The names of eligible appointees are 
“put on separate slips and drawn from a container by the Clerk to ensure that 
selection is random.”300 Roughly six names are drawn, says the clerk, and “if 
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the first declines, we just go to the next.”301 The Chief Justice does not 
“approve” the selection, which “avoids charges of picking people who’ll vote 
a preferred way.”302 Eligible pro tem appointees include active and retired 
court of appeals judges. Interestingly, former Washington Supreme Court 
justices are not eligible (unless the justice had participated in the case before 
leaving the Court).303 
The Court doesn’t wait for deadlock to arise. If the number of those not 
participating reduces the nine-member Court to an even number, the default is 
that “a pro tempore justice shall be appointed by the Chief Justice, unless a 
majority of the court directs otherwise” but when the Court, though shorthanded, 
is still operating with an odd number, the Chief notifies the others, “and the 
majority shall direct whether a pro tempore justice should be appointed.”304 
ii. In Other States, the Chief Justice Selects Non-randomly 
Oklahoma: Like Texas, Oklahoma has a bifurcated high-court system (the 
nine-member Oklahoma Supreme Court for civil matters, the five-member 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal matters). Chief Justices of 
the Supreme Court name substitute judges, not only to their own civil high 
court but also to the criminal high court.305 Timing-wise, says the clerk, “the 
situation is assessed after the initial vote is taken on a case by the reduced 
panel.” If there’s a tie, the Chief Justice will appoint a member of the bench—
“the chief can pick whoever he wishes”—either a lower-court judge or a 
member of the sister high court.306 The clerk says tie-vote situations “hardly 
ever happen” on the five-member court of criminal appeals, though if they did, 
the supreme court’s Chief Justice would name someone, quite possibly a 
supreme court justice, “if the presiding judge of the criminal high court 
requests it.”307 
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has general superintending control over the Court of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6. 
306 Several years ago, eight of nine Oklahoma Supreme Court justices were recused, and the 
remaining justice made eight appointments. Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Michael 
Richie, Clerk, Okla. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author) (discussing Musgrove Mill, 
LLC v. Capitol-Medical Ctr. Improvement & Zoning Comm., 2009 OK 19, 210 P.3d 835). 
307 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Michael Richie, supra note 306; see, e.g., Order 
of Appointment, Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C-2009-720 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2009), 
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&number=2009-720 
[https://perma.cc/HC2N-U4AJ] (Vice Chief Justice Steven Taylor assigned to sit on the Court of 
Criminal Appeals due to the retirement of a judge). 
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South Carolina: The practice in South Carolina is multi-layered, and the 
timing of appointments “depends on what we’re dealing with,” explains the 
clerk.308 “For routine motions or petitions that will be decided without oral 
argument, the Court will determine that it is deadlocked before appointing a 
substitute.”309 But for cases set for oral argument, “a substitute will be appointed 
well before the argument is commenced.”310 The Chief Justice may appoint a 
“retired judge or justice from the Supreme Court or court of appeals,”311 but the 
clerk says using retired high-court justices has proven “very effective” and that 
using court of appeals judges “disrupts the schedules of those courts.”312 The 
Chief Justice has unfettered discretion, but the clerk reports no criticisms of 
strategic selection. “It usually turns on who’s available and close by.”313 
South Dakota: The state constitution gives the Chief Justice “power to 
assign any circuit judge to sit . . . on the Supreme Court in case of a vacancy 
or in place of a justice who is disqualified or unable to act.”314 The five-
member high court has no discretionary review, and the clerk says 
appointments happen regularly and as soon as the Court is operating at less 
than full strength. How does it work? The clerk is unsure, calling it “random,” 
saying “word comes down from the chief who he has selected.”315 
Virginia: The Chief Justice assigns retired members of the Supreme Court 
and has freewheeling discretion to pick for “whatever reasons he wishes,” says 
the clerk.316 Appointments are frequent and occur up front, whenever the 
Court dips below full strength.317 And in the rare event a retired supreme 
court justice is unavailable, a 3–3 split affirms the lower court.318 
West Virginia: In the Mountain State, the Chief Justice has “absolute 
discretion” says the clerk, “but decisions are often made collaboratively.”319 
While selection “isn’t random,” the inquiry is more, “Who would be good on 
this case and hasn’t been up here before?”320 And because the chief justiceship 
rotates every year in West Virginia, “responsibility isn’t lodged in someone 
 
308 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Dan Shearouse, Clerk, S.C. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-215. 
312 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Dan Shearouse, supra note 308. 
313 Id. 
314 S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 11. 
315 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Laura Graves, Clerk, S.D. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-
Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
316 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Trish Harrington, supra note 263. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Rory Perry, Clerk, W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
320 Id. 
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permanently, which fosters goodwill people not wanting to spoil the well.”321 
Appointments happen “when we reach a critical stage of the proceedings,” 
says the clerk, specifically “once the Court has voted and a tie vote presents 
itself for the first time.”322 The Court gets a “good read” on votes at the 
Decision Conference, which occurs pre-argument in every case.323 Again, the 
Chief Justice has “wide discretion” but is “good about keeping those 
appointments as neutral and fair-minded as possible, and spreading work” 
among the seventy to eighty jurists who are in the eligible pool.324 
Interim appointments in West Virginia weren’t always so 
noncontroversial. In 2000, when the West Virginia Supreme Court frequently 
split 3–2, a prominent West Virginia lawyer lamented the Chief Justice’s “vast 
discretion (comparable, say, to that of an Oriental potentate),” able to dole 
out appointments “to those who were personally or ideologically 
simpatico.”325 Citing the scandal then engulfing the similar appointment 
system in New Hampshire, the lawyer decried the arbitrariness and risk of 
abuse: “Not infrequently, it is the substitute justices, voting with the chief, 
who constitute the majority. Thus, under this rule, as a de facto matter the 
Chief Justice is given a second, and occasionally a third, vote.”326 The lawyer 
predicted, “A New Hampshire-style wreck is just waiting to happen.” The 
issue isn’t, he continued, whether the Chief Justice actually stacked the deck, 
but whether a reasonably prudent person might think so.327 A better system, 
he proposed, would be to simply put the names of eligible judges in a 
proverbial hat and draw one. Unfettered discretion enables “backroom 
politics[] that never sees the light of day” and risks “the crassest of cronyism,” 
he contended. “More sinister, it can be part of a scheme to influence the 
result,”328 noting a report that “a chief justice in years past would call 
prospective appointees and pose ‘hypothetical’ questions.”329 
Wyoming: The current Wyoming Supreme Court makes frequent use of 
temporary justices. “It happens quite often,” says the clerk.330 It’s a five-






325 John Rogers, Appointment of Substitute Judges: The Proverbial Train Wreck Looking for a Place 





330 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Carol Thompson, Clerk, Wyo. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
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22-year trial court judge in a district with a prison.331 Translation: He recuses 
a lot. And while the Constitution says the Chief Justice “may appoint,” the 
current chief (an office that rotates every four years) treats it as “shall 
appoint.”332 Geographically, chiefs “try to move it around,” says the clerk, 
adding, “It’s done on the front end before anything happens.”333 The clerk’s 
office is uninvolved.334 The Chief Justice picks a list of 23 trial court judges 
and one former Supreme Court justice.335 The Chief Justice says, “chiefs have 
probably done it differently over the years,” but his practice is to send an 
email to trial judges and “ask if they want to take a turn.”336 He tries to go 
through that list and says he has never tried to pick “selectively,” noting that 
“[s]ome cases are more significant than others, thus you’d want a more 
seasoned judge to participate.”337 Also, “weather is a real issue, so you try to 
get judges from different parts of the state during times of the year when it’s 
easier to travel.”338 And when the chief himself is recused, the most senior 
justice picks “and always picks the retired Supreme Court justice.”339 
b. Four Courts Rely on the Governor 
Four states involve the Governor in selecting the tiebreaking justice: 
Arkansas, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas.340 
Arkansas: As noted above, the Governor names a substitute in “maybe 10 
percent of cases.” He does so on the front end, says the clerk, which saves 






335 Id.; see also Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with E. James Burke, Chief Justice, Wy. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 




340 I do not count Alabama among the governor-picks group. True, a statute says the governor 
will name a temporary, tiebreaking justice when “there is equal division among [the judges] on any 
question material to the determination of the case.” ALA. CODE § 12-2-14. But the nine-member 
Alabama Supreme Court considers that law unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. See 
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1093-95 (Ala. 2006) (holding that § 12-2-14 is 
unconstitutional insofar as it limits the chief justice’s right to fill a court vacancy). The court 
considers the chief justice head of the judicial branch of government, and the Chief Justice appoints 
someone whenever the court is stymied, “typically a retired former justice,” says court staff. 
Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Brad Medaris, Cent. Staff Att’y, Ala. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 
2015) (on file with author). But the chief has “wide-open discretion” and could draw from a wider 
judicial pool. Id. 
341 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stacey Pectol, supra note 204. 
494 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 441 
case specifics when he makes the assignment, but again, it happens early on, 
before stalemate has arisen.342 
Nevada: The Silver State bifurcates the power to name temporary justices. 
In other words, the power to unlock a divided court is itself divided—or 
rather, shared between the Governor and the Chief Justice. Once the Nevada 
Supreme Court votes and a tie arises, the Governor may designate a lower-
court judge.343 But in practice the selection is made by the Chief Justice, who 
draws a name at random from index cards—a “high-tech process,” says the 
clerk.344 A letter then goes to the Governor asking him to appoint whoever 
was drawn.345 “It’s courtesy that the governor defers to the Court’s request,” 
the clerk says.346 “If the appointee is a district judge, the governor makes the 
appointment,” deferring to whatever name the Chief Justice drew at 
random.347 But “if the appointee is a senior (i.e., retired) justice, the Chief 
Justice picks whoever he wants unilaterally, and the governor has no 
involvement.”348 Nevada “only recently got a court of appeals,” but the clerk 
suspects it would work the same as district judges—the Governor rubber-
stamping the Chief Justice’s random, index-card selection.349 
Tennessee: In 2014, the Volunteer State amended its Constitution to adopt 
the “Tennessee Plan” for choosing appellate judges: Governor appoints, 
Legislature confirms, voters retain.350 As for filling temporary vacancies, 
things are a bit complicated, as authority is not vested solely in one branch. 
 
342 Id. 
343 NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (“In case of the disability or disqualification, for any cause, of a 
justice of the Supreme Court, the Governor may designate a judge of the court of appeals or a 
district judge to sit in the place of the disqualified or disabled justice.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5) 
(2019) (“Upon the disqualification of: . . . A justice of the Supreme Court . . . a judge of the Court 
of Appeals or a district judge shall be designated to sit in place of the justice as provided in Section 
4 of Article 6 of the Constitution . . . .”); NEV. R. APP. P. 25A(b)(2)(C) (“A senior justice, senior 
Court of Appeals Judge, or active district court judge may be assigned to sit in place of a justice as 
provided by law.”); see also NEV. SUP. CT. R. 10(8) (“The temporary assignment of a senior 
justice . . . to the supreme court . . . shall be made by order signed by the chief justice or the chief 
justice’s designee and filed with the clerk of the supreme court.”) 






349 Id.; see NEV. SUP. CT. R. 10(8). 
350 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The 2014 amendment scrapped the Judicial Nominating 
Commission and added confirmation by the General Assembly. See Alexandra Martellaro, All 4 Tenn. 
Constitutional Amendments Pass, RENO GAZETTE J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:35 PM), 
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/04/november-election-tennessee-
amendments/18489923 [https://perma.cc/AJ5C-AT23] (reporting on a voter-passed amendment that 
changed the way judges are appointed in the state). 
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The Tennessee Constitution gives appointment power to the Governor,351 but 
the very next sentence authorizes the Legislature to pass laws for the 
appointment of “special Judges” if someone is “unable . . . to attend or sit” or 
is “incompetent.”352 And lawmakers have done just that, passing statutes that 
confer power on the Chief Justice to appoint replacement judges.353 The 
Tennessee Supreme Court put it this way in a 1999 case challenging the Chief 
Justice’s power to name special supreme court justices: “We believe that 
[these various statutes] were promulgated with the intent to empower both 
the Governor and the Chief Justice to designate temporary judges.”354 Such 
temporary appointments, however, are exceedingly rare, says the Court 
clerk.355 And if a 2–2 deadlock results from a vacancy, rather than a recusal, 
the Court agrees to hold the case until the permanent justice is named.356 
Texas: The Lone Star State uses the uncommon—and in my view, 
alarming—method described at the beginning of this Article. That is, the 
Governor—the head of a separate branch of government—selects the 
tiebreaking justice and does so with full knowledge of which case is 
deadlocked and what the disputed issues are. He does not know which justices 
have voted which way, but he knows the case is tied and that his appointee 
will cast the tiebreaking vote. Texas law doesn’t require the case to be 
revealed.357 The disclosure is simply a matter of longstanding tradition. 
Unsurprisingly, no other state with a “governor-picks” designation system 
thinks it a good idea to reveal which case is tied. 
In recent history, the Texas Supreme Court has used judicial pinch-hitters 
sparingly—only fourteen cases in the past quarter-century. Nine of these 
 
351 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (“In case all or any of the judges of the Supreme Court shall 
thus be disqualified . . . the governor of the state . . . shall forthwith specially commission the 
requisite number of men, of law knowledge, for the trial and determination thereof.”). Twenty years 
ago, the governor exercised his constitutional power to name replacements for the entire court when 
they all recused themselves in a case challenging the way justices are elected. State ex rel. Hooker v. 
Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 1996). 
352 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (“The Legislature may by general laws make provision that 
special judges may be appointed, to hold any courts the judge of which shall be unable or fail to 
attend or sit; or to hear any cause in which the judge may be incompetent.”). 
353 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-2-102 (giving the Governor the power to fill vacancies if a judge 
is “incompetent to sit”), 17-2-104 (same if a judge falls ill), and 17-2-110(a) (2019) (giving the Chief 
Justice the power to fill vacancies when a judge is “unable to try the docket”). 
354 Hooker v. Sundquist, 1999 WL 74545 at *2-3 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 1999) (“We interpret the 
reference to “appellate judge[s]” in TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-110(a) to include judges of the 
Supreme Court.”). 
355 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with James M. Hivner, Clerk, Tenn. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Feb. 2016) (on file with author). 
356 Id. 
357 See infra Section IV.D; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2020) (giving the 
governor the power to appoint justices in the event of a vacancy without requiring the Chief Justice 
to reveal the specifics of the case). 
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occasions arose during fifteen-year tenure of Governor Rick Perry (2000–
2015),358 up from four during the five-year tenure of Governor George W. 
Bush (1995–2000),359 up from one during the combined eight-year tenure of 
Governor Bill Clements (1979–1983; 1987–1991).360 
Unlike the twenty-four other states where a temporary justice is named as 
soon as the court is operating at less than full strength, the Texas Supreme 
Court usually doesn’t request a substitute justice unless the court is hopelessly 
deadlocked post-argument. Some Texas high court justices report a general 
reluctance to involve the Governor unless inescapably necessary, a view 
plausibly understood as fostering greater openness and deference to the views 
of colleagues (similar to how some SCOTUS Justices are reportedly more 
“accommodating” in order to avoid a 4–4 split given the lack of any tiebreaker). 
One point merits mention: It would be mistaken to describe all of the 
Texas substitute appointees as “tiebreaking” justices. For example, in one 
case, In re George,361 as a letter from then Chief Justice Phillips to then 
Governor Bush makes clear, three justices were recused, meaning the Court 
was markedly short-handed; they had to decide the case with only six justices, 
making the five-vote majority “needed to render judgment” tougher to 
reach.362 But the tie-vote impasse was obvious in other cases, as well. For 
example, in In re Masonite Corp.,363 Chief Justice Phillips’s letter frankly states, 
“[w]ith eight justice[s] participating, five justices have not been able to agree 
on the proper disposition.”364 Same with In re Epic Holdings,365 where, with 
 
358 The cases during Governor Perry’s tenure include: DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588 
(Tex. 2008); Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp. Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008); In re BP Prods. N. 
Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2008); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 
(Tex. 2008); Energy Serv. Co. of Bowie, Inc. v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190 
(Tex. 2007); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006); Sultan v. Mathew, 178 
S.W.3d 747 (Tex. 2005); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002); In re TXU Elec. Co., 
67 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. 2001). 
359 In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999); 
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998); In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 
41 (Tex. 1998). 
360 Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988). 
361 28 S.W.3d 511. 
362 Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex. 2001) (holding that a minimum of five 
justices is needed to render judgement); see also Letter from Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Just., Tex. 
Sup. Ct., regarding In re EPIC Holdings, to George W. Bush, Governor, Tex. (Jan. 4, 2000) (on file 
with the Texas Supreme Court). 
Two historical tidbits. First, some of the letters from Governor Bush announcing his appointment 
of tiebreaking justices were sent to then Secretary of State Alberto Gonzales, who served in that role 
after his stint as Governor Bush’s first general counsel and before serving on the Texas Supreme Court. 
Second, in In re George, Alberto Gonzales was himself one of the recused justices and later became 
President George W. Bush’s White House Counsel and then U.S. Attorney General. 
363 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999). 
364 Letter from Thomas R. Phillips to George W. Bush, supra note 362. 
365 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998). 
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two recusals, “five justices have not been able to agree on the proper 
disposition.”366 As these letters demonstrate, temporary justices are needed 
whenever the Court is unable to reach a five-vote majority, whether or not 
that corresponds to a 4–4 tie. 
While infrequent, deadlock does arise in the Lone Star State, and when 
it does, the Governor appoints a replacement justice.367 When the Texas 
Supreme Court, the civil high court, is operating at less than full strength, 
the Chief Justice may, but isn’t required to, “certify to the governor,” who 
“immediately shall commission the requisite number of persons who are 
active appellate or district court justices or judges and who possess the 
qualifications prescribed for justices of the supreme court to try and 
determine the case.”368 
Notably, the Texas Supreme Court’s substitute-justice law changed in 1995 
in three key ways.369 First, the prior law was phrased in mandatory terms, 
stating, “[t]he chief justice shall certify to the governor . . . .” The new law 
gives the Chief Justice discretion.370 Second, the prior law envisioned two 
scenarios justifying a special appointment: lack of a quorum and equal 
division.371 The new law scrapped the deadlock requirement, meaning the 
Chief Justice may request substitute justices whenever someone is unable to 
participate372—for example, if multiple recusals leave the Court short-staffed, 
as happened in In re George, when three temporary justices were 
commissioned.373 Third, the prior law didn’t require appointment of a sitting 
judge, stating only that the appointee must “possess the qualifications 
prescribed for justices of the supreme court[.]”374 The new law says 
appointees must be “active appellate or district court justices or judges” who 
are themselves constitutionally eligible to sit on the Supreme Court.375 
These tweaks aside, the gamesmanship persists. Unsurprisingly, and 
presumably, Governors will appoint temporary justices whose general judicial 
philosophy tracks their own. And while a Governor cannot foretell his 
permanent appointees’ behavior spanning thousands of cases in a judicial 
 
366 Letter from Thomas R. Phillips to George W. Bush, supra note 362. 
367 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019). 
368 § 22.005(a)-(b). 
369 Act of May 19, 1995, ch. 428, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3097, 3097 (codified as amended at 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019)). 
370 Id. (“The chief justice may . . . .”). 
371 Id. (allowing a vacancy to be filled only when “at least five members of the supreme court 
are disqualified . . . or the justices of the court are equally divided”). 
372 Id. (allowing a vacancy to be filled whenever “one or more justices of the supreme court 
have recused themselves . . . or are disqualified”). 
373 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000). 
374 § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3097, 3097. 
375 Id. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (West 2019) for the current version in its entirety. 
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career, the dynamics are different when the Governor is appointing a 
tiebreaking justice for a single, specific case.376 
c. Seven Courts Rely on Court Administration 
Seven states let the court collectively select a tiebreaking justice. Here, too, 
the specifics vary from state to state. And as with chief justice appointments, 
many courts delegate the selection to administrative personnel at the court. 
Connecticut: Connecticut uses an uncommon method of impasse 
resolution. The seven-member Connecticut Supreme Court often hears cases 
in five-justice panels, but what happens if a justice recuses, and the four 
remaining justices split 2–2? Statute and court rule both state, “Whenever the 
court is evenly divided as to the result, the court shall reconsider the case, with 
or without oral argument, with an odd number of judges.”377 Who gets added 
and how? The 1998 case Pesino v. Atlantic Bank of New York is instructive.378 A 
justice recused post-argument, so another member of the court was added to 
the panel (the mechanics of which sparked some disagreement).379 When 
adding to a panel, the Supreme Court first looks to its seven active members 
and then to retired members. If a panel can’t be constituted from active and 
retired members of the court, a lower-court judge may be summoned, and that 
selection, the clerk says, is “completely based on seniority.”380 
Georgia: Georgia law gives appointment power to “the remaining 
Justices,”381 and the mechanics are unique. The clerk has exclusive access to 
the “designated judge list,” a spreadsheet of names of lower-court judges 
submitted by all seven members of the court. “I’m the only person who 
knows who’s up next,” says the clerk, “so there’s no appearance of cherry-
picking. It’s all randomized.”382 Names are selected “in alternating order, 
 
376 For an examination of the fourteen cases in which substitute justices were appointed in the 
past quarter century, see infra Appendix B. 
377 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-209; CONN. R. APP P. § 70-6; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-
207 (permitting the Chief Justice to summon a Superior Court or Appellate Court judge to 
temporarily sit in for a Supreme Court judge who is unavailable or disqualified). 
378 709 A.2d 540, 542-43 (Conn. 1998) (providing an example in which a justice who was added 
to an evenly divided panel participated in the decision after reviewing briefs and listening to a 
recording of the oral argument). 
379 See id. at 548 n.1 (McDonald, J., dissenting) (arguing the case should have been reargued). 
380 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Pamela Meotti, Chief Admin. Officer, Conn. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015) (on file with author). 
381 GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (“If a Justice is disqualified in any case, a substitute judge 
may be designated by the remaining Justices to serve.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-2 (“Whenever one 
or more of the Justices of the Supreme Court are unable . . . to preside in any case and the parties 
desire a full bench, it shall be the duty of the remaining Justices to designate a [trial] judge . . . to 
preside in the place of the absent Justice or Justices . . . .”). 
382 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Therese Barnes, supra note 212. 
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giving each justice the opportunity to extend an invitation.”383 This neutral 
process has long been followed, though Justice David Nahmias, a former 
law clerk to Justice Scalia, has “tightened things up” to ensure “randomness 
and no influence.”384 
Idaho: Appointments are discretionary and may factor in subject-matter 
expertise. And while the Idaho Constitution vests authority in the court 
collectively, the selection is delegated to the clerk. “In most cases, I select the 
pro tem justice without input from the court,” the clerk says. “I discuss with 
the Chief Justice who to select in about 10 percent of the cases. Most of these 
discussions occur when the Court will be traveling for hearings, and I need 
to find a local district judge to sit with the Court.”385 
Louisiana: Befitting Louisiana’s quirky, fun-loving vibe—laissez les bons 
temps rouler—the names of lower-court judges eligible for appointment are 
written on small circular discs (like those attached to your car keys at a valet 
stand) and thrown into a plastic Halloween Jack-o’-Lantern.386 The clerk 
reaches in and plucks one. Actually, the clerk plucks three, “keeping in mind 
the order of their selection,” says the clerk. If all three decline, “three more 
names are pulled and the process continues until a judge accepts.”387 
The court uses “ad hocs” both when determining its docket and when 
deciding its docket. “When considering whether to grant or deny a writ, we 
appoint if it’s a 3–3 tie,” says the clerk.388 But when the court sits to hear a 
granted case, “we have a total of seven participate, filling any vacancies with 
ad hocs prior to sitting.”389 The court will tell the clerk it needs a seventh 
justice, and the clerk will take it from there. “The Court signs the order of 
appointment but is removed from the decision of who will sit,” says the clerk, 
who offers this advice for states: “Have a pre-selected pool of potential 
appointees so that the appointment can be random without a perception of 




385 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Stephen Kenyon, supra note 214. 
386 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with John Olivier, Clerk, La. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-
Jan. 2016) (on file with author). Louisiana’s Constitution gives its Supreme Court general 
supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and authority to establish procedural and 
administrative rules not in conflict with law and to assign a sitting or retired judge to any court. LA. 
CONST. art. V, § 5. 
387 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with John Olivier, supra note 386. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. Not all lower-court judges’ names go into Louisiana’s Jack-o’-Lantern. There is a 
preapproved list, and Supreme Court justices have discretion to remove certain jurists from 
consideration. So only “eligible” judges are potential appointees. Id. 
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Nebraska: Since 1991, the process has worked this way: The Chief Justice’s 
administrative assistant calls the chief judge of the court of appeals, who seeks 
a member of that court to sit on the Supreme Court. “The Chief Justice is 
not involved in that process within the Court of Appeals. We are fairly certain 
that the Court of Appeals selection is on a rotational basis.”391 
New York: The Empire State has “no set rule in place,” says the clerk.392 
The Constitution authorizes the high court to designate a trial court judge in 
times of “temporary absence or inability to act,” and the court only does so 
when it is hopelessly deadlocked.393 Interestingly, the court only names a 
temporary justice if the 3–3 tie is due to recusal, not if it’s due to a vacancy 
(which doesn’t fit within what the Constitution calls a “temporary absence or 
inability to act”).394 If the former, “someone can vouch in”; if the latter, “the 
Court might reargue.”395 Appointments are made by the court, “under 
leadership of the chief judge,” says the clerk, adding, “They spread it around, 
but beyond that, I can’t be more specific.”396 
Oregon: The pool of appointees varies depending on the type of case. “In 
non-capital cases, we select from the court of appeals,” says the clerk.397 “We 
have a list by seniority and just go down the list. It’s rotational.”398 In “death 
cases,” however, “we tend to pull from retired Supreme Court justices.”399 
And if the court still winds up 3–3—”we may end up with six even if we didn’t 
start with six”—“we’ll probably affirm by an equally divided Court,” says the 
clerk, though if it’s a mandatory-appeal case, “we might evaluate our options 
and work hard to avoid a tie.”400 When asked why the court switched 
procedures, which the court has used “probably three times so far,” the clerk 
replied, “It avoids the danger of six so you know you have seven going in. 
And pulling a court of appeals judge just means walking across the alley.”401 
 
391 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Teresa Brown, supra note 226. 
392 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Andrew Klein, Clerk, N.Y. Ct. App. (Oct. 
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III. YOU CAN’T PLEASE EVERYBODY: DRAWBACKS TO STATES’ 
DIVERGENT TIEBREAKING APPROACHES 
Naturally, the various tiebreaking systems have naysayers. As the Illinois 
Supreme Court put it a generation ago, “No solution is wholly free from 
objection.”402 No matter how a state deals with impasse, there is no shortage 
of deadlock dramas in state high courts. This section will highlight examples 
of the heartburn that may result when (1) there is no tiebreaker, (2) the high 
court collectively selects someone, (3) the Chief Justice picks a replacement 
justice, or (4) the Governor chooses. 
A. Angst When There Is No Tiebreaker—Pennsylvania and Wisconsin 
At full strength, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is a septet—but it spent 
nearly all of 1995 as a sextet. Shorthanded, the six-justice court deadlocked 3–
3 in several cases. One case concerned a couple trying to adopt a sickly toddler 
they had nurtured since infancy. Another involved a company trying to stop 
union organizing at one of its stores. A third case concerned a criminal 
defendant seeking to overturn a drug conviction and long prison term. As at 
the U.S. Supreme Court, a tie vote on the Pennsylvania high court means the 
lower-court judgment stands.403 Said one Philadelphia lawyer: “Those 3–3 
splits are so disheartening. It’s such a long journey just to get there in the first 
place, and to lose because of a missing justice is devastating.”404 Said another: 
“A 3–3 vote is like kissing your sister. You don’t get anywhere, and the state 
of the law is not advanced at all.”405 A former member of the court added, 
“The state’s highest court should be in a position, at all times, to make 
definitive decisions on the laws of the land.”406 
A few years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices deadlocked 3–3 
over whether their colleague’s 2008 campaign ad violated judicial ethics rules. 
The impasse left everyone befuddled, though the accused justice declared 
victory, saying the stalemate meant the state had failed to satisfy its burden. 
A former member of the court confessed, “It’s an anomaly and I don’t know 
of anything like it. I don’t have the foggiest idea of where they go next.”407 
 
402 Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 1975) (per curiam). 
403 See infra Appendix A. 
404 Larry King, Some Want Full House in High Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1996, at A1. 
405 Id. at A10. 
406 Id. (quoting former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Bruce W. Kauffman). 
407 Jason Stein, State Supreme Court Deadlocks on Gableman’s Ethics Case, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (July 1, 2010), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/97557794.html 
[https://perma.cc/V5PZ-ACJ7] (quoting former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Janine Geske). 
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B. Angst When a Former Member Is the Tiebreaker—Maryland 
The seven-member Maryland Court of Appeals (the name for the high 
court) fills temporary vacancies with retired Court of Appeals judges, though 
virtually “any former judge” is eligible.408 In fact, because the state 
constitution mandates retirement at age 70 and also permits retired judges to 
be recalled into service, “the Court may have more provisional, retired 
members than it has active members.”409 Some Maryland lawyers lament the 
outsized role these retired judges exert, particularly “in some of the Court’s 
most prominent and controversial decisions.”410 It’s true. Retired fill-in judges 
often provide the decisive votes and author the majority opinions in high-
stakes cases.411 The replacement judges don’t vote on whether to grant the 
case, but their vote often decides the outcome. Some appellate specialists 
contend that retired judges should not wield such influence, particularly in 
cases of great public importance: “[A]s the Court’s membership shifts with 
retired judges pinch-hitting for active members, the Court undermines its 
ability to enunciate a consistent and coherent view of the state’s public 
policy.”412 The high court, some lawyers complain, “should be more than just 
a collection of different panels of disparate decision-makers.”413 
C. Angst When the Chief Justice Picks the Tiebreaker—New Jersey and 
California 
New Jersey has been fighting over temporary New Jersey Supreme Court 
appointments for years.414 This political tug-of-war over the makeup of the 
court has spilled over into how the court handles temporary assignments, 
though such assignments are never used to break ties. 
 
408 MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3A (“[A]ny former judge, except a former judge of the Orphans’ 
Court, may be assigned by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, upon approval of a majority of 
the court, to sit temporarily in any court of this State.”). 
409 Kevin Arthur, Who Is on the Court of Appeals: The Role of Retired Judges, MD. APP. BLOG 






414 The New Jersey Senate President lambasted Governor Chris Christie, alleging he 
“absolutely, 1,000 percent” broke a longstanding deal to leave unfilled a six-year-old vacancy on the 
New Jersey Supreme Court. See Brent Johnson, Sweeney: Christie ‘Absolutely’ Broke Deal on N.J. 
Supreme Court, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019) https://www.nj.com/politics/2016/03/sweeney_
christie_absolutely_broke_deal_on_nj_supre.html [https://perma.cc/9GWC-RFZ3]; see also Brent 
Johnson, Sweeney Slaps Down Christie over N.J. Supreme Court Nominee, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nj.com/politics/2016/03/sweeney_slaps_christie_over_nj_supreme_court_nomin.html 
[https://perma.cc/4ZBQ-ZWFG] (calling the State Senate President’s refusal to grant a 
confirmation hearing to Governor Christie’s judicial nominee “the newest standoff in an old feud”). 
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Under the New Jersey Constitution, the Chief Justice “shall assign” 
temporary replacements for absent justices “[w]hen necessary.”415 But when 
is a temporary assignment “necessary”? Necessary to what? Are we talking 
sort of “necessary” or urgently “necessary”? “Necessary” to reach a quorum 
or “necessary” to reach the court’s full membership of seven? One scholar 
contends the state constitution’s substitute justice provision “should be 
interpreted as a narrow, mandatory duty applicable only when the court 
would otherwise lack a quorum.”416 He insists that loosey-goosey 
appointments to achieve anything that advances the court’s broad judicial 
power are not “necessary” and “take license with the constitution,” especially 
with language “designed to cabin its own members’ powers.”417 Since 1968, 
however, a court rule has provided that assignments are permissible “to 
replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the business of 
the court,”418 a provision that some observers, including a former member of 
the court,419 believe departs from the Constitution’s “[w]hen necessary” 
restriction, thus “empowering a wily Chief Justice . . . to thereby assign the 
particular judge she desires.”420 And even if the selection were wholly 
aboveboard, “there is a considerable risk of suspicion, especially in a 
‘politically critical’ case, that it was not,” particularly in cases “where the 
 
415 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 1 (“The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and 
six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the 
Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service . . . to serve 
temporarily in the Supreme Court.”) 
416 Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 735, 
749 (2003). This quorum-focused view is echoed by Professor Maltz, who notes that “by its terms 
the language of the New Jersey constitution seems consciously designed to limit the discretion of 
the chief justice” and “[w]hen necessary” should be read as “when necessary to the fulfillment of the 
court’s constitutional responsibilities.” Earl M. Maltz, Temporary Assignments to Fill Vacancies on the 
New Jersey Supreme Court 6 (The Federalist Soc’y, White Paper, Sept. 20, 2010), https://fedsoc-cms-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/CXnqMXdc7TUCI6wpm6xfdrWDHYDWQyUAHvSPMu
gU.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQR-AS6X]. 
417 Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761. 
418 N.J. R. 2:13-2(a). 
419 Before leaving the court, former Justice Rivera-Soto wrote a long opinion explaining his 
decision to abstain in a case in which the chief justice had assigned a temporary justice. Justice Rivera-
Soto’s spirited opinion concluded that “[t]he Court as so constituted is unconstitutional and its acts are 
ultra vires.” He pledged that he “will continue to abstain from all decisions of this Court for so long as 
it remains unconstitutionally constituted,” though he later tempered his stance, saying he would vote 
when the temporary justice’s participation didn’t affect the outcome, and perhaps others. Henry v. New 
Jersey Dep’t of Human Svcs., 9 A.3d 882, 903-14 (N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., abstaining). 
420 Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761. 
420 Id. at 761 (citing In re Registrant M.F., 776 A.2d 780 (N.J. 2001)) (concerning sex offender 
registration, in which three justices did not participate, but only one judge was temporarily assigned); 
see also Michael Booth, Lawyers Beg for Leniency in Cases of Flubbed Affidavits of Merit, N.J.L.J., Sept. 
29, 2003, at 4 (discussing cases argued the same day and noting that a replacement was named in cases 
in which Justice Verniero was recused but not in a case in which Justice Wallace was recused). 
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Supreme Court is otherwise equally divided.”421 Ever since the rule was 
adopted, the court’s assignment practice has been labeled “erratic” and 
“lawless,” with “little rhyme or reason . . . as to when a temporary 
replacement will be used for an absent justice.”422 In any event, the clerk says 
the Chief Justice assigns no one just to break a tie. “We’re not bringing anyone 
up if we have a quorum. Many high-profile cases have tied 3–3.”423 
The California system grants the Chief Justice near absolute discretion.424 
And in years past, it came under particular criticism—namely, that the 
process “has been manipulated to favor replacements that will vote with the 
Chief Justice.”425 The knock is that a willful Chief Justice could succumb to 
the temptation to put a finger on the scale by stacking the court with like-
minded allies.426 Some scholars insist the process is prone to manipulation 
and gamesmanship, finding “substantial evidence of vote bias” in how 
replacement justices are picked.427 Chief Justice Bird was accused of exactly 
that—abusing her appointment power to achieve a preferred agenda. 
Researchers have tried to move the debate from the anecdotal to the 
empirical, studying whether Chief Justice Bird was indeed strategically 
picking judges who would give her a second vote. Three major scholarly 
investigations examined the agreement rates between Chief Justice Bird and 
the temporary justices she appointed and compared that data with the 
agreement rates between Bird’s predecessors and their appointees.428 
Although the studies yielded what the most recent analysis called “mixed 
results,”429 popular distrust of Bird’s neutrality spurred her successors to take 
a more mechanical, nondiscretionary approach: by picking pro tempore 
justices alphabetically.430 
 
421 Hartnett, supra note 416, at 761. 
422 Id. at 738, 752. 
423 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Gail Haney, Clerk, supra note 148. 
424 See supra notes 268-277 and accompanying text (discussing the powers of the chief justice). 
425 Schubert, supra note 78, at 226. See also Brent, supra note 270, at 16-17. 
426 Brent, supra note 270, at 16-17. 
427 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1155. 
428 Comment, The Selection of Interim Justices in California: An Empirical Study, 32 STANFORD 
L. REV. 433, 435 (1980) (examining cases decided between June 1, 1954 and May 31, 1979, calculating 
an average agreement rate of eighty-seven percent, and concluding “the power to fill temporary 
vacancies may indeed have been used to assign judges likely to agree with the chief justice”); 
Stephanie M. Wildman & Denise Whitehead, A Study of Justice Pro Tempore Assignments in the 
California Supreme Court, 20 UNIV. S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985) (“The charge that the Chief Justice assigns 
pro tem justices in order to influence the judicial process lacks any evidentiary support.”); Barnett 
& Rubinfeld, supra note 268 (examining the tenures of several Chief Justices and discussing 
commentary surrounding the role of the chief judge). 
429 Brent, supra note 270, at 15. 
430 Id. at 18. 
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The most expansive study, in 1986, looked at voting behavior during years 
1954–1984 (spanning four Chief Justices: Gibson, Traynor, Wright, and Bird) 
and found that overall, assigned justices were more than twenty percent more 
likely to side with the Chief Justice in cases where the replacement justice’s 
vote was decisive.431 Looking at the Bird court specifically, the authors 
discerned manipulation in her assignments, noting that (1) temporary justices 
were more likely to vote with her than were other justices, and (2) this 
tendency vanished after she instituted a procedural change in April 1981.432 
The agreement percentage spiked during Chief Justice Bird’s tenure, who 
was accused of wielding the appointment power to manipulate outcomes. 
Initially, she would assign justices for an entire calendar (up to eighteen 
cases), not for a single case, and the replacements were forty nine percent 
more apt to agree with her in cases where they cast the deciding vote.433 After 
April 1981, when she limited assignments to a single day, the bias vanished.434 
The most recent study, in 2006, is the only one that looks at voting 
behavior since the post-Bird Chief Justices made the selection procedure less 
discretionary. This study picked up where the 1986 study left off and 
examined years 1977–2003, comparing agreement rates between fill-in justices 
and Chief Justices Bird, Malcolm Lucas, and Ronald George. If Bird was 
indeed gaming the system, then the shift to alphabetical selection would 
presumably result in lower levels of agreement. 
Bird’s successors opted for nondiscretionary methods of filling temporary 
vacancies. Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas (1987–1996), adopted a random, 
alphabetical rotation system.435 Chief Justice Ronald George (1996–2011) kept 
the rotational system, and also stopped designating trial-court judges, instead 
choosing only to name appeals court presiding judges.436 The agreement rate 
between the Chief Justices and their appointees plummeted, suggesting that 
randomly selected replacements defer less to the Chief Justice.437 
Obviously, court decisions that involve a temporary justice carry the same 
force of law as decisions cast by all-permanent justices. And in California, fill-
in justices often cast tiebreaking votes, sometimes in the most contentious, 
high-stakes cases.438 Their votes pack no less of a punch, but it’s interesting that 
in California, a temporary replacement is unlikely to author an opinion—
 
431 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1142. 
432 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1141. 
433 Id. at 1142. 
434 Id. 
435 Brent, supra note 270, at 18. 
436 Id. 
437 Id. at 17. 
438 See, e.g., People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (considering the constitutionality of a 
law criminalizing abortion); DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1981) 
(deciding the constitutionality of affirmative action in public universities). 
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whether majority, concurring, or dissenting. One study looked at 1954–1984 and 
found that fill-in justices wrote majority opinions in only four percent of cases, 
compared to thirteen percent for permanent justices.439 As for concurring or 
dissenting opinions, replacements were only half as likely to write them, in 
eight percent of cases compared to sixteen percent for permanent justices.440 
D. Angst When the Governor Picks the Tiebreaker (and Knows Which Case is 
Tied)—Texas 
As noted above, the Lone Star State has a bifurcated high-court system: a 
Supreme Court for civil matters and a Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal 
matters. But while Texas’s dual high courts are constitutional twins, their 
statutory tiebreaking mechanisms, and the courts’ use of them, differ markedly.441 
  
 
439 Barnett & Rubinfeld, supra note 268, at 1164. 
440 Id. 
441 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.005 (2020). Until 1995, the two courts operated under 
generally comparable statutes, which empowered the Governor to designate non-judge lawyers. In 
fact, Governor Clements’s lone Supreme Court substitute was a lawyer. Coincidentally, that same 
year (1988) was the last time the sister high court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, used a substitute 
judge. The Texas Legislature amended the SCOTX provision a few years later to limit appointments 
to sitting lower-court judges constitutionally qualified to sit on the court. 
Both high courts, however, operate under the same constitutional provision governing 
disqualifications: 
No judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested, or where either of 
the parties may be connected with the judge, either by affinity or consanguinity, within 
such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when the judge shall have been counsel 
in the case. When the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of 
Appeals, or any member of any of those courts shall be thus disqualified to hear and 
determine any case or cases in said court, the same shall be certified to the Governor 
of the State, who shall immediately commission the requisite number of persons 
learned in the law for the trial and determination of such cause or causes. 
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. 
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The SCOTX and CCA provisions differ in three main ways: 
 
 Texas Supreme Court442 Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals443 
Type of vacancies 
covered 
Recusals and disqualifications. Only disqualifications. 
Discretion to request 
a substitute 
Chief Justice may certify to 
the Governor. 




Lower-court judge who is 
qualified to sit on SCOTX. 
Someone “learned in the law.” 
 
There is another stark difference: frequency of use. Since 1988, SCOTX 
has enlisted twenty-four specially commissioned justices, while the Court of 
Criminal Appeals has used just one.445 
Yet for all the differences in the two courts’ appointment provisions, the 
courts share one consequential custom: revealing to the Governor the name 
of the case in which a tie needs to be broken. This requirement is absent from 
the Texas Constitution—even while the Texas Constitution itself authorizes 
the Governor to appoint temporary high court jurists.446 Disclosure is just 
how the court has always done it. Habit. Custom. Inertia. 
 
442 § 22.005(a) (“The chief justice may certify to the governor when one or more justices of 
the supreme court have recused themselves under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure or are 
disqualified under the constitution and laws of this state to hear and determine a case in the court.”); 
Id. § 22.005(b) (“The governor immediately shall commission the requisite number of persons who 
are active appellate or district court justices or judges and who possess the qualifications prescribed 
for justices of the supreme court to try and determine the case.”). 
443 Id. § 22.105(a) (“The fact that a judge of the court of criminal appeals is disqualified under 
the constitution and laws of this state to hear and determine a case shall be certified to the 
governor.”); Id. § 22.105(b) (“The governor immediately shall commission a person who is learned 
in the law to act in the place of the disqualified judge.”). 
444 While the statute requiring notice to the governor is worded in mandatory terms, and not 
limited to tie-vote situations, the Court of Criminal Appeals has long interpreted it to mean the 
court need not seek a substitute justice unless the court is “evenly divided on the proper disposition.” 
See, e.g., Letter from John F. Onion, Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., to William P. 
Clements, Governor, Tex. (Jan. 8, 1988) (on file with Texas A&M University). 
445 The letter from Presiding Judge Onion to Governor Clements’s office is pretty funny, 
noting that he had requested the tiebreaking appointment eighteen months earlier, from a previous 
governor—to no avail. The letter also underscored that the Court of Criminal Appeals has “no 
appropriations to cover the pay of a special judge,” adding, “I tell you this in order that you might 
make it clear to whomever is appointed that pay may be a problem.” Letter from John F. Onion, 
Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., to James Huffines, Dir. of Appointments (Jan. 8, 1988) (on 
file with the Supreme Court of Texas). The letter cites the example of retired SCOTX Justice Meade 
Griffin, who was once appointed a special Court of Criminal Appeals judge and “had to get special 
legislation introduced in order to pay him for his services.” Id. 
446 One could hardly fault any governor for adeptly flexing the power constitutionally given 
him on behalf of the State’s interests as he sees them—and some might well brand it political 
malpractice not to select tiebreaking justices strategically, too. 
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The result is that the Governor has lopsided power over the judicial 
branch. After all, the case might well be one concerning the scope of executive 
power, or one challenging the Governor’s policy initiatives, or one where the 
Governor has expressed an opinion or even filed an amicus brief urging the 
court to rule a certain way. 
Nobody has publicly lambasted the Lone Star State’s odd practice—
certainly not the Governors who do the appointing—but the separation-of-
powers tension seems both obvious and ominous: inviting a co-equal branch 
of government to seize outsized influence over a core judicial function. 
And the exercise of such a singular power—essentially the power to decide 
a specific case—seems discordant under the lengthy Texas Constitution, 
which is so verbose precisely because the Lone Star State’s Founders were so 
persnickety about concentrated power.447 Indeed, the Texas Constitution 
“takes Madison a step further by including, unlike the federal Constitution, 
an explicit Separation of Powers provision to curb overreaching and to spur 
rival branches to guard their prerogatives.”448 
What do elite Texas appellate lawyers think about a system in which the 
Governor is told not only that a case is deadlocked, but which case is 
deadlocked? I interviewed several board-certified Texas appellate lawyers 
who handled cases involving these substitution issues.449 
One case, In re EPIC Holdings,450 featured the Governor’s post-argument 
appointment of two justices. The losing party moved for reargument “based 
on Governor George Bush’s recent decision to appoint two new justices to 
hear and decide this case.”451 Counsel noted that “the newly appointed justices 
have not had the benefit of oral argument” and cited a case earlier that year 
where the court indeed held a second oral argument after the Governor 
commissioned a tiebreaking justice.452 
 
447 ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE & EDWARD J. HARPHAM, GOVERNING TEXAS 91 (Ann Shin 
ed., 1st ed., 2013) (“The framers of the Texas Constitution gave the state government specific powers 
so that the government could not use ambiguity to expand its powers. As a result, the Texas 
Constitution requires frequent amendments to address situations not covered specifically in the 
original constitution.”). 
448 In re Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802, 808 n.39 (Tex. 2014) (citing TEX. CONST. 
art. II, § 1). 
449 According to the Texas Board of Legal Specialization: “Board Certification is a mark of 
excellence and a distinguishing accomplishment within the Texas legal community. . . . Board Certified 
lawyers . . . hav[e] substantial experience, the respect of their peers, and proven specialized competence 
in their select area of law.” Why Choose a Board Certified Lawyer?, TEX. BD. OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, 
https://www.tbls.org/findlawyer [https://perma.cc/B2DS-P56M] (last visited Dec. 30, 2020). 
450 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998). 
451 Motion for Reargument at 1, In re Epic Holdings, 985 S.W.2d 41 (Nos. 96-1131 & 96-1133) 
(on file with the Texas Supreme Court). 
452 Id. at 2 (citing H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 29 (Tex. 1998)). 
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One lawyer who lost a Governor-picks-the-tiebreaker case put it bluntly: 
“It was a travesty of justice in so many respects.”453 A former Assistant 
Solicitor General of Texas involved in another deadlocked case describes the 
current practice as “so wrong on so many levels. It gives me lots of angst.”454 
When informed that the Governor will be naming a fill-in justice, this lawyer 
naturally wonders, “Is it a political case even if I don’t think so?”455 
Another appellate expert, Wade Crosnoe, who lost a substitute-justice case 
5–4, says his chief concern is structural: “the potential problem of executive 
meddling in the judicial branch,” though he stresses he’s “not suggesting that 
happened in my case.”456 He apprehends the risk that “a governor, if so 
inclined, could study up on the appeal and appoint a justice in a manner 
designed to achieve a desired result.”457 (For the same reason, Crosnoe does 
not favor giving unfettered discretion to the Chief Justice, who “might also be 
motivated to select a substitute inclined to see things the chief ’s way.”458) 
Some extensive critique came from another board-certified appellate 
specialist, Reagan Simpson,459 whose comments merit printing in full: 
When I argued St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff, the Court had 9 justices. The 
decision came two years later. By that time, Greg Abbott had been elected 
Attorney General, and his appointed successor on the Court was my partner 
Xavier Rodriguez, who had been at our firm when we tried the case and during 
the appeal. So Justice Moseley was appointed to fill his place. I do not recall 
being told that Justice Moseley had been appointed for that reason to our case. 
The opinion came out on Election Day. I remember getting the surprise 
call while in a Miami airport. As you know, Xavier [Rodriguez] had not been 
elected to the Court, so he was off the Court as soon as the election results 
were certified. The certification of the election then would put Steve Smith 
on the Court, and Jim Moseley would disappear. I think that explains the 
nature of the fractured opinions, with concurrences in the result only. The 
sole holding in Wolff by a majority was that, if you correctly object to the 
charge, you are entitled to an evidentiary review based on what the charge 
should have been. 
 
453 E-mail from Pamela Baron, Solo Tex. App. Att’y (Feb. 18, 2016) (on file with author). 
454 E-mail correspondence with a former Assistant Solicitor General of Texas (Mar. 2, 2016) 
(on file with author). 
455 Id. 
456 E-mail Correspondence with Wade Crosnoe, Partner, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, 
LLP (Mar. 3, 2016) (on file with author). 
457 Id. 
458 Id. 
459 Mr. Simpson represented the Petitioner in St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 
2002). See id. at 517 (naming Mr. Simpson as counsel for the petitioner). 
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I really never want to argue to a Supreme Court with only 8 justices. That 
raises the problem of a tie, of course. I do not like a system where the tie is 
broken by an appointment made for the reason of breaking the tie in that 
specific case. That raises the problem of a result-based appointment. 
Changes in judges is not new to me, of course. In courts of appeals, from 
time to time, I face changes in the panel. . . . Obviously, I also benefit or 
suffer from reassignments for [docket] equalization purposes. 
But I have never gotten the idea that an appointment was being made 
specific to a case to affect the result. I would certainly not want that, either 
for or against me. 
So I would prefer to argue always with a full court. If the full court cannot 
decide the case, I would prefer an appointment before a tie comes up. I would 
prefer some sort of blind appointment. 
I had not thought of this before, but Texas really has an easy way to deal 
with this. We have two courts elected by the people statewide to make the 
ultimate decision on important cases. Some justices on both courts have 
served in the courts of appeals, so they have decided both civil and criminal 
cases. But a judge is a judge, so civil judging experience is not necessary in 
my view. Thus, a random appointment from the Court of Criminal Appeals 
to the Supreme Court would be an idea. Another option would be a random 
appointment, perhaps based on seniority, from the courts of appeals. I would 
prefer it to be done by the Chief Justice, not the Governor; it is a matter of 
court administration.460 
Opposing counsel’s motion for rehearing in Wolff stated plainly her 
dissatisfaction. Counsel was irked that the court’s opinion was written by a 
temporary justice named one year after oral argument, joined by another 
justice who also had not participated in argument.461 Most upsetting: “No 
notice was given to the parties that this appointment had taken place.”462 
 
460 E-mail Correspondence with Reagan W. Simpson, Partner, Yetter Coleman LLP (Feb. 20, 
2016) (on file with author). 
461 Id. 
462 Id. From the motion for rehearing: 
The makeup of the Court has changed considerably since oral argument in this case. 
Of the four justices that made up the plurality, only two participated in oral argument. 
The justice who wrote the plurality opinion, Justice Moseley, was appointed by 
Governor Perry on October 19, 2001, more than a year after oral argument was heard. 
November 5, 2002—the day the opinion issued—was the last possible day that Justice 
Moseley could participate in the decision, because Justice Rodriguez, who had lost to 
Justice Smith in the primary election, resigned from the Court the following day. 
Resp.’s Mot. for Reh’g at 2-3, St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (No. 99-1192) (on file with 
the Texas Supreme Court). 
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David Keltner, one of the state’s top appellate lawyers and a former court of 
appeals justice, described his experience with the Texas tiebreaker system this way: 
It was always strange to me that we went to another branch of government to 
pick the tiebreaking justice. My initial reaction was “Oh, my goodness. 
What’s gonna happen?” Also, I probably need to figure out what this judge 
has done on similar cases. And why in heaven’s name is the governor doing 
it? It might be better to appoint someone up front. That seems more fair, 
though it’s not the most efficient use of judicial resources.463 
Keltner concedes that “the Governor properly made the appointments 
according to the process that was in place” but firmly believes “the process 
could stand a significant revision.”464 As Keltner put it: 
When Hyundai reached the Supreme Court, the petition was granted and the 
case was argued for the first time. After resignations decimated the Court, 
the Governor appointed two justices from intermediate courts of appeals and 
we reargued the case. Ironically, one of the appointed justices wrote the 
majority opinion. 
*   *   * 
The appointment of justices by the Governor seems strange. At the 
outset, it seems odd for appointments of replacement justices to be made by 
one who is not part of the judiciary. If the appointment of additional justices 
were to occur in a case in which the State is a party or in which a sensitive 
political issue is involved, certainly the appointments would be suspect. 
Fortunately, in Hyundai, neither of those problems was involved and the 
appointment of two well-qualified justices—one from Mike’s hometown of 
Houston and the other from my hometown of Fort Worth—made sense.465 
 
463 E-mail Correspondence with David Keltner, Partner, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (Feb. 29, 
2016) (discussing Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006)) (on file with author). 
464 Id. 
465 Keltner also noted an interesting tie-vote frustration at the court of appeals level: 
Ironically, I have had problems with tie votes before. In a case before the Fort Worth 
Court of Appeals, the panel decision was against me on a 2 to 1 vote, with one justice 
“aging-out” after the opinion was issued. That justice was not the author but had been 
in the majority. 
On our motion for rehearing en banc, I pulled three of the remaining justices, for 
what appeared to be a 4 to 3 win. However, under the rules, the “aged-out” justice was 
allowed to remain as the eighth justice on the seven-justice court and the rehearing 
vote was 4 to 4. Because of the tie vote, rehearing was denied. 
On further motion for rehearing, I raised the propriety of allowing a justice, 
whose term had expired, to sit as the eighth justice on a statutorily created seven-
member court. Rehearing and petition for review were denied. 
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Another appellate specialist said, “The procedure is so unusual,” adding, 
“If I’m lead counsel, I’ll try to do some digging. ‘What makes this substitute 
judge tick?’ ” Overall, though, this lawyer was 
inclined to let it be [and not file supplemental briefing focused on the fill-in 
justice] unless I found something really significant. I’d be reluctant to get in 
there and stir the pot. It’s not like the Court is hermetically sealed. The 
justices all talk to each other. I’d likely just let the process unfold.466 
Another point bears mentioning: Texas’s current Governor, Greg 
Abbott—possibly owing to his prior service as a justice on the Texas Supreme 
Court and as Attorney General—has created an amicus curiae practice run 
out of his general counsel’s office. Since January 2015, Governor Abbott’s 
office has submitted twelve court briefs, including four in the Texas Supreme 
Court, three in the United States Supreme Court, five in various other state 
and federal courts, plus five briefs to the attorney general’s office.467 Governor 
Abbott is an experienced, gifted lawyer who well understands the Texas 
Supreme Court’s unique power to shape state law. As Governor, he has 
distinct interests, both institutionally and on a policy level, that naturally lead 
to his effort to steer the law in a discrete direction. 
And that unprecedented amicus practice raises interesting questions in 
the realm of tiebreaking votes. As noted above, high court cases sometimes 
deal with first-principles disputes about the architecture of government. As 
head of the executive branch, the Governor—particularly this justice-AG-
Governor—has sophisticated ideas about how governing power should be 
allocated. What if a case posed a question going to the core of executive 
power? What if it involved the most high stakes of state disputes, like school 
finance? What if the deadlocked case has attracted an amicus brief from 
someone who now wields the power to select the tiebreaking justice—an 
advocate picking “the decider”? 
 
As you can imagine, my clients felt they had won their case but were denied a 
victory by the vagaries of nonsensical rules. 
Id. 
466 Telephone Interview with anonymous Texas lawyer (Oct. 2015-Mar. 2016) (on file with 
author). Despite these concerns, the lawyer noted that “historically, the system doesn’t seem to be 
causing a lot of mischief—it hasn’t caused terrible harm—but it’s certainly not the way you’d do it if 
designing from scratch.” 
467 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Jimmy Blacklock, Justice, Tex. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015-Mar. 2016) (on file with author); Telephone Correspondence with James Sullivan, Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, Off. of Tex. Governor Greg Abbott (Nov. 19, 2020). 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM IN TEXAS (AND BEYOND?) 
I confess up front: I haven’t cracked the code on the perfect method for 
selecting substitute justices. As with judicial selection generally, there’s no 
glitch-free method, just varying degrees of imperfection. Whether picking 
temporary judges for one case or permanent judges for all cases, every approach 
has distinctive pros and cons. But the Governor-picks-the-decider method used 
in Texas and a handful of other states is fundamentally worrisome. 
I favor for Texas an approach that honors both structural principles and 
prudential goals: separation of powers, judicial independence, neutrality, and 
judicial economy. My modest proposal: before each Term, have the court 
name five potential appointees who would be appointed in random order 
whenever deadlock arises. My fundamental concern—judicial 
independence—is neither new nor novel. Harken back to Sir Edward Coke. 
A. Classic Coke: Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law468 
In the turbulent Elizabethan Age, Sir Edward Coke’s consequential life 
“uniquely contributed to the foundation of the law as an institution 
independent of the political powers of the state.”469 Indeed, as one leading 
Coke scholar avers, “no one has contributed more to create the modern notion 
of the rule of law” than Coke.470 
Coke, who served Elizabeth I as Attorney General and James I as Chief 
Justice, steadfastly resisted the King’s dabbling in judicial matters—and was 
later removed for it.471 Coke inhabited an age when the feudal order was waning 
and commercialism was waxing. Conflicts galore arose that needed solutions 
imposed by a predictable and no-favorites system of legal rules and remedies.472 
Coke the jurist, “incorruptible and respected,” believed that Parliament 
and the common law were law’s sole legitimate sources and that only courts 
of law, not other arbiters, not even kings, should decide disputes.473 He 
believed judges must be allegiant to the dictates of law, not the royal 
 
468 The discerning reader will note that “Coke” in this instance is pronounced not like the 
beverage but instead like “cook.” See generally Liberty Fund Books, Steve Sheppard and the Writings of 
Sir Edward Coke, YOUTUBE, at 0:23 (May 18, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCSjjxdWIEM (discussing the significance of Sir Edward 
Coke in English history and his profound influence on the development of the common law). 
469 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE xiii (Steve 
Sheppard ed. 2003) [hereinafter COKE SELECTIONS]. 
470 Id. 
471 Id. at xxiii; accord Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke. 
472 COKE SELECTIONS, supra note 469, at xxiii-xxiv. 
473 Id. at back cover. 
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prerogatives of monarchs.474 The crown was often unamused at Coke’s 
impertinence, preferring unchecked control over peoples’ affairs.475 
I share Coke’s view that a judge should do as a “judge ought to do” free of 
royal command.476 The outcome of the law should not be dictated by imperial 
power. Coke contributed mightily to the modern notion of the rule of law, 
which, in our enlightened system of three rival branches, requires separation 
of powers, not integration. Coke’s influence in resisting abuses of power, 
including the Crown’s power (both James and Charles), continued in his post-
judicial life as a member of Parliament, when he secured the Petition of 
Right,477 an anthem of liberty for the English people that a century and a half 
later took deep American root in our own Bill of Rights.478 
Coke’s bold advocacy for judicial independence, a death-defying stand in 
those days, also manifests in American law through the power of judicial 
review—most famously articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison,479 but exercised twenty-one years earlier by Marshall’s former law 
teacher George Wyeth, a venerated state court judge, in Commonwealth v. 
Caton.480 The jurisprudential genealogy is evident: Marshall was doubtless 
influenced by Wythe (who also taught future presidents Jefferson and 
Monroe), and Wythe was doubtless influenced by Coke. 
Governors are not Stuart monarchs. Judicial decision-making must be 
independent and free of assertions of raw executive power. It is one thing for a 
Governor to appoint judges who will decide the whole of a court’s docket. It is 
quite another for a Governor to handpick the tiebreaking jurist in discrete cases. 
Shortly before Watergate, Senator Sam Ervin reminded America that “an 
independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic of a free 
society.”481 This aversion to executive oppression is anchored deeply in 
American tradition but was advanced long before the Revolution. As 
discussed above, our English forebears pushed back against executive 
oppression. Our Founders continued the fight, listing among the 
Declaration’s grievances George III’s habit of making judges “dependent on 
his [w]ill alone.”482 The Federalist Papers underscore the bases for Article III’s 
 
474 Id. at xxv-xxvi. 
475 Id. at xxiii, xxvi. 
476 Id. at xxvi. 
477 Id. at xxiii. The Petition of Right was the first of three constitutional documents of English 
civil liberties, along with the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights 1689. 
478 COKE SELECTIONS, supra note 469, at xxiii. 
479 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
480 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782); accord William Michael Treatnor, The Case of the Prisoners and the 
Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994). 
481 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
108, 121 (1970). 
482 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
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independent judicial branch, to serve as an excellent barrier both “to the 
despotism of the prince,” and “to the encroachments and the oppressions of 
the representative body.”483 
In my view, a Governor’s post-deadlock appointment of a tiebreaking justice, 
after getting the chance to examine the case and form an opinion about how it 
should be decided, puts the court at risk of undue politicization. The judicial 
branch letting the executive branch decide a case by proxy? This arrangement 
resembles a modern-day prerogative court, something akin to a divine-rights 
theory of kingship/governorship.484 What if the deadlocked case involves 
gubernatorial power or the validity of the Governor’s actions or policies?485 
I believe high courts should have a tiebreaking mechanism and, for 
separation-of-powers purposes, it should rest within the judiciary. 
B. Possible Paths for Texas 
Texas could implement myriad reforms that would enhance judicial 
independence. The ideal solution—nixing the Governor’s outsized role and 
housing the tiebreaking system entirely within the judiciary—would require 
a constitutional amendment, meaning that the legislature, and then the 
voters, must approve it. Doable, but a non-minor undertaking. That said, the 
most mischievous feature of the Texas approach—divulging to the Governor 
which case is tied—can be cured immediately and unilaterally. Nothing in 
Texas law requires such disclosure. I will briefly address each option. 
 
483 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
484 This is a matter of constitutional dimension, as the Alabama Supreme Court held in 2006. 
City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So.2d 1061, 1092 (Ala. 2006). The court confronted the judicial-
executive tension head-on in a dispute over who constitutionally has the power to appoint substitute 
high court justices. Throughout much of Alabama history, the Governor appointed special justices, 
but in 1973, Alabama amended its Constitution to establish the Chief Justice as the administrative 
head of the State’s judicial system, and to give the Chief—and only the Chief—the power to “assign 
appellate justices and judges to any appellate court for temporary service.” ALA. CONST. art. VI, 
§ 110. But Alabama had a preexisting statutory scheme that vested sole power in the governor to 
appoint a tiebreaking justice if there was “equal division.” ALA. CODE § 12-2-14 (1975). There was a 
direct conflict between the code and the constitution, and the constitution wins such battles—
always. City of Bessemer, 957 So.2d at 1092 (“When the Constitution and a statute are in conflict, the 
Constitution controls . . . .”) (quoting Parker v. Anderson, 519 So.2d 442, 446 (Ala. 1987)). There is 
no way, the court said, to square a constitutional provision that confers appointment powers on the 
chief justice with a statutory provision that constrains such power. The court thus held the statute 
“invalid to the extent that it improperly restricts the Chief Justice’s constitutionally granted power 
to assign Special Justices to serve temporarily on this Court.” Id. at 1095. Says the clerk’s office: 
“The Chief Justice is the captain of the judicial boat in all respects.” Telephone and E-mail 
Correspondence with Brad Medaris, supra note 340. 
485 As the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, “fears of bias can 
arise when . . . a man chooses the judge in his own cause.” 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009). 
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1. Baby Steps: Tweak the Governor’s Role 
Even if Texas retains its Governor-centered method and remains a 
tiebreaking state and not a tie-avoiding state, one reform seems obvious: The 
Texas Supreme Court should stop sharing internal vote information outside 
the judiciary. This is the most harrowing feature of the Texas approach. And 
it can be remedied instantly. 
One rationale given for identifying the name of the case is to ensure the 
Governor does not unwittingly name someone who might have participated 
in the case below. But there are several ways to eliminate this concern short 
of disclosing the case: 
• Request the Governor not to appoint someone who hails from a 
certain court of appeals; 
• Tell the Governor nothing, and just alert the Governor if the 
appointee has a conflict; 
• When deadlock arises, ask the Governor for a list of replacement 
justices in preference order and simply pick the first person eligible to sit; 
• At the beginning of a Term, ask the Governor to submit three names 
in preference order that the court will use as needed. 
2. Swing for the Fences: Scrap the Governor’s Role 
Fortune favors the bold, and I favor a top-to-bottom overhaul that severs 
the Gordian knot clean through, keeping the process entirely within the 
judicial branch.486 
After examining all fifty states, here is my modest proposal for that 
judicial process: Before each term, the Texas Supreme Court should 
collectively agree on five potential appointees who would be selected—in 
random order—should deadlock arise. If the first name drawn has a conflict, 
another name would be chosen until someone is able and willing to sit. 
Keeping appointee selection wholly within the judicial branch honors 
separation of powers and judicial independence, underscoring the Supreme 
Court’s institutional role as administrative head of the judicial branch.487 And 
having five consensus names on the front end, plus the randomness of the 
specific name chosen, promotes evenhandedness and ensures that one justice 
cannot wield outsized influence by picking strategically. This method also 
 
486 It is true the Texas Constitution, not merely a statute, confers this pro tem appointment 
power on the governor. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. So for Texas, adopting my proposal would take 
a constitutional amendment—meaning the Legislature, and then ultimately the voters, must 
approve any proposed reform. 
487 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.021 (2019) (“The supreme court has supervisory and 
administrative control over the judicial branch and is responsible for the orderly and efficient 
administration of justice.”). 
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advances judicial economy, as it applies only when the court is deadlocked. 
Finally, to give it a distinctive Lone Star flavor (and inspired by Louisiana’s 
Jack-o’-Lantern), names would be drawn from a ten-gallon Stetson: 
 
Figure 9: Lone Star Stetson Hat488 
 
Enhancing the role of the Texas Supreme Court in selecting judicial 
replacements aligns with how most states approach avoiding or breaking ties. 
And Texas law seems copacetic with this judiciary-led approach. As it currently 
stands, the Chief Justice has judge-picking power in various special situations: 
• Public school finance challenges—The Chief Justice, after being 
petitioned by the attorney general, appoints a “special three-judge district 
court” to hear challenges to “the finances or operations of this state’s public 
school system.”489 One member is specified by statute (“the district judge of 
the judicial district to which the original case was assigned”490), but the chief 
has discretion in picking the other two.491 
• Redistricting—As described immediately above, the Chief Justice 
names a special three-judge trial court that “involves the apportionment of 
districts” for various state and federal offices.492 
 
488 Don Willett, How the States Avoid Supreme Stalemates, JUDICATURE, Winter 2016, at 8, 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/judicature/judicature-100.4-
willett.pdf. 
489 See id. § 22A.001(a)(1). 
490 Id. 
491 Id. § 22A.002(a)(2)-(3). 
492 Id. § 22A.001(a)(2) (outlining that the other two judges in the three-judge trial court will 
consist of a district court judge from a different judicial district than the one the case was assigned 
and a judge from a court of appeals). 
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• Judicial disciplinary proceedings—The Chief Justice appoints a three-
member special court of review, a panel of court of appeals justices selected 
by lot.493 Says the Supreme Court’s general counsel, “This is not 
discretionary. We literally put all Justices’ names in a hat and pick three 
out.”494 Separately, when the Judicial Conduct Commission recommends 
removal or retirement of a judge, the Chief Justice selects by lot a seven-
member Review Tribunal of court of appeals justices.495 Each of Texas’s 
fourteen courts of appeals designates one of its members for inclusion in the 
pool, and the first name drawn chairs the Review Tribunal.496 
• Attorney disciplinary proceedings—Judges in attorney discipline 
matters are appointed by the court as a whole.497 Says the Supreme Court 
general counsel: “We rotate those assignments among active district judges 
around the state, it’s pretty much random, but we do take into account 
whether they’ve been on the bench at least a year, how long it’s been since 
their last assignment, and we select from a different administrative judicial 
region than the attorney to reduce conflicts. I send these recommendations 
to all Justices for review before the assignments are made.”498 
• Certain other recusal-based vacancies—The Chief Justice has authority to 
assign judges in certain other cases where recusals occur—e.g., the regional 
presiding judge, who would normally oversee recusal motions, has recused 
himself, meaning the Chief Justice must appoint the trial judge instead.499 
On timing, Texas could model most states and strive to avert ties by filling 
out the court as soon as it drops below full strength. “It might be better to 
appoint someone up front,” according to one appellate specialist, although 
that approach is “certainly not the most efficient use of judicial resources.”500 
Yet “up front” need not mean before a case is argued; it could also mean you 
have a bullpen of potential appointees from which to draw if, and only if, the 
short-staffed court locks up 4–4. 
 
493 Id. § 33.001(11); see generally TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.02 (discussing the assignment of 
judges to preside in disciplinary cases). 
494 Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). The former Chief Justice, a proud graduate of the Michigan State University College 
of Law, reportedly used a Spartan cap. The current hat is a nondescript wool chapeau. 
495 GOV’T § 33.001(9). 
496 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(9); see also Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, supra note 494. 
497 TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.02. 
498 Interview with Nina Hess Hsu, supra note 494. 
499 GOV’T §§ 74.049–.057. 
500 E-mail Correspondence with David Keltner, supra note 463. 
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CONCLUSION 
When you seek fortune-telling advice from a Magic 8 Ball, the 
icosahedron may well respond, “Ask again later” or “Better not tell you now” 
or “Concentrate and ask again.” Out of twenty possible answers, ten are 
positive, five are negative, and five are neutral.501 Yet courts ought never tell 
litigants, “Reply hazy—try again.” It’s one thing for a supreme court to be 
Delphic, providing gauzy pronouncements that leave people scratching their 
heads. It’s another for a supreme court to be mute, providing no 
pronouncement at all and leaving people shaking their fists. There’s a reason 
Lady Justice is depicted with scales and not with a shrug. 
Courts of last resort must be courts, and courts exist to decide cases. Every 
state high court in America has an odd-numbered composition for good 
reason: to avoid ties. But supreme courts inevitably confront temporary 
vacancies—some long (unfilled vacancy, extended illness) and some short 
(case-specific recusal)—that raise the risk of deadlock. 
Federal law forbids a tiebreaking mechanism at the U.S. Supreme 
Court.502 There is no such thing as a substitute SCOTUS Justice. The fifty 
states, however, handle the specter of stalemate in wildly different ways. 
In some states, fill-in justices are selected neutrally; in other states, 
intentionally. And in Texas, the appointer—the head of a separate branch of 
government—wields an extraordinary power: He knows not only that a case 
is tied, but which case, arguably enabling him to decide the case by deciding 
who decides it. 
But it was a nineteenth-century Texas Governor—Sul Ross—who 
cautioned, “[L]oss of public confidence in the judiciary is the greatest curse 
that can ever befall a nation.”503 The judiciary’s power derives from a public 
perception that courts operate above the political fray, that the judiciary (even 
an elected one, as most state judiciaries are) is not merely another political 
branch of government. Judicial legitimacy necessarily means that judges are 
not perceived as politicians in robes, stacking the legal deck to impose 
ideologically congenial results. And judicial independence should not require 
dependence on another branch to break ties in known cases. 
I have not devised a glitch-free mechanism for impasse resolution. Every 
approach—pre-deadlock vs. post-deadlock, chief justice individually vs. court 
 
501 See Magic 8-Ball, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_8-Ball 
[https://perma.cc/87JQ-V6M3] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (detailing the distribution of answers 
provided by the Magic 8-Ball). 
502 Hartnett, supra note 18, at 651-52. 
503 Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks Out Against Judicial Elections, ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/an-elected-judge-speaks-out-against-
judicial-elections/279263 [https://perma.cc/UD6Q-Y93A]. 
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collectively, unfettered discretion vs. randomized—has upsides and 
downsides. For Texas, I propose letting the court, at the beginning of each 
Term, designate five lower-court judges to be appointed in random order as 
deadlock arises. In my view, this approach ensures that cases get decided but 
in a manner that furthers separation of powers, judicial independence, 
neutrality, and judicial economy. 
The U.S. Supreme Court usually dominates the spotlight. But America 
“boasts not one Constitution but 51, meaning American constitutionalism 
concerns far more than what began in Philadelphia 232 years ago.”504 Justice 
Brandeis memorably depicted states as laboratories of democracy.505 And when 
it comes to impasse resolution, state-level innovations abound, some more juris-
imprudent than others. My hope is that this Article sparks fruitful scrutiny of 
state high courts’ tiebreaking systems and helps policymakers identify smart 
refinements that honor judicial independence and the Rule of Law. 
  
 
504 Thompson v. Dall. City Att’y’s Off., 913 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 2019); see also SUTTON, supra 
note 22, at 16-21. 
505 New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A—Summary Chart of State Approaches 
 

















ALA. CODE § 12-2-14 (1975), 
held unconstitutional in City of 
Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 
2d 1061, 1093-95 (Ala. 2006); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Brad 
Medaris, Cent. Staff Att’y, 
Ala. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2015) (on 
file with author). See supra 
notes 340 & 484 and 
accompanying text. 




n/a n/a ALASKA R. APP. P. 106; 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, 
§ 16; Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with 
Marilyn May, Clerk of App. 
Cts., Ala. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015–Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra notes 157-
58 and accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Janet 
Johnson, Clerk, Ariz. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra note 202 and 
accompanying text. 




Attorney Governor ARK. CONST., amend. 80, 
§ 13(A); Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Stacey Pectol, Clerk of Cts., 
Ark. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–
Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra notes 204-
208 & 341-342 and 
accompanying text. 
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CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; 
CAL. SUP. CT., INTERNAL 
OPERATING PRACS. & 
PROCS. §§ IV.J, XIII.B; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Frank 
McGuire, Ct. Admin & 
Clerk, Cal. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015–Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra notes 273-
274 and accompanying text. 




n/a n/a COLO. APP. R. 35(b); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Polly 
Brock, Clerk, Colo. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). 
Conn. 7 Back-end 
tiebreaking 
Judge Court CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-
207, 51-209; Conn. R. App. P 
§ 70-6 ; see also Pesino v. Atl. 
Bank, 709 A.2d 540; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Pamela 
Meotti, Chief Admin. 
Officer, Conn. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015) (on file with author). 
See supra note 380 and 
accompanying text. 




Email Correspondence with 
Leo Strine, Chief Just., Del. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 26, 2015) (on 
file with author). See supra 
note 211 and accompanying 
text. Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Cathy 
Howard, Clerk, Del. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author).  




FLA. SUP. CT. INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROC. § X; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with John 
Tomasino, Clerk, Fla. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). 
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Ga. 7 Front-end 
avoidance 
Judge Court GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, 
para. 1; GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-2-2; Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Therese Barnes, Clerk, Ga. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 212 & 382-384 
and accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Public 
Affairs Office, Hawaii State 
Judiciary (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 282-287 and 
accompanying text. 
Idaho 5 Front-end 
avoidance 
Judge Court IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk, 
Idaho Sup. Ct. (Jan. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 214, 266-267, 385 
and accompanying text. 




n/a n/a Perlman v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Chi., 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. 
1975) (per curiam); ILL. CONST. 
art. VI, § 16; Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Carolyn Taft Grosboll, Clerk, 
Ill. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015) (on file 
with author). 




n/a n/a IND. APP. R. 58(c); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Kevin 
Smith, Clerk, Ind. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). 
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n/a n/a IOWA CODE § 602.4107; Polk 
Co. Bd. of Review v. Village 
Green Co-Op, Inc., No. 13-
1205, 2014 WL 2619674, at *1 
(Iowa June 13, 2014); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Donna 
Humpal, Clerk, Iowa Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 




n/a n/a KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 4; 
Thornton v. Shore, 654 P.2d 
475 (Kan. 1982); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with Heather Smith, Clerk, 
Kan. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 2016) (on 
file with author). 




n/a n/a Ky. Utils. v. S.E. Coal, 836 
SW 2d 407, 409-410 (1992); 
KY. CONST. § 110(5)(b); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Susan 
Clary, Clerk, Ky. Sup. Ct. 
(Feb. 24, 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra notes 154, 
178 and accompanying text. 
La. 7 Front-end 
avoidance 
Judge Court Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with John 
Olivier, Clerk, La. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015-Jan. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra notes 
386-390 and accompanying 
text. 




n/a n/a Day v. State Tax Assessor, 
942 A.2d 685, 686 (Me. 
2008); Hale v. Antoniou, 820 
A.2d 586, 586 (Me. 2003); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with 
Matthew Pollack, Exec. 
Clerk, Me. Sup. Ct. (Nov. 
2015) (on file with author). 
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MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3A; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Bessie 
Decker, Clerk, Md. Ct. App. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). 




n/a n/a Fresh Pond Shopping Ctr., 
Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of 
Cambridge, 446 N.E.2d 1060, 
1060 (Mass. 1983); Pacella v. 
Milford Radio Corp., 476 
N.E.2d 595, 595 (Mass. 1985); 
MASS. R. APP. P. 27.1(g); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Francis 
Kenneally, Clerk, Mass. Sup. 
Ct. (Nov. 2015-Jan. 2016) (on 
file with author). 




n/a n/a MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.230; People v. Sullivan, 
609 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 
2000); Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Larry 
Royster, Clerk, Mich. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 176-177, 180-182 
and accompanying text. 




n/a n/a State v. Retzlaff, 842 N.W.2d 
565, 565 (Minn. 2012); 
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Rita 
DeMeules, Clerk, Minn. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 154, 200 and 
accompanying text. 
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n/a n/a MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 165; 
Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 
2d 1237, 1243 (Miss. 2003); 
Telephone Interview with Bill 
Waller Jr., Chief Just., Miss. 
Sup. Ct. (Jan. 15, 2016) (on 
file with author); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with Hubbard T. Saunders, 
IV, Clerk, Miss. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015-Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author. 




MO. CONST. art. V, § 6.; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Clerk, 
Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 2016) (on 
file with author). See supra 
notes 198, 216 and 
accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Ed 
Smith, Clerk, Mont. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 218-220, 225 and 
accompanying text. 
Neb. 7 Front-end 
avoidance 
Judge Court Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Teresa 
Brown, Clerk, Neb. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra notes 
226-230, 391 and 
accompanying text. 
Nev. 7 Back-end 
tiebreaking 
Judge Governor NEV. CONST. ART. 6, § 4; 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5); 
NEV. R. APP. P. 
25A(b)(2)(C); NEV. SUP. CT. 
R. 10(8); Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Tracie Lindeman, Clerk, Nev. 
Sup. Ct., (Oct. 2015-Feb. 
2016). See supra notes 344-349 
and accompanying text. 
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N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 490:3; Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Eileen Fox, Clerk, N.H. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 289-292 and 
accompanying text. 




n/a n/a N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 
1; N.J. R. 2:13-2(a); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with Gail Haney, Clerk, N.J. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 148, 423 and 
accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Joey 
Moya, Clerk, N.M. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra notes 
231-237 and accompanying text. 
N.Y. 7 Back-end 
tiebreaking 
Judge Court Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with 
Andrew Klein, Clerk, N.Y. 
Ct. App. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra note 392-396 and 
accompanying text. 




n/a n/a Forbes Homes, Inc. v. 
Trimpi, 326 S.E.2d 30, 30 
(N.C. 1985); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 7A-39.3, 7A-39.5; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with 
Christie Roeder, Clerk, N.C. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Penny 
Miller, Clerk, N.D. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra notes 
238-242 and accompanying text. 
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Interview with Maureen 
O’Connor, Chief Just., Ohio 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 243-249 and 
accompanying text. 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Amy 
Reitz, Clerk, Ohio Sup. Ct. 








OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6; 
Order of Appointment, 
Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C-
2009-720 (Okla Crim. App. 
Apr. 20, 2009); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with Michael Richie, Clerk, 
Okla. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-
Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra note 306-








Okla. Const. art. VII, § 6; 
Gandy v. Oklahoma, No. C-
2009-720; Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Michael Richie, Clerk, Okla. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra note 306-307 and 
accompanying text. 
Or. 7 Front-end 
avoidance 
Judge Court Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Lisa 
Norris-Lampe, Clerk, Ore. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 250-251, 397-
401 and accompanying text. 




n/a n/a Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 
A.3d 705, 705 (Pa. 2014); PA. 
SUP. CT. INTERNAL 
OPERATING PROCS. 
§ 4(B)(3); Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
John Vaskov, Clerk, Pa. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). 
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n/a n/a Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 
587 (R.I. 2013); 8 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 8-3-8(d) 
(2020); R.I. R. APP. P., art. I, 
r. 25(a); Cahill v. Morrow, 11 
A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011); Ucci 
v. Mancini, 387 A.2d 1056, 
1057 (R.I. 1978); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with Debra Saunders, Clerk, 
R.I. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 2015) (on 
file with author). See supra 
notes 151, 171-173, 179 and 
accompanying text. 






S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-215; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Dan 
Shearouse, Clerk, S.C. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 308-310, 312-313 
and accompanying text. 




S.D. CONST. art. V, § 11; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Laura 
Graves, Clerk, S.D. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra note 
315 and accompanying text. 















TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 
11; State ex rel. Hooker v. 
Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 
335 (Tenn. 1996); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 17-2-102, -
104, -110(a); Hooker v. 
Sundquist, 1999 WL 74545 at 
*3 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 1999) 
(unpublished); Telephone 
and Email Correspondence 
with James M. Hivner, 
Clerk, Tenn. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 
2015–Feb. 2016) (on file with 
author). See supra notes 355-
356 and accompanying text. 
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Judge Governor TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 22.005; Act of May 19, 
1995, ch. 428, § 1, 1995 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 3097, 3097; 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Blake 
Hawthorne, Clerk, Tex. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 









law . . . .” 
Governor TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; 
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 22.105(a); Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Abel Acosta, Clerk, Tex. Ct. 
Crim. App. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author); 
Letter from John F. Onion, 
Presiding Judge, Tex. Ct. of 
Crim. App., to William P. 
Clements, Governor, Tex. 
(Jan. 8, 1988). See supra notes 
444-445. 




UTAH CONST., art. VIII, 
§ 2; Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Andrea 
Martinez, Clerk, Utah Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 253-254 and 
accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Deb 
Laferriere, Program Adm’r, 
Vt. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 255, 257-261 
and accompanying text. 




VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
302(B) (2020); Telephone and 
Email Correspondence with 
Trish Harrington, Clerk, Va. 
Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 263-264, 316-
318 and accompanying text. 
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WASH. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 
21(c); Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Ron 
Carpenter, Clerk, Wash. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on 
file with author). See supra 
note 301-303 and 
accompanying text. 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Rory 
Perry, Clerk, W. Va. Sup. Ct. 
(Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) (on file 
with author). See supra notes 
319-324 and accompanying 
text. 




n/a n/a Sohn Mfg. Inc. v. Lab. & 
Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 854 
N.W.2d 371, 371 (Wis. 2014); 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Diane 
Fremgen, Clerk, Wis. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). 




Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with Carol 
Thompson, Clerk, Wyo. Sup. 
Ct. (Oct. 2015–Feb. 2016) 
(on file with author). See 
supra notes 330-335 and 
accompanying text. 
Telephone and Email 
Correspondence with E. 
James Burke, Chief Justice, 
Wy. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 2015-Feb. 
2016) (on file with author). 
See supra notes 335-339 and 
accompanying text. 
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Appendix B—Texas’s Temporary-Justice Process 
Since the late 1980s, the Texas Supreme Court has used judicial pinch-
hitters sparingly—in just fourteen cases: nine during the tenure of Governor 
Rick Perry (2000–2015);506 four during the tenure of Governor George W. 
Bush (1995–2000);507 and one during the tenure of Governor Bill Clements 
(1979–1983 and 1987–1991).508 
The relatively small number of Governors and deadlocks facilitates 
empirical examination of how requests for substitute justices are handled in the 
Governor’s Office and how those temporary appointees tend to vote. This 
Appendix examines all fourteen cases and concludes that, even with the small 
sample, Governors’ Offices have had polar-opposite views on how and whom to 
pick. As a practical matter, how are requests for substitute justices handled in 
the Governor’s Office? And how do those temporary appointees tend to vote?  
1. Non-strategic Selection—A Generic Focus on “Capable, Qualified 
Jurists”; “We Didn’t Try to Tip the Scales in a Big Way.” 
a. Governor Bill Clements (1979–1983 and 1987–1991): One Appointee in One Case 
Bill Clements was the 42nd and 44th Governor of Texas, but he appointed 
just one substitute Justice, in 1988—a temporary chief justice, in fact.509 
The Chief Justice at that time, Tom Phillips (whom Governor Clements 
had appointed a few months earlier), was disqualified from sitting in a 
personal-injury case being litigated by his former law firm.510 At that time, 
Texas law did not require the substitute justice to be a sitting lower-court 
judge, and Governor Clements appointed a prominent Dallas lawyer, Tom 
Luce (who two years later ran, unsuccessfully, for Governor himself).511 
 
506 See supra note 358. 
507 See supra note 359. 
508 See supra note 360. 
509 Until this 1988 appointment, the most recent appointment was a full quarter-century earlier, in 1963. 
510 Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988) (listing Baker Botts 
representation); cf. Thomas R. Phillips, Baker Botts, https://www.bakerbotts.com/people/p/phillips-
thomas-r [https://perma.cc/D8KH-CEHJ] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020) (noting Phillips’ employment 
at Baker Botts before and after his time on SCOTX). 
511 The Legislature changed the statute after this case to require that temporary Supreme 
Court justices be lower-court judges constitutionally qualified to sit on the court. Telephone 
Interview with Tom Phillips, former Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. Tex. (August 21, 2015) (on file with 
author); see also supra notes 369-376. 
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b. Governor George W. Bush (1995–2000): Seven Appointees in Four Cases 
Governor Bush appointed seven substitute Justices in four cases.512 
Unfortunately, neither of the two Bush-era appointment directors, Clay 
Johnson (for the first three cases) and Ron Bellamy (for the final case), recalls 
how these requests were handled.513 
Interviews with several of those appointed, however, reveal some details. 
For example, Judge Stephen Ables recalls receiving a call from Clay Johnson, 
with whom Judge Ables had some recent contacts.514 Governor Bush had just 
appointed him presiding judge of one of Texas’s nine administrative judicial 
regions. Judge Ables was a known and respected judge, also serving on the 
Texas Judicial Council. He had also invited Johnson to speak at a 
Philosopher’s Club meeting. Judge Ables recalls Johnson saying he “wanted 
to get a trial judge and appellate judge.”515 He says Johnson described 
generally what the case was about and asked Judge Ables to confirm he had 
no conflicts that would preclude his appointment. Johnson mentioned it was 
a big case out of Dallas, and “everyone in the Dallas GOP was close to one 
side or the other. He wanted someone far from Dallas to avoid accusations of 
appointing someone with connections.”516 All in all, says Judge Ables, “it was 
a very enjoyable experience,” though generally, he says, “the Bush/Perry 
appointments offices never had a great feel for the judiciary.”517 
In the Bush era, only one of the appointed justices wound up in the 
minority, writing the dissent, it turns out. In In re George, decided 5–4, the 
dissent was penned by Scott Brister, then a trial judge but who a few years 
later would himself be appointed to the Supreme Court. (Brister was also 
commissioned a substitute justice while later serving on the court of appeals.) 
Sometimes the replacement justice even authored the opinion for the court.518 
 
512 See supra note 359. 
513 Governor Bush’s first appointments director, Clay Johnson, later headed the White House 
Office of Presidential Personnel under President Bush, and then served as Deputy Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. Telephone Interview with Ron Bellamy, former Appointments 
Dir. for Governor Bush (August 23, 2015) (on file with author). 
514 Telephone Interview with Stephen Ables, Judge, Tex. 6th Admin. Jud. Region (Aug. 31, 




518 Justice Jim Moseley, then a member of the Dallas-based court of appeals, authored a 
plurality opinion in St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2003). The Texas Supreme Court 
experienced frenetic turnover in the early 2000s (ten new justices from 2000 to 2005), and was 
actually decided with eight justices, as the opinion explains: 
After the case was argued and while it was under submission, Justice Gonzales and 
Justice Abbott resigned from the Court. Justice Rodriguez, who was appointed to 
replace Justice Abbott, recused himself from participation in the decision of the case. 
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c. Governor Rick Perry (2000–2015): Sixteen Appointees in Nine Cases 
Rick Perry, the longest-serving Governor in Texas history, also holds the 
record for most number of substitute justices appointed: sixteen in nine cases 
(four cases in 2008 alone).519 Fourteen of the sixteen appointees were court 
of appeals justices, and two were district court judges. 
As during the Bush and Clements governorships, Governor Perry relied 
exclusively on his appointments director. When it came to naming permanent 
Supreme Court justices, Governor Perry’s appointments director assembled 
a team of people, including lawyers outside the Governor’s Office, to help 
interview top candidates. But when naming temporary, one-case-only 
justices, the appointments office handled it solo. 
The appointments offices under Governors Clements and Bush were not 
led by lawyers. That changed during Governor Perry’s tenure, when 
appointments were led by lawyer Ken Anderson (who had also served as 
deputy appointments director for Governor Clements). And Anderson did 
not consult with gubernatorial staff outside the appointments office. “I 
handled judicial appointments myself,” Anderson says.520 There was no real 
interview process and no attempt to plumb a candidate’s thoughts on the case, 
which Anderson says would be “highly improper.”521 
Interviews with Governor Perry’s two appointments directors reveal a 
process focused on administrative nuts and bolts, such as avoiding recusal 
issues, not on trying to steer the result a certain way. “We tried to figure out 
where the case was from so we wouldn’t appoint judges with a conflict,” said 
Anderson.522 “We tried to move them around geographically, tending to prefer 
urban areas, where you’d have judges who’ve heard more sophisticated cases.”523 
When the first request arrived from the court for a substitute justice, 
Anderson had to first go back and refresh his recollection on the statute. 
Governor Clements’s sole substitute appointee, in 1988, had been a lawyer, 
but the statute was amended in 1995. “I discovered it had been changed to 
require a sitting judge,” Anderson says.524 
What criteria did Governor Perry’s office use? 
 
Chief Justice Phillips certified that fact to the Governor, who thereupon commissioned 
to the Court the Honorable James A. “Jim” Moseley, Justice of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, to participate in deciding the case. 
Id. at 519 n.10. 
519 See supra note 358. 
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We looked for folks who actually would’ve been good Supreme Court justices—
the best and the brightest. We didn’t read briefs, but we explored what the case 
involved big picture. In a utility case, for example, we would look for someone 
who likes to dig into the weeds because it’ll require a lot of homework.525 
Anderson says they did not try to influence the case outcome, an 
“improper” impulse in his view: 
We didn’t try to tip the scales in a big way. That could come back to bite the 
Governor in the behind and put potential appointees in a pickle. 
Philosophical  distinctions are not all that huge. It was more what were their 
backgrounds. I tried to diversify the Court in terms of background 
experience. They were all conservatives in a legal sense. We just tried to get 
someone smart and conservative.526 
Anderson says he has “no real misgivings” about the Texas procedure, 
though he concedes there’s “no perfect mechanism.”527 In that sense, he says, 
it’s akin to judicial selection, where every system has pros and cons. “Clements 
and Perry viewed judicial appointments seriously,” says Anderson, adding, 
“Their only priority was to appoint a smart, conservative judge.”528 Anderson 
has no recollection of anyone reaching out or suggesting names or lobbying 
for someone, though he says after Governor Perry began appointing substitute 
justices, “judges would approach me and volunteer to be appointed.”529 
How do Governor Perry’s substitute appointees recount the experience? 
Former Justice Jim Moseley of the Dallas-based court of appeals described 
his selection for the Wolff case this way: 
I was talking to Ken [the appointments director] about other issues, and near 
the end he said, “Occasionally, we have to appoint a temporary justice. Would 
that be something you’d be interested in?” It was just a question in the 
abstract. But Ken called months later and asked if I’d be interested in sitting 
in this case or had any conflicts. They wanted someone not from Austin or 
Houston, which as I recall is where the parties were from. The Court had 
already had argument. We met in the conference room, discussed the case, 
and reached a tentative vote. I got the strong impression the case had been 







530 Telephone Interview with Jim Moseley, former Just., Sup. Ct. Tex. (Sept. 10, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
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Justice Moseley isn’t a fan of disclosing the case to the Governor. “A better 
option,” he says, “is to just inform the Governor there’s a need for an 
appointment, and then run the choice by the chief justice for conflicts. That 
way you preserve anonymity and protect separation of powers.”531 
2. Strategic Selection—A Targeted Focus on the Issues Raised and Who 
Might Lean a Preferred Direction; “The Judicial Version of a Fantasy 
Football Draft”: Governor Greg Abbott (2015–present) 
Texas’s newest Governor has yet to appoint a substitute justice. But 
interviews with his key executive personnel make clear that Governor 
Abbott—a former Texas Supreme Court justice and attorney general—would 
approach the responsibility much differently, and more strategically, than his 
non-lawyer predecessors. 
Governors Clements, Bush, and Perry relied exclusively on their 
appointments directors when naming substitute justices. Governor Abbott, 
by contrast, would be far more engaged personally and would consult a wider 
circle of executive-team advisers (chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, general 
counsel), all top-tier lawyers who served in senior staff roles alongside him at 
the attorney general’s office. These savvy and versatile lawyers, including 
federal appellate and SCOTUS clerks, boast a sophisticated understanding 
of the judicial branch generally and the court’s docket specifically. 
When asked how Governor Abbott’s team might handle a request for a 
tiebreaking justice, his appointments director, Luis Saenz, laughed, “It would 
be the biggest pow-wow,” he said, joking, “We’re talking fantasy football draft. 
Eye black. Calisthenics. People banging their heads into lockers.”532 Saenz says 
they would examine the case to assess whose background might “fit the case.”533 
Governor Abbott’s former general counsel Jimmy Blacklock, who now 
serves as a Texas Supreme Court justice, confirms that Governor Abbott 
“would take it really seriously.”534 In fact, a lawyer from the general counsel’s 
office is assigned to every judicial vacancy and plays “a big role in the judicial 
selection process.”535 Governor Abbott and his Chief of Staff, a 15-year Abbott 
veteran and former Number Two in the Attorney General’s Office, “would 
take it as seriously as anybody could.”536 
 
531 Id. 
532 Telephone Interview with Luis Saenz, Appointments Dir., Off. of Tex. Governor Greg 
Abbott (Aug. 24, 2015) (on file with author). 
533 Id. 
534 Telephone and E-mail Correspondence with Jimmy Blacklock, supra note 467. 
535 Id. 
536 Id. 
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Now Justice Blacklock explained that the Governor’s Office would “want 
to know everything we possibly could about the case and the record,” which 
would help them select the right jurist to assist the court in making an 
expeditious, principled decision.537 Certainly “we’d ask what are the 
Governor’s interests in the outcome and in the direction the case might take 
the law. These cases have broad implications.”538 As with any gubernatorial 
decision, including permanent vacancies to be filled, the Governor’s “view of 
the case would matter.”539 Ultimately, this role was not one any Governor 
demanded, but one given to all Governors by the People. “The Texas 
Constitution is written to vest power in the governor to select a tiebreaker. 
Our Framers were comfortable with him exercising this power.”540 
Texans elect their judges, but vacancies are filled by the Governor. And 
since taking office, Governor Abbott’s team has overhauled the judicial 
nominee application in order to get a better read on applicants’ judicial 
philosophies. The then general counsel (who later succeeded this author on 
the Supreme Court of Texas) describes it as “60-70% the same as Perry, but 
it now has seven to eight pointed questions about judicial philosophy.”541 
Indeed, Governor Abbott’s hands-on approach to judicial nominations long 
predates his election as Governor. While serving on the Texas Supreme 
Court, then Justice Abbott volunteered to help vet lower-court judicial 
nominees from the Houston area for Governor Perry. 
 
537 Id. 
538 Id. 
539 Id. 
540 Id. 
541 Id. 
